tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3726083.post2849004061285046748..comments2023-10-10T09:46:13.964-04:00Comments on Tillers on Evidence and Inference: On Detecting Movements of the Mind and the Heart by Observing Events in the BrainAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03081983465036974432noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3726083.post-41285160607209090092009-06-11T13:28:48.509-04:002009-06-11T13:28:48.509-04:00A reader and I had the following exchnage:
if you...A reader and I had the following exchnage:<br /><br />if you say that (1) events f at level 1 are associated with deception and that (2) more than one pattern of events at level 2 can produce events f doesn't it necessarily derive that all these latter patterns must be associated with deception?<br />Why the observation of an association between deception and an event at a lower level should be more reliable?<br />I think I'm missing some point.<br /><br />I replied:<br /><br /><br />Reason why inference from events at level 1 may be wrong: the observation of events at level 1 was not observation of all events at level 1; events at level 1 are just a sample. Extrapolation from sample of events at level 1 may be wrong because, by happenstance, observed events at level 1 may be (A) accompanied by events at level 2 that are known to be associated with deception but (A) not accompanied by events at level 2 known (or believed) to be not associated with deception (but such level 2 events, it is known or believed, still generate the false positives at level 1).<br /><br />The question about greater reliability of lower level events -- their greater probative or inferential force -- is interesting.<br /><br />The reason for more reliability is only this: my assumption (in the argument) that physical processes at lower levels determine events at higher levels.<br /><br />The first part of my argument (the one tied to Figure 1) does not take into consideration what happens if none of the events in the brain at any level are causally connected with mental phenomena such as deception.<br /><br />My argument does assume that events at the level that has real causal force are more probative, have more inferential force.<br /><br />However, Figures 2 & 3 are meant to suggest the possibility that causality may in fact reside in various levels of material existence or in the relationships among those levels. Of course, physicists and other such scientists might wonder how this is possible -- how, for example, it could be that anything "external" could affect the outcomes of quantum processes.<br /><br />...<br /><br />Deep mysteries.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03081983465036974432noreply@blogger.com