Law, Probability and Risk

EDITOR'S CHOICE

The following articles have been selected by the editor are available FREE online. Click on the article titles below to read them.

Discussion paper: The structure and the logic of proof in trials 
Peter Tillers 
Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2011 

Irreversibility 
Cass R. Sunstein 
Volume 9 Issue 3-4 September-December 2010

What ‘Strengthening Forensic Science’ today means for tomorrow: DNA exceptionalism and the 2009 NAS Report 
Prof. E. Murphy 
Volume 9, Number 1, April 2010 

Height measurements in images: how to deal with measurement uncertainty correlated to actual height 
Gerda Edelman and Ivo Alberink 
Volume 9, Number 2, June 2010 

Is the civil ‘higher standard of proof ’ a coherent concept? 
Ennis McBride 
Volume 8, Number 4, December 2009

Painting the target around the matching profile: the Texas sharpshooter fallacy in forensic DNA interpretation 
William C. Thompson 
Volume 8, Number 3, September 2009

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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Proportionality and Quantitative Justice

• SPECIAL ISSUE: Proportionality and Quantitative Justice

Volume 10 Issue 3 September 2011

Articles

• • Rainhard Bengez, 
  • Scott Brewer, 
  • Giovanni Sartor, 
  • and Vern Walker

  Proportionality and quantitative justice. An introduction to the special issue

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 161-165 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr014
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  • Peter Tillers

  Trial by mathematics—reconsidered

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 167-173 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr011
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  • Scott Brewer

  Logocratic method and the analysis of arguments in evidence

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 175-202 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr013
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  • Douglas Walton

  Teleological argumentation to and from motives

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 203-223 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr012
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  • Joseph L. Gastwirth, 
  • Efstathia Bura, 
  • and Weiwen Miao

  Some important statistical issues courts should consider in their assessment of statistical analyses submitted in class certification motions: implications for Dukes v. Wal-mart

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 225-263 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr009
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  • Daniela Tiscornia, 
  • Tommaso Agnoloni, 
  • and Maria-Teresa Sagri

  Balancing rights and values in the Italian Courts: a statistical and conceptual analysis

  Law, Probability and Risk (2011) 10(3): 265-275 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgr010
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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Fact Investigation & Dynamic Inference

Inference is dynamic: It changes over time; it exists in a changing environment (the world is constantly changing, the actors who draw inferences change); inference suffers the slings and arrows of changing preferences, emotions, desires, passions, etc.; inference changes when subjective judgments change and when generalizations or beliefs about the world change; it often changes when the evidence changes, which evidence always does (to some degree); inference changes when standards of judgment (e.g., burdens of persuasion, or what decision theorists call "decision rules") change; and inference changes for yet other reasons I can't think of at the moment.

Fact investigation is also hard in part because, as someone, said, "Predictions are hard, particularly about the future." An investigator, who always suffers from some ignorance, must make decisions about what to investigate and what lines of investigation are worth pursuing. Such prophecies about future evidentiary rewards are intrinsically hard to make -- given the investigator's ignorance of the evidence that will ultimately be found (or not found). Cf. "value of information" theory.

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The dynamic evidence page