Sunday, June 12, 2011

To Save the Memory of James H. Chadbourn

Since the Wikipedia entry for James H. Chadbourn is in danger of being deleted or radically pruned, I will reproduce that entry here:

James Harmon Chadbourn (born Spartanburg, South Carolina, 1905; died, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982) was an American legal scholar and an expert in civil procedure, Federal jurisdiction and evidence.[1][2] 

He was a Fessenden Professor of law at Harvard University from 1963 until his retirement in 1974.[2]

Education

 

Chadbourn received a B.A. from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina in 1926.
He received an LL.B. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law in 1931.

Employment

 

Assistant Professor & ---, University of North Carolina School of Law, 19-- - 19--
Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1940-1950
Professor, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, 1950-1963
Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, 1961-1963
Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 1963-1974

Career

 

Chadbourn wrote about (and against) lynching when and where it took courage to do so. See James Chadbourn, Lynching and the Law (1933), reprinted in 2008 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.; James Chadbourn, "Lynching and the Law," 20 American Bar Association Journal 71 (1934); Note (by James Chadbourn), "Plan for Survey of Lynching and the Judicial Process," 9 North Carolina Law Review 330 (1931). See also the blog post Tillers on Evidence and Inference (December 31, 2008), http://tillerstillers.blogspot.com/2008/12/james-h-chadbourn-lynching-and-law-1933.html

Chadbourn was a master teacher and an expert in several fields, particularly civil procedure and the law of evidence. He authored or co-authored numerous casebooks and articles in these fields.

Chadbourn's approach to his fields was—to put it mildly—historical. This was most apparent in his approach to the teaching of civil procedure. There have been three major phases of civil procedure in America: common law procedure, the nineteenth century Field Codes, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Chadbourn devoted a lot of time to common law procedure, a considerable amount of time to the code system of pleading and procedure, and only a little bit of time to the twentieth century Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He had an "utterly mad" interest (so said his Harvard colleague John Dawson) in the common law forms of action. He delighted in constructing elaborate hypotheticals that illustrated how the vindication of seemingly valid claims could be frustrated at every conceivable turn by the intricate rules governing the common law forms of action.

One of Chadbourn's major accomplishments (not widely known by today's forgetful legal professoriate) was writing a series of preliminary studies http://www.clrc.ca.gov/Mreports-bkstudies.html for the California Law Revision Commission in the early 1960s on the then-pending proposal to codify California's law of evidence. Chadbourn can fairly be called the father of the California Evidence Code. This Code was one of the earliest codifications of American evidence law. It had a substantial influence on the codification of the federal law of evidence roughly a decade later.

Chabourn's most monumental accomplishment was the revision of almost all of the volumes of John Henry Wigmore's classic and mammoth multi-volume treatise on the American law of evidence, a treatise that is widely regarded as the greatest English-language legal treatise ever written. (Chadbourn managed to do much of this arduous work while fighting cancer.) Chadbourn was proud that readers found it hard to distinguish his additions to the treatise from Wigmore's original work.

Family, Personal, Extracurricular

 


Personal, Anecdotes:

Chadbourn liked to cook. He generally left work each day at 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. to go home and cook supper. (He was an excellent cook.)

Chadbourn liked to fish. On one occasion he went to New Hampshire on a fishing trip with a research assistant. Chadbourn rarely spoke about personal matters to other people. However, during this fishing trip he and his research assistant took a rowboat out to the middle of a small lake and there, while fishing, Chadbourn asked his assistant, "How can we keep doing this stuff?" Chabourn was referring to studying and writing about the law of evidence. There was a deep strain of skepticism in Chadbourn. (The befuddled research assistant, who did not know how to fish, did not answer the possibly-rhetorical question.)


Peter Tillers recounts at http://tillerstillers.blogspot.com/2010/08/be-nice-on-your-way-up-but-kick-them.html:

I did research for James H. Chadbourn for a number of years while he taught at Harvard Law School. ... Chadbourn hated deans -- without exception. I still recall one day when a person, an administrator, dropped by his office at Harvard... (I was sitting behind a small desk doing research -- the old-fashioned way, by reading cases in "hard copy" form.) Chadbourn had been friendly with this administrator. She told him she had been named an assistant dean. From then on, Chadbourn was hostile to her. I don't know what lay at the root of Chadbourn's contempt for deans. Part of the reason may have been philosophical and temperamental: he was a curmudgeon -- a gentle curmudgeon -- and a skeptic, and he was generally distrustful of authority. Another part of the reason may have been his experiences with authority while he taught at UCLA: the story has it that he fought bitterly against a McCarthyite attempt to purge two junior faculty members who were accused of being Communist sympathizers. ...
...
... Toward the end of his life, Chadbourn's enmity toward deans abated a little. Initially Chadbourn did not like Dean Albert Sacks of Harvard Law School, particularly because Sacks (possibly on behalf of a law school committee) once chastised Chadbourn after Chadbourn ordered a rude grade-grubbing law student to leave his office. Chadbourn eventually got cancer. Sacks apparently visited Chadbourn often while Chabourn was ill. For this Chadbourn was grateful. To his great credit, Sacks wrote a touching tribute to Chadbourn, 96 Harvard Law Review 361 (1982). He wrote:

I came to know Jim well during the past decade -- the period when I was Dean. Clearly, he had established a very special relationship with his students. Year after year, one heard from excited, happy students of his colorful way of teaching, which combined meticulous care for content and pedagogy with a vivid style laced with humor and wit. ... Obviously, he had achieved a genuine mastery of his subjects and his craft. These accomplishments, impressive as they are, disclosed only one part of the man. Aside from what he revealed of himself in the classroom (and visitors were discouraged), Jim Chadbourn was essentially a private person. Instinctively modest, he preferred to speak little of achievements and undertakings. Sentimental or other emotive feelings were masked, if not buried, by the use of irony, recourse to wit, or a not very convincing display of grumbling. But he and I dealt with each other at a time when he confronted limitations of age and serious illness. I too had recently confronted a difficult illness, and so we were able to achieve a perhaps unusual openness. Jim Chadbourn revealed a clear-eyed sense of his vulnerability, a reluctantly exercised capacity to accept whatever limitations he had to face, accompanied by an unshakeable determination to achieve the goals dictated by his work. Notwithstanding his success as a teacher and the satisfaction it gave him, he chose to retire early in order to devote his time to Wigmore's treatise. His cancer required treatments that were temporarily debilitating. After each treatment, he would bide his time and then go back to work. What emerged for me was a picture of something more than the great professor and the master craftsman. Here was an indomitable spirit, quietly expressing itself in a cause that could have only one final outcome. Of course he was now limited and vulnerable -- aren't we all, ultimately? Still, he not only completed the work he had set for himself, but he also continued to appreciate the people and experiences around him for which he could still find time. Indeed, I sensed at times that in this period of trial and hardship he felt a special satisfaction, which he characteristically masked. His friends offered support and encouragement, but we were of little help. What help he received came from within and from one other person -- his remarkable wife, Erika, for whom this time was also one of great trial and, in the deepest sense, of triumph as well. I was not at all surprised that Jim's students left his classes with the sense that they had learned the subject and, beyond that, had been touched by a man of memorable character. And it was natural for him to tell his first-year classes, during their last hour together, that the students should become not only good lawyers -- that would not be hard for them -- but also good people. His contribution to us all -- his students, colleagues, family, and friends -- was the example he set of quiet professional excellence, of courage and determination in confronting adversity, and of an understanding and appreciation of life that were genuine and deep though not seen on the sleeve. This is the measure of our loss. This is also the measure of our gain.
Peter Tillers reports that he heard from Chadbourn's family or friends, not only that Chadbourn came to detest the dean that he initially served under at UCLA, but also that Chadbourn, after declining to become one of the law school's founding faculty members, agreed to join the law school in 1950. Chadbourn, who had been teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, thought he would become one of the senior faculty members at UCLA. But on arriving at UCLA, he discovered, to his horror, that Roscoe Pound had become a faculty member at UCLA's new law school. Chadbourn - for some reason - detested Roscoe Pound.

It turned out that Chadbourn had ample reason to detest both Roscoe Pound and the first dean of UCLA Law School, L. Dale Coffman. The wave of the post-World War II anti-communist fervor had reached California by 1050. The board of regents of the University of California resolved that all faculty members had to take loyalty oaths. Dean Coffman and Roscoe Pound agreed that law faculty members should also be required to do so.[3]

Chadbourn was renowned for his dry wit. In a civil procedure class at Harvard Law School Chadbourn was discussing the common law action of trespass. In the course of doing this, he mentioned the common law maxim that the possessory rights of an owner of a fee simple absolute extend from heaven to hell. ("It is one of the oldest rules of property known to the law that the title of the owner of the soil extends, not only downward to the center of the earth, but upward usque ad coelum." Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457 (1902).) A student raised his hand and earnestly asked (roughly), "But Professor Chadbourn, planes fly over land all the time. How high do the rights of a property owner extend?" Chadbourn paused, furrowed his eyebrows, looked down at his notes, and then said, "Real high."


Publications

 

Books, treatises, casebooks & reports:

Chadbourn revised seven volumes (turning them into eight) of the third edition of the classic treatise John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (3d ed. 1940).
J. Chabourn, Lynching and the Law (1933), reprinted in 2008 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd; T. Atkinson & J. Chadbourn, Cases and Other Materials on Civil Procedure (1948); T. Atkinson & J. Chadbourn, Introduction to Civil Procedure (1948); J. Chadbourn, L. Levin & P. Shuchman, Cases and Materials on Civil Procedure (2d ed. 1974) (original edition published by Chadbourn and Levin in 1961); R. Magill & J. Chadbourn, Cases and Civil Procedure Preface (3d ed. 1939); J. Chadbourn & L. Levin, Procedure Portfolio: Pleadings, Process and Appeal Papers in Facsimile (1962); J. Chadbourn, H. Grossman & A. Van Alstyne, California Pleading -- Civil Actions (1961); J. Chadbourn, A. Van Alstyne & H. Grossman, California Discovery Practice (1972); C. McCormick, J. Chadbourn & C. Wright, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts (6th ed. 1976) (federal courts casebook first published by McCormick and Chadbourn in 1946); 6 California Law Revision Commission Reports 39-45, 58-74, 133-69, 307-09, 328-416, 439-80, 509-25, 627-79, 727-71, 831-60, 925-50, 1049-107 (1964).

Law review articles:

J. Chadbourn, "Lynching and the Law," 20 A.B.A. J. 71 (1934); Note (by Chadbourn), "Plan for Survey of Lynching and the Judicial Process," 9 North Carolina Law Review 330 (1931); Chadbourn, "A Summary Judgment Procedure for North Carolina," 14 North Carolina Law Review 211 (1936); Chadbourn, "Trial by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment," 92 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 92 (1943); Chadbourn, Book Review, 41 Iowa Law Review 719 (1956); Chadbourn, Book Review, 33 Texas Law Review 151 (1954); Chadbourn, Book Review, 87 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633 (1939); James Chadbourn & Leo Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1942; James Chadbourn, Book Review, 29 Tulane Law Review 608 (1955); James Chadbourn, Book Review, 98 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 455 (1950); Chadbourn, "The Activities of the North Carolina Bar Association in Stimulating Legislation," 8 North Carolina Law Review 101 (1929); Chadbourn, "High Ethical Standards and Professional Ideals -- The Problem of Inculcation at the Student Level: Teaching Legal Ethics in Law School," BRIEF, Fall 1955, at 17; Comment (by Chadbourn), "Taxation -- Patents and Copyrights as Immune Federal Instrumentalities," 9 North Carolina Law Review 475 (1931), reprinted in 14 Journal of the Patent Office Society 421 (1932); Comment (by Chadbourn), "Evidence -- Impeaching Witness by Showing Religious Belief," 9 North Carolina Law Review 77 9 (1930); Comment (by Chadbourn), "Quasi-Contracts -- Liability of Municipality for Benefits Conferred Under Illegal Contract," 8 North Carolina Law Review (1930); Comment (by Chadbourn), "Public Utilities -- Distinction Between License and Franchise -- Cotton Ginning as a Business Affected with a Public Interest," 8 North Carolina Law Review 87 (1929); Comment (by Chadbourn), "Criminal Law -- Self-Defense -- Duty to Retreat -- Reasonableness of Appearance of Necessity," 7 North Carolina Law Review 460 (1929); Chadbourn, Book Review, 8 North Carolina Law Review 228 (1930); Chadbourn, "Bentham and the Hearsay Rule -- A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 75 Harvard Law Review 932 (1962); Chadbourn, "History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A Proposal for Liberalization,' 4 UCLA Law Review 175 (1957); Chadbourn, "The 'Uniform Rules' and the California Law of Evidence," 2 UCLA Law Review 1 (1954); Chadbourn, Book Review, 43 California Law Review 365 (1955); Chadbourn, Book Review, 29 California State Bar Journal 501 (1954); Chadbourn, Book Review, 98 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 610 (1950); Chadbourn, Book Review, 89 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 256 (1940); Chadbourn, Book Review, 10 Tulane Law Review 480 (1936); Chadbourn, Book Review, 30 Illinois Law Review 128 (1935).


References

 

  1. ^ JAMES H. CHADBOURN obituary, New York Times, October 1, 1982. Accessed June 9, 2011
  2. ^ a b James Chadbourn, Retried Professor, Dies of Cancer, Harvard Crimson, September 30, 1982. Accessed June 9, 2011
  3. ^ Renee Y. Rastorfer, "THOMAS S. DABAGH AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS OF THE UCLA LAW LIBRARY: A CAUTIONARY TALE," 95 Law Library Journal 347, 357 (2003) ("[T[he dean of the law school, L. Dale Coffman, became a vocal supporter of the loyalty oath. In later years, he recalled that Regent Edward Dickson was unhappy about the controversy embroiling the system. 'Indeed so. As a matter of fact, that's why he came to me to see if [Roscoe] Pound and I and other members of the faculty would make public statements in that regard. I did to the Examiner. Pound did, too .... I stated publicly that I'm not a communist, I never have been, I never expect to be, and I don't see where in it interferes with my academic freedom to say so.') See generally, N.E.H. Hull, Chapter 6 ("Pound Moves to the Right and Llewellyn Applies Himself") in Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: searching for an American jurisprudence (Chicago, 1997).







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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Save the Memory of James H. Chadbourn (in Wikipedia)!

Some whippersnapper has proposed that the Wikipedia entry for Professor Chadbourn be deleted. If you wish to save the entry, promptly go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_H._Chadbourn by midnight tonight (U.S. eastern daylight time? central time? etc.?) and register your vote or opinion!

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I may have to abandon my faith in "democratic" encyclopedias. Do not let the rabble rule (scholarship and history)!?

Fans of Evidence Do Not (always) Bowl Alone




No bowling alone at Wasserman's Evidence!



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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post
.

Proclamation

I hereby proclaim that the workshop on AI & Evidential Inference in Pittsburgh was a success. Kudos to the panelists.

The workshop papers will be published in Law, Probability and Risk. The images found below, however, will not be published there.

Left to right: Boaz Sangero, Michael Risinger, Michael Pardo, David Hamer, Thorne McCarty, and Giovanni Sartor

Left to right: Michael Pardo, David Hamer & Federico Picinali


Clockwise from foreground: Boaz Sangero, Jim Franklin, Ron Allen, Michael Risinger, Michael Pardo & David Hamer





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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Monday, June 06, 2011

Will fingerprint evidence become the new DNA?

Perhaps new technology (nanotechnology) will dramatically improve the ability to retrieve fingerprints from difficult surfaces and also to retrieve them even when fingerprint impressions were left years or decades ago. See Nanotechnology is key to recovering usable fingerprints from old evidence
.


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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Monday, May 30, 2011

Restyled Federal Rules of Evidence Approved by the Supreme Court







On April 26, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the restyled Federal Rules of Evidence and transmitted them to Congress. If Congress takes no action, the Rules will go into effect on December 1, 2011.  

28 U.S.C. Section 2074. Rules of procedure and evidence; submission to Congress; effective date 
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies. 
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.




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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Saturday, May 28, 2011

The Logic of Fact Investigation versus the Logic of Factual Proof?

In philosophical discourse there is some talk about the difference (or the supposed difference) between the "logic of discovery" and the "logic of justification." Is there a parallel or analogous difference between the discovery of facts and the proof of facts in legal settings? Does one type of logic govern the investigation of factual questions and another type of logic govern the proof of factual hypotheses in legal settings such as trials?

I think the answer is both yes and no: Although the forms of mental structuring that play a role in settings such as the process of proof at trial also influence fact investigation that is conducted with an eye to the possibility of a legal event such as a trial -- for example, substantive legal rules influence pretrial investigation as well as proof at trial, and investigators as well as trial lawyers sometimes have to think about the credibility of witnesses --, some forms of mental structuring (or evidence marshaling) tend to be more prominent in later phases of proof (broadly understood) than in earlier phases of proof. This is the way that I formulated this thesis in the most recent iteration of the syllabus for my course Fact Investigation I:
Fact Investigation II, offered in the spring semester, is a continuation of Fact Investigation I, which is given in the fall semester. In the spring semester, teams of students attempt to bring to a conclusion one or more of the investigations they began the previous semester. Although the fall semester course and the spring semester course have some of the same objectives and themes, the spring semester course differs in important ways from its predecessor. In the spring semester there is more emphasis on sources of evidence beyond databases and public records; for example, there is a greater emphasis on witness interviews. More generally, in the spring semester there is less emphasis on exploratory investigation and there is more emphasis on bringing an investigation to a successful conclusion. For this reason, in the spring semester substantially more attention is devoted to the relationship between the steps taken during investigation and matters such as (a) the legal requirements governing the admissibility of evidence in settings such as trials; (b) the extent and the range of the evidence bearing on legally-material factual issues and hypotheses; (c) assessment of the probative value of evidence and the credibility of witnesses; and (d) the persuasiveness of the evidence that may be submitted to a trier of fact or audience such as a judge, a jury, a legislative committee, a corporate executive, or the public.
See The General Nature, Purposes & Scope of the Course in Fact Investigation




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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Friday, May 27, 2011

What Is a Polygraph?

It isn't what you probably think it is.

Thomas Jefferson -- yes, that Thomas Jefferson -- used a polygraph. If you don't believe me, go here.




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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

A Weathered but Still-Tasty ... but also Misshapen? -- Morsel by Judge Posner

Judge Richard Posner once said, "As one of our finest academic public intellectuals, Jean Bethke Elshtain, has put it, 'The problem with being a public intellectual is you get more and more public and less and less intellectual.'" Diary, Entry 5 Slate (Jan. 18, 2002) (see bottom of page).

But there is a slight (trivial?) problem with Judge Posner's logic. In the passage quoted above Posner endorses the proposition that there is an inverse relationship between the degree to which one is a public intellectual and the the degree to which one is an intellectual. But two sentences before the one I quoted above, Posner states that in his book Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline he studied the relationship between "media prominence" and "academic prominence" (emphasis mine). Perhaps Posner should have explicitly said that in his mind the degree to which an academic is "intellectual" is the degree to which the academic is seen to be intellectual by his or her academic colleagues. (Of course, if he had done that, the bon mot -- or whatever we might wish to call it -- would have lost its charm and its bite.)

So the question arises: Can we validly say of an academic that he or she is "intellectual" even if the academic in question garners little praise, admiration, or attention from his or her colleagues?
I wonder how Judge Posner grades the performance of the students in his unorthodox but interesting Evidence course? Does he consult the opinions of academics or the opinions of the students' colleagues before he awards a student a grade? And if he does that, do they in turn ask Posner what he thinks? (Do you detect a vicious circle here? [But the paradox is solved if we have an academic pope -- such as Judge Posner.])
Perhaps Judge Posner proves once again that people tend to prefer the measures of merit - the "merit metrics" - that make them look best.






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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Spindle Law Interview: Erwin Chemerinsky

Spindle Law interview of Erwin Chemerinsky.

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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Death Penalty in China

The BBC reports that the People's Supreme Court of the PRC has taken a further step toward reducing the frequency of the death penalty:
China has introduced a number of measures over recent years to cut down the number of executions.
This latest development appeared in the annual report of the supreme court.
"Suspend the death sentence for two years for all cases that don't require immediate execution," read the report.
The court does not say why some cases might need to be carried out immediately, although in the past the government has instructed judges to be more severe in cases that involved crimes it was targeting.
Those benefiting from the changes will probably never be executed.
Criminals given a suspended death penalty usually have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment.
China does not reveal the number of executions it carries out each year, but it is thought to kill more people than any other country.
Four years ago the Supreme People's Court took back the right to review every death sentence handed out by lower courts.
The result has been fewer executions.
Earlier this year China reduced the number of crimes that carry the death penalty by 13 to 55.


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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

The "Clergy Sex Abuse Scandal" in Context: The May 2011 John Jay Report

From the very first day I began this blog -- August 25, 2002 -- I have posted -- intermittently -- about the "clergy sex abuse scandal," which has often been used as a synonym for the Roman Catholic clergy sex abuse scandal. Along the way I raised various questions about the scandal. I wondered, for example, why the Boston Globe, which won a Pulitzer Prize for its reporting, was interested only in sex abuse by members of the Catholic clergy. I was disturbed by the use of questionable evidence -- such as repressed memory -- in many of the legal actions brought against alleged offenders. I wondered whether sex abuse was more prevalent among the Catholic clergy than in, say, families or schools. I worried that the financial interests of potential plaintiffs and their lawyers were leading to distortions of evidence. I worried that the zealotry of victims' groups and their lawyers were leading to worrisome shifts in the balance between the interests and rights of victims and the interests and rights of civil and criminal defendants.

All of the questions I raised depended to some degree on empirical propositions. Now a report has been released that may shed light on many of those questions of fact: John Jay College Research Team, The Causes and Context of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests in the United States, 1950-2010: A Report Presented to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (First Printing, May, 2011).

Although impressive steps were taken to preserve the independence of the John Jay investigators (Karen J. Terry, Principal Investigator; Margaret Leland Smith, Data Analyst; Katarina Schuth, O.S.F., Consultant; James R. Kelly, Consultant; Brenda Vollman, Research Associate; and Christina Massey, Research Associate), the report will almost certainly not satisfy many constituencies, including groups that have a stake in advancing legal claims against Catholic organizations in America. Nonetheless, I do hope -- perhaps in vain -- that the report will lead to more balanced reporting in the mass media and that some attacks -- for example, on the celibacy rule -- will now be seen for what they probably are, attacks based on little more than prejudice and anti-Catholic animus.




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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Sunday, May 15, 2011

A Problem of Criminal Procedure -- and American Liberty

I am watching a C-Span program "2011 Virginia Festival of the Book." Bruce Fein, author of American Empire Before the Fall, is one of the speakers. The discussion put me in mind of a problem I posed to the students in my seminar Constitutional Criminal Procedure:


April 13, 2011
Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Discussion Problem



On July 1, 2010, Officer Marlene Davis of the Sexual Crimes Unit of the City of Ames Police Department, State of Blackacre, visits the Heavenly Day Care Center in Ames. There she gives a talk to the children at Heavenly to warn them not to let grownups touch their genitals and to tell their parents if anyone does. Immediately after the talk, Amy Johnson, a five-year-old girl at Heavenly, rushes up to Officer Davis and whispers in her ear, “A big man at school played with my wee-wee today.'' Officer Davis replies, “Who did that, Amy?” However, Amy starts crying hysterically and refuses to say anything more. Officer Davis establishes that four men work at the Heavenly Day Care Center. Officer Davis immediately interviews all four men in Heavenly's cafeteria. Three of those men deny any wrongdoing. However, the fourth man, Adolf Carter, responds by saying, “I don't have to talk to you and I'm not going to,” and then walks away. Officer Davis, however, follows Carter, takes him into custody, and drives him in her patrol car to the offices of the Sexual Crimes Unit. There another police officer, Officer Walton Wanton, a male officer, straps Carter into a chair and subjects him to a penile plethysmograph test, which is is a procedure that involves placing a pressure-sensitive device around a man's penis, presenting him with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses. Officer Wanton reports to Officer Davis that Adolf Carter exhibited an extraordinarily high level of sexual arousal on being shown images of young nude female children. Officer Davis informs Adolf Carter, who is still strapped in the chair, “I'm afraid you flunked the test, Mr. Carter.” Carter responds, “OK. So I touched the kid. So what? That's not a crime.” Adolf Carter is indicted for sexual abuse of a minor. At Carter's trial the prosecutor offers in evidence Carter's statement “OK. So I touched the kid. So what? That's not a crime.” Carter's counsel states, “I object, your Honor. The evidence is barred by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment and by the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause. Moreover, the forcible use of that test was a gross imposition on Mr. Carter's constitutionally-protected liberty and privacy.”


Please evaluate the admissibility of Carter's statement under the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause, under the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, and under any other federal constitutional principles we have discussed in this seminar.



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Does the procedure described above strike you as nothing more than the product of the fevered imagination of a pointy-headed academic? If so, consider


United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2008):
As we explained in detail in United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2006), penile plethysmograph testing involves placing a device on a man's penis to "measure[ ] its circumference and thus the level of the subject's arousal as he is shown sexually explicit slides or listens to sexually explicit audio scenes," id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plethysmograph testing has become a fairly common component of sex offender treatment programs. Id.

United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2006):



Plethysmograph testing is a procedure that "involves placing a pressuresensitive device around a man's penis, presenting him with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses." Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and Perversity: The Use of Penile Plethysmography on Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). Although one would expect to find a description of such a procedure gracing the pages of a George Orwell novel rather than the Federal Reporter, plethysmograph testing[1]has become routine in the treatment of sexual offenders and is often imposed as a condition of supervised release.


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We don't subject the entire American adult male population to the penile plethysmograph test. But we do plan to subject all air travelers to a device -- a full-body backscatter x-ray unit -- that exposes travelers' genitals to the operator of the device. There are said to be plans to use the device on some subway lines and perhaps elsewhere.



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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Schedule of Events at Workshop on AI & Evidential Inference, June 10, 2011


One-Day Workshop on AI & Evidential Inference
(in memory of Craig Callen)
in Conjunction with
ICAIL 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 10, 2011


 


Schedule of Workshop Talks & Events, Friday, June 10, 2011

8:50 – 9:00
Giovanni Sartor & Peter Tillers
Welcome, greetings
9:00 – 9:30
James Franklin
How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review
9:30 – 10:00
D. Michael Risinger
Against Symbolization—Some reflections on the limits of formal systems in the description of inferential reasoning and legal argumentation
10:00 – 10:30
Federico Picinali
Structuring inferential reasoning in criminal cases. An analogical approach
10:30 – 11:00
Coffee
Coffee
11:00 – 11:30
Michael Pardo
Relevance, Sufficiency, and Defeasible Inferences: Comments on Modeling Legal Proof
11:30 – 12:00
David Hamer
A probabilistic model of the relationship between the quantity (weight) of evidence, and its strength
12:00 – 12:30
Joseph Laronge
Evaluating Universal Sufficiency of a Single Logical Form for Inference in Court
12:30 – 1:00
Rainhard Bengez
On the Computable Structure of the Logocratic Method and Analyses Specific to Evidence Law
1:00 – 2:00
Lunch
Lunch
2:00 – 2:30
Bruce Hay
Roughly Two Conceptions of the Trial
2:20 – 3:00
Ronald J. Allen
Taming Complexity: Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the Legal System
3:00 – 3:30
Scott Brewer
Representing Legal Arguments: The Centrality of Abduction
3:30 – 4:00
Coffee
Coffee
4:00 – 4:30
Douglas Walton & Floris Bex
Combining Evidential and Legal Reasoning with Burdens and Standards of Proof
4:30 – 5:00
Bart Verheij
Can the argumentative, narrative and statistical perspectives on legal evidence and proof be integrated?
5:00 – 5:30
Henry Prakken
Can non-probabilistic models of legal evidential inference learn from probability theory?
5:30 – 6:00
Giovanni Sartor & Giuseppe Contissa
Evidence arguments in air traffic safety. A model for the law?
6:00 – 6:30
Boaz Sangero
Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for Key Evidence

Monday, May 09, 2011

Not an Arcane Issue?: The Modularity or Non-Modularity of the Brain (Mind)

In a recent book review in the London Review of Books the witty and irreverent Rutgers philosopher Jerry Fodor again attacks the thesis of the "massive modularity" of the mind. See Fodor, "Massively Modular Minds," 33 LRB No. 9 (April 28, 2011). This controversy may seem arcane -- and it is -- but the question of whether the mind amounts to nothing more than a clump of distinct adaptive parts -- parts produced only by Darwinian natural selection -- has a bearing on the question of the extent to which explicit rational deliberation -- or what passes for rational deliberation -- can influence the inferences that human beings ought to draw from evidence. Cf. the blog post:
Do You Believe in Sociobiology and the Law? - Chapter II (October 21, 2007)
See also the brief discussion associated with Figure 3 of the following blog post:

Friday, October 16, 2009


Brain Science: A Meditation on Mechanical Lie Detection

Drawing Inferences about "Deception" from Observed Events in the Brain:
Of fMRI and Similar Purported Tools for Observing or Inferring States of the Human Mind and Heart




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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

A Two-Part Course in Fact Investigation: Tentative Descriptions



Fact Investigation I  (Fall 2011)
Professor: Tillers/Segal
Credits: 3 (2 academic, 1 clinical) 
Pre/Corequisite: None

Effective pretrial investigation requires not only imagination, but also careful marshaling of evidence and careful organization of thinking about evidence. It frequently requires the application of a variety of distinct marshaling and analytical methods such as the development of time lines, the formation of scenarios, orderly assessment of the credibility of testimonial evidence, and the marshaling of evidence on the basis of legal rules and their elements. Students in the course are introduced to a toolkit of evidence marshaling strategies for investigation. Students also become familiar with important databases and public records. Students work in teams and conduct actual investigations of real-world problems. Consult the following web site for a more detailed description of the course: http://tillers.net/fi-course/fi-home.html. 

Fact Investigation II  (Spring 2012)
Professor: Tillers/Segal
Credits: 2
Pre/Corequisite: Fact Investigation I

This course is a continuation of Fact Investigation I. In this course, teams of students carry forward and bring to a conclusion one or more of the investigations launched by the members of the previous semester's course in fact investigation. Although this course and the previous semester's course in fact investigation have some common objectives and themes, this course differs in important ways from its predecessor. In this course, there is a greater emphasis on sources of evidence apart from databases and public records; for example, there is a greater emphasis on witness interviews. More generally, this semester there is less emphasis on exploratory investigation and more emphasis on bringing an investigation to a successful conclusion. For this reason, close attention is given to the relationship between (i) decisions and steps during investigation and (ii) matters such as (a) the legal requirements governing the admissibility of evidence in settings such as trials and (b) the persuasiveness of evidence submitted to a trier of fact or audience such as a judge, a jury, a legislative committee, a corporate executive, or the public.

Saturday, May 07, 2011

A New Phase in the Teaching of Fact Investigation - or An Old Dog Can Teach New Investigation Tricks

My course in fact investigation now moves into a different phase. This course, which I teach with Phil Segal, becomes a two-semester course next year. This is important because (i) more time can now be devoted to theory (in the first semester) and (ii) more time can be devoted (in the second semester) to gathering and packaging evidence so that (a) it will meet the legal requirements for admissibility in a forum such as a trial and (ii) it will be intelligible and as persuasive as possible to a trier of fact such as a judge or a jury.

As before, students in the course will conduct investigations of real-world matters. (There are no simulated investigation problems in our course.) However, some of the investigations in the second semester will lead to the preparation of public reports, reports that will be released to the public.

The topic of fact investigation is crucial for both philosophy and law. As every trial lawyer knows (or should know), fact investigation is crucial for successful litigation and advocacy. Furthermore, the study of fact investigation inevitably raises the question of how human beings manage to acquire knowledge about the world. In short, few topics are more fundamental than fact investigation!


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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Monday, May 02, 2011

The Meaning(s) of "Exoneration"

The Innocence Projects do God's work -- but I have long thought that the Projects use the word "exoneration" much too loosely and thereby frequently claim far more than the evidence shows. Cf., e.g., parts of my blog posts

Saturday, November 12, 2005

When Chances Collide; DNA & "Exoneration"; Suggestibility & Gullibility at http://tillerstillers.blogspot.com/2005/11/when-chances-collide-dna.html


and

Tuesday, August 27, 2002


DNA in the News: Imperfect Evidence and Imperfect Justice, at http://tillerstillers.blogspot.com/2002/08/dna-in-news-imperfect-evidence-and.htm
A new article by Keith A. Findley apparently makes an analogous point. But Findley draws a starkly different moral than I do: He thinks the Innocence Projects define "exoneration" and "innocence" too narrowly rather than too broadly.

  • I think that some guilty people are wrongly convicted and that when we think that a wrongful conviction of a probably guilty person has been properly set aside, we should not refer to such an event as an "exoneration." We should call a spade a spade. We should say, simply, that the conviction was properly set aside, and we should not pretend (unless we have reason to think that such is the case) that an innocent person has been exonerated.
  • Under many circumstances, of course, the wrongful action (or inaction) of some public official makes it difficult or impossible to make a reasonable judgment about the guilt or innocence of some person. When that is the case, that is what we should say is the case.