Friday, February 27, 2009

A Constitutional Right to Offer Character Evidence?

An important dictum noted by Joannes Untalan Vinarao-Pilapil:

United States v. Williams, 458 F.3d 312, 317 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2006):

We acknowledge that there might be cases in which an application of Rule 404(b)'s prohibition against propensity evidence arguably encroaches on a defendant's right to present a full defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986) (holding that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 401 explain that rules such as Rule 404 and those that follow are meant to prohibit certain types of evidence that are otherwise clearly "relevant evidence," but that nevertheless create more prejudice and confusion than is justified by their probative value. This, however, is a sweeping and non-individualized judgment, and the drafters have provided exceptions to this general rule for certain types of crimes. See Rules 413, 414 & 415, Federal Rules of Evidence (providing that evidence of the defendant's commission of an offense of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible for any purpose). Under exceptional circumstances, therefore, it could plausibly be argued that a defendant has a constitutional right to present propensity evidence otherwise barred by Rule 404(b). See Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731- 1733, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006) (observing that "state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials" and that rules restricting the ability of a defendant to offer evidence that another person committed a crime are "widely accepted," but that evidence rules that significantly infringe upon the interest of the accused and are disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve are impermissible). But we need not reach this question here...

the dynamic evidence page

coming soon: the law of evidence on Spindle Law

1 comment:

Unknown said...

Cf. United States v. Daulton, 266 Fed. Appx. 381, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 939(6th Cir.2008 (unpublished opinion):

"Daulton argues that he should have been permitted to present evidence of non-fraudulent tax returns prepared by Daulton's Tax Service. A district court's determination of admissibility based on relevance and prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be overruled lightly. United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir. 2002). Reversal due to an exclusion of evidence under Rule 404(b) is appropriate only if this court is "firmly convinced of a mistake that affects the substantial rights and amounts to more than harmless error." Pressman v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 384 F.3d 182, 187 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

"'[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986)). '[E]vidence of noncriminal conduct to negate the inference of criminal conduct is generally irrelevant.' United States v. Dobbs, 506 F.2d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that the district court's exclusion of evidence of noncriminal conduct [**11] in the preparation of some tax returns was appropriate); see also Derango v. United States, 18 F.2d 778, 778 (6th Cir. 1927) (excluding testimony that the accused had refused to commit similar crimes to the crimes charged on other occasions). Evidence of noncriminal activities 'would only be relevant if the indictment charged the defendants with ceaseless criminal conduct.' United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011 (2d Cir. 1990).

"Daulton argues that the district court's exclusion of evidence of instances when he prepared non-fraudulent returns violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Daulton sought to introduce testimony from seven clients whose tax returns he prepared without false deductions. The district court excluded this evidence as irrelevant and immaterial to whether Daulton prepared the eighteen false returns listed in the indictment. Daulton argues that because the government was permitted to present evidence of acts outside the indictment to show a common scheme, he should be able to negate such evidence with evidence of noncriminal acts. In Dobbs, this court found noncriminal conduct irrelevant because the defendants were charged with separate instances of criminal conduct and not a scheme. 506 F.2d at 447. Similarly, Daulton was charged with separate instances of preparing fraudulent tax returns. The government did not contend that the defendant always engaged in criminal activity when preparing tax returns, but rather that the defendant had a method for maximizing refunds by including deductions for expenses that were not incurred. Therefore, the proffered evidence of instances when Daulton prepared truthful returns is irrelevant to the charged instances."

But Daulton also argued that the government thad tried the case "like a conspiracy." Responding to this argument, the cour said that Daulton's argument presented a close question but held that the exclusion of the evidence offered by Daulton was harmless error.