Saturday, September 29, 2012

Accident or Non-Accident? A Dummy May Tell

Two (former) wives of a philandering pastor died "accidentally." The second wife died in 2008 in an automobile crash that may or may not have been an accident.

The first wife was found dead in 1999 at bottom of the basement steps in her home. At the time the coroner did not decide whether this second death was an accident or a homicide.

After the pastor -- Schirmer -- was charged with the murder of his second wife -- the prosecutors claim that Mr. Schirmer staged the 2008 automobile "accident" --, prosecutors in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, re-examined the death of the first wife, Jewel Schirmer.  Jewel's "body [had been found] in a pool of blood at the bottom of the basement steps" and "she had suffered a fractured skull as well as injuries to her face, body, arms and legs."
[Government?] [i]nvestigators hired a biomechanical engineering firm to recreate Jewel Schirmer’s supposed fall down the stairs. The firm used a test dummy fitted with various instruments to collect data on the forces to which her tumbling body would have been subjected.
"We found the ’crash dummy’ evidence to be particularly compelling, as it indicated to us that Jewel could not have suffered all of her injuries by accidentally falling down a flight of stairs," the grand jury wrote.
The grand jury cited medical testimony that revealed Schirmer likely used blunt objects to kill both his wives.
"We find it particularly disturbing and difficult to believe that both of A.B. Schirmer’s wives could have suffered such horrific injuries by accident. To the contrary, we believe probable cause exists to believe that neither woman died from an accident," the report said.
Source: Authorities: Retired pastor killed both wives, Boston Herald (A.P. story; Sept. 29, 2012)
 
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Tuesday, September 25, 2012

The Popularity of the Problem of Drawing Inferences about a Tree


What you make of the fact that one of my most popular posts ever is my post Drawing Inferences about a Tree (August 8, 2010)?


Scott Brewer's Tree

One thing seems reasonably apparent: Readers are more interested in inferences about trees than in inferences in legal settings.

Did I miss my true calling?

N.B. Perhaps the post attracts attention because of the nice image of a leaf (from the tree in question) that I put in the post?


P.S. I highly recommend the book I consulted.






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What Is Bayesianism?


In a post today on the BISC [Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing] discussion list, Lotfi Zadeh addressed the question, "What is Bayesianism?" Professor Zadeh wrote:

Dear members of the BISC Group: 

    Bayesianism has been an object of discussion in the past
. The issue is sufficiently important to warrant a  revisit. In recent years, Bayesianism has been growing in popularity and visibility. Outside of the probability community, there are many misconceptions about Bayesianism. In many cases,  Bayesian X merely means that probability theory is used in X. Within the probability community, Bayesianism has a much narrower meaning. In this perspective, Bayesian networks is a misnomer. Bayesian networks are simply probabilistic networks. Note that there are possibilistic networks.

    So what is Bayesianism? The answer is rooted in the difference between can and should. Let me elaborate on this statement. Traditionally, probability theory has been associated with randomness and repeated events. Example. What is the probability that a fair coin will fall heads m times in n tosses? However, consider the statement, p: It is likely that Robert is rich. In this case, no repetition of trials is involved and there is no overt randomness. What is involved in this case is lack of knowledge. This simple example suggests that probability theory can be applied when there is uncertainty, but no repetition of trials and no overt randomness. This is the principal tenet of Bayesianism. So far there is nothing that is controversial. A problem arises when "can" is replaced with "should," as in the following dictum of a noted Bayesian, Professor E. Lindley.


The only satisfactory description of uncertainty is probability. By this I mean that every uncertainty statement must be in the form of a probability; that several uncertainties must be combined using the rules of probability; and that the calculus of probabilities is adequate to handle all situations involving uncertainty…probability is the only sensible description of uncertainty and is adequate for all problems involving uncertainty. All other methods are inadequate…anything that can be done with fuzzy logic, belief functions, upper and lower probabilities, or any other alternative to probability can better be done with probability (Lindley 1987).

Professor Lindley's dictum is challenged by fuzzy logic. In the perspective of fuzzy logic there are many different kinds of  uncertainty. The Bayesian "One size fits all" approach is misdirected. This view is the point of departure in my 20022005 and 2006 papers. Here are two deceptively simple problems which are a challenge to Bayesians. The second problem is less simple than the first. A box contains twenty balls of various sizes. Most are large. How many are small? A box contains approximately twenty balls of various sizes. There are many more large balls than small balls. What is the number of small balls? Note that interval interpretation of fuzzy terms is not acceptable. Comments are welcome. 

                                Regards,

                                Lotfi

    


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Wednesday, September 19, 2012

A Litigious Fellow, He Is


Serial litigator Andy Martin is self-proclaimed corruption fighter and crusader against Obama, Washington Post (September 19, 2012) (AP Story):


CONCORD, N.H. — Andy Martin, a.k.a. Anthony Martin-Trigona, is a legend in his own mind.

He is a self-proclaimed “corruption fighter,” ‘’Internet powerhouse” and “Republican foreign policy expert.”
He is currently trying to get a New Hampshire judge to undo the sale of The Balsams grand hotel and appoint a receiver to reopen it immediately. He has volunteered his services to be that receiver.
[snip, snip]
The 66-year-old Martin has twice run for president of the United States and earlier this month apologized to GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney for not endorsing him sooner.
[snip, snip]
Martin graduated from the University of Illinois Law School in 1973 but was denied admission to the bar because he “lacks the qualities of responsibility, candor, fairness, self-restraint, objectivity and respect for the judicial system,” according to one federal court ruling.
The Chicago Tribune, in a profile of Martin three years ago, said the Illinois Supreme Court — in denying his admission to the bar — also cited a Selective Service report that stated Martin has a “moderately severe character defect manifested by well-documented ideation with a paranoid flavor and grandiose character.” That profile was triggered by a radio ad by Martin — then running in Illinois for U.S. Senate — in which Martin said he had it on “solid rumor” that his opponent was gay.
[snip, snip]
In Connecticut in 1984, U.S. District Court Judge Jose Cabranes issued an order barring Martin from filing any more lawsuits. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals — which covers Connecticut, Vermont and New York — upheld the order, calling Martin “perhaps the most prolific litigator in this circuit’s history.”


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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Monday, September 17, 2012

Some SNAP E-Mails Handed Over, Others Withheld

Laurie Goodstein, Missouri: [Some] Documents Turned Over in Priest’s Abuse Case, NYTimes (Sept. 14, 2012):

After losing its appeals, the Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests has turned over about 180 documents that were subpoenaed by lawyers for a Roman Catholic priest accused of sexual abuse. The Survivors Network had argued that the documents, mostly e-mails, should remain confidential because they contained information about victims. ... Among the documents it withheld were those pertaining to the Rev. Shawn Ratigan, a Kansas City priest who pleaded guilty last month to child pornography charges and is still the target of civil lawsuits. ...

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I wonder what is in those withheld e-mails. (SNAP "encourages" [alleged] victims of clerical sex abuse to come forward. SNAP cooperates with tort lawyers.)


 
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Friday, September 14, 2012

MarshalPlan 5.5

I have created - with the critical but now long-past inspirational and technical contribution of David A. Schum - a prototype, or an interactive sketch, of an evidence marshaling app for evidential discovery and proof in legal settings.




I call the current iteration of this app "MarshalPlan 5.5" You can download this app for use on a Windows computer by  going to http://tillers.net/MarshalPlan.5.5/ and opening the subfolder "Windows" and then clicking on MarshalPlan 5.5exe (NOT MarshalPlan.5.5exe).
  • Apple Corporation seems to strip this exe file of its ability to run on Apple computers. Sorry!
 I think that one of of my most interesting MarshalPlan stacks (files) is "Legal Argument."


The following "cards" in the Legal Argument "stack" (file) illustrate how a traditional legal treatise writer might think (in part) about legal interpretation:





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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


fMRI & Neurobabble


Steven Poole, Your brain on pseudoscience: the rise of popular neurobollocks, New Statesman (Sept. 6, 2012):

The human brain, it is said, is the most complex object in the known universe. That a part of it “lights up” on an fMRI scan does not mean the rest is inactive; nor is it obvious what any such lighting-up indicates; nor is it straightforward to infer general lessons about life from experiments conducted under highly artificial conditions. Nor do we have the faintest clue about the biggest mystery of all – how does a lump of wet grey matter produce the conscious experience you are having right now, reading this paragraph? How come the brain gives rise to the mind? No one knows.

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Read the rest of this article. It is hilarious -- and incisive.

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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Saturday, September 08, 2012

Human Rights, Crepes, and Caviar


"She [Ms. Clinton] raised the issue of human rights and recent moves by Russia to restrict nongovernmental organizations during a private breakfast of crepes and red caviar with Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov, a senior State Department official said." Myers & Herszenhorn, Clinton Tells Russia Sanctions Will End, but Congress May Disagree (September 8, 2012):
 
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Thursday, September 06, 2012

AI & Evidential Inference




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Spindle Law Interview: Carlyn McCaffrey


Spindle Law Interviews: Carlyn McCaffrey

August 8th, 2012 by Nicholas Diamand
Carlyn McCaffreyCarlyn S. McCaffrey is a partner at the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP and is co-head of the firm’s private client practice in New York.  She focuses her practice on tax and estate planning for high net worth individuals.
Carlyn frequently lectures and writes on subjects relating to tax law, trusts and estates, foreign trusts and matrimonial law. She is also an adjunct professor of law at New York University School of Law and the Miami Law School. She received her J.D. and LL.M. from New York University School of Law and her B.A. from George Washington University.
Carlyn is a fellow and a past president of the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, a fellow of the American College of Tax Counsel, a member of the International Academy of Trust & Estate Counsel and a member of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws.  She serves on a number of boards and advisory boards, including the Board of Directors of the Catholic Communal Fund, the Board of Directors of the Breast Cancer Research Fund, The Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Professional Advisory Council, The Museum of Modern Art’s Planned Giving Advisory Committee and the Professional Advisors Council Committee of Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc.

Spindle Law: Who inspired you to become a lawyer?
Carlyn McCaffrey: I didn’t know any lawyers when I was young.  But I loved the Perry Mason television show; he made the law look like a very exciting way to make a living.  Of course, when I became a lawyer my practice turned out to be nothing like Perry Mason’s.
Early in my career, my mentor was Len Schmolka who, at the time, was a partner in the trust and estates department at Weil, Gotshal & Manges.  After clerking and after I obtained my LLM in tax at NYU, I taught for six years, the last four in NYU’s tax masters program.  At that point, I decided it would be a good idea to get more practical legal experience.  Len was an adjunct on the NYU faculty and he persuaded me to come to Weil where he was a partner.  I took a leave of absence from teaching to join Weil.  He made it such a wonderful experience that I never went back to full-time teaching.
SL:  What first attracted you to this type of practice?
CM:  I started out wanting to be a tax lawyer. What attracted me to tax law as a student was the intellectual challenge of working through code provisions and finding solutions to problems.  When I started to teach at NYU Law School, the school asked me to teach the basic trust and estate course in addition to tax.  The course introduced me to that field.  I liked the intellectual challenge and the personal interest aspects of the field.  When I joined Weil, I went into its trust and estate department which gave me the opportunity to combine tax and trust and estate work.   Over the years, what I’ve enjoyed the most about it is working with people as people.  Most big firm lawyers work with people, of course, but usually in their representative capacity as officers of  huge enterprises.  But, in the “private client practice” as we call it, we work with individuals on individual problems while, at the same time, working through the intellectual challenge of the tax law.  That’s what I like about it.
SL:  And how has that practice changed in the course of your career?
CM:  In some ways, it’s easier and, in some, it’s harder.  The technology has been amazing.  When I started practicing, wills were done on paper with carbon paper.  If you made a mistake, you had to do the whole page over again.  Now, every associate I work with basically does his or her own document production on a computer so it’s become a lot easier.  The actual putting together of the documents, once you’ve figured out what you want to do, is a lot easier.  On the other hand, the law itself has become enormously more complicated in the more than thirty years that I’ve been practicing.  Every year, the complexity increases.  We can no longer rely on the law remaining the same in my area from one year to the next.  For example, as you probably read, 2010 was a bizarre year when there was no estate tax.  And last year and this year, while everybody has the possibility of giving away $5 million without any gift tax, unless Congress changes its mind again, the limit will go back to $1 million next year.  So, there’s a lot of change and a lot of complexity.
SL:  Are there aspects or elements of the tax policy that you would change if you could?
CM:  It’s essentially the converse of what I said before.  If there were more stability and a lot less complexity that would be a good thing.  It doesn’t look like it’s going to happen though because the trend has been in the opposite direction.  When I first started studying tax law, in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, we had one volume for the tax code and two volumes of regulations.  We now have two bigger volumes for the tax code and the regulations go all the way up to six good-sized volumes.
Second, the legislative process clearly doesn’t work very efficiently.  A substantial number of the people who vote for these bills don’t really know what they’re doing.  They’re advised by members of their staff and some of them listen to people who want particular exceptions built in to encourage particular kinds of industry or to discourage other kinds of activities.
SL:  In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand wrote:  “Over and over again, the courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everyone does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands:  taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.  To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”  Is this as true today as it was in 1947?
CM:  That kind of sentiment is familiar.   Congress has encouraged people to set up structures that exist for the principal reason of reducing income taxes.  However, a couple years ago, back in 2010, Congress codified a rule called the Economic Substance Doctrine.  This rule says that, in order to be considered valid, any transaction that you put together has to have an economic purpose aside from the reduction of tax liability.  There are certain standards you have to comply with to show that there is an economic purpose in the transaction besides the reduction of tax.
On one level, it’s a good thing because it’s discouraging some of the abusive tax shelters.  On the other hand, because the statutory standard is so vague, people are uncertain as to exactly what kind of transactions it’s going to encompass.
SL:  In a recent New York Times article, A Family’s Billions Artfully Sheltered, it reported that “[t]he tax burden on the nation’s superelite has steadily declined in recent decades, according to a sliver of data released annually by the I.R.S.  The effective federal income tax rate for the 400 wealthiest taxpayers, representing the top 0.000258 percent, fell from about 30 percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 2008, the most recent data available.”  Is this consistent with your experience?  And, how do you explain it?
CM:  It’s not particularly surprising because the tax rates have gone down.  When I first started to practice, they were 50%, now they’re 35% and, most importantly, capital gains rates which used to be at least half of the top tax bracket, are now down to 15%.  And the dividend rate is down from 50% to 15% so the truly wealthy people, those who make their money through investments rather than salaries, are more likely to pay capital gains rates or dividend rates than people who work for a living.
The statistics are somewhat misleading because, when you’re looking at the 15% rate on dividend income, you should keep in mind the fact that, before the corporation can give its shareholders dividends on which they pay a 15% tax rate, the corporation has already paid a 34-35% federal tax.  In other words, the effective tax rate on corporate earnings that are available to individual taxpayers has gone through two tax systems before it gets there.
SL:  What do you think the most important development in the legal profession has been in the last 25 or 30 years?
CM:  One of the things that has changed between then and now is the increased diversity among members of the profession, particularly in the case of women. When I went to law school, there were only four of us in my class and it was very hard for women to get jobs in a major law firm.  Now women are accepted on a fairly equal basis.  In addition, people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, different religions, and different gender orientations have entered the profession in increasing numbers.  The big firms make an effort to put together a diverse group of associates and, ultimately, partners.  This has made a huge difference in the way law firms look than the way they looked in the late ‘60s.
SL:  Other than the increased number of women in the profession, have you seen changes as to the role of women in the law?
CM:  Because of technological advances and an increasing emphasis on the need for diversity, many big firms now provide career paths for women and others with flexible work hours.  For young people, particularly women, who want careers and a family, this is obviously an important development.  When I first started, you had to have what they called ‘face time.’  You had to be at your desk or in your office eight to ten or more hours a day.  Now, it’s much more flexible; there’s not as much problem in having people work at home because the technology makes it possible for you to work at home without inconveniencing your partners or your clients.  There’s a lot more telecommuting which makes it easier for men and women who have family responsibilities to put in a full schedule, but just not every day in the office.  It has created more opportunities for people.
SL:  Are there issues that you anticipate to be hot ones in trusts and estates in the coming months or years?
CM:  There are a lot of hot tax issues.  For example, there will be tremendous pressure on the part of wealthy people to give away at least $5 million or $10 million this year with the fear that that’s going to disappear next year.  There’s the prospect that many of the techniques that have developed over the years to help people make gifts during their lifetime, as opposed to dying with all their wealth, are being looked at very hard by Congress and may be shut down.  They would include things like valuation discounts for minority interests in companies.  So, it’s a constant process of trying to anticipate what Congress is going to do next.
If President Obama wins and if the House becomes Democratic, we probably are going to see a significant decrease in the gift tax credit.  On the other hand, if the Republicans gain control, we might actually see a repeal of the gift tax because in the last 10-12 years they’ve been trying to achieve that.
SL:  Do you have advice for law students and new lawyers?
CM:  For those young professionals who are interested in a law career that has a lot of exposure to individuals and individual issues and, at the same time want the challenge of working with a complex body of law to solve interesting problems, trust and estates or private client work is a good choice.  Those who are interested in this field should give some thought to working for a Masters in tax law or in estate planning.


Putin as Icarus?


So Putin is flying amid the birds (Siberian cranes)? See 

Putin Pulls Off Latest Feat: Flying With the Birds


That's OK. Let's cut him some slack.

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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Tuesday, September 04, 2012

New Published Papers in Law, Probability and Risk








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Tattoo Evidence: The New - the Old? - Gold Standard?

Curtis Krueger, Police say tattoo evidence ... helps catch more crooks Tampa Bay Times (Sept. 3, 2012):

Many Floridians have learned to their dismay that their unique ink can help police catch them — and persuade juries to convict them.

Tattoo evidence isn't as high-tech as DNA evidence, or as new. And a tattoo alone probably won't send anyone to prison without additional evidence to support it.

But tattoos have exploded in popularity, and police agencies increasingly photograph, catalogue and distribute them. ...

[snip, snip]

A few tattoos figure into "dumb criminal" stories from the Tampa Bay area and beyond. Take Sean Eric Roberts, accused in 2009 of breaking into a home in Riverview. He was identified by the outline of the state of Florida, helpfully inked onto his face.

And, in what may be the most bizarre example of body art imitating life, a California man named Anthony Garcia was convicted of murdering a man outside a liquor store. The case had gone unsolved until a Los Angeles County sheriff's sergeant was sorting through photos and saw one of Garcia's chest. It was covered with a tattoo depicting the murder scene.

But not every tattoo is helpful, said Mike Puetz, a St. Petersburg police spokesman and former homicide sergeant. All kinds of people seem to have inscribed themselves with crosses, hearts and skulls, so those don't exactly separate anyone from the crowd. But when a guy tattoos his girlfriend's name in cursive on his neck, that's a different story.

[snip, snip]

Police have checked out tattoos for decades, but computers now make the job easier. Many police agencies enter descriptions of tattoos into computer databases whenever people get arrested.

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Monday, September 03, 2012

More Slouches, More Drunkards, but More Innovators?


Michael Powell,  A Redoubt of Learning Holds Firm NYTimes (Sept. 3, 2012) (quoting Paul Nurse, President, The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge a/k/a the Royal Society):

"'The U.S.A. has a very strong work ethic, and you keep a very close eye to the cutting edge,' he says. 'We are a bit lazier. We drink more. But sometimes the science we produce is rather quirkier and more innovative.'”

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Saturday, September 01, 2012

Harvard College


Richard Perz-Pena, Harvard Students in Cheating Scandal Say Collaboration Was Accepted (August 31, 2012) (snippets):

In years past, the course, Introduction to Congress, had a reputation as one of the easiest at Harvard College. Some of the 279 students who took it in the spring semester said that the teacher, Matthew B. Platt, an assistant professor of government, told them at the outset that he gave high grades and that neither attending his lectures nor the discussion sessions with graduate teaching fellows was [sic] mandatory.

“He said, ‘I gave out 120 A’s last year, and I’ll give out 120 more,’ ” one accused student said.

[snip, snip]

Harvard University revealed on Wednesday that nearly half of the undergraduates in the spring class were under investigation for suspected cheating, for working together or for plagiarizing on a take-home final exam. Jay Harris, the dean of undergraduate education, called the episode “unprecedented in its scope and magnitude.” 

[snip, snip]

An accused sophomore said that in working on exams, “everybody went to the T.F.’s and begged for help. Some of the T.F.’s really laid it out for you, as explicit as you need, so of course the answers were the same.”

He said that he also discussed test questions with other students, which he acknowledged was prohibited, but he maintained that the practice was widespread and accepted.

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But they're all above average, aren't they? Don't they all deserve As?
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Thursday, August 30, 2012

Ranking Heterogeneous Entities - such as Universities and Law Schools


Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things, New Yorker (Feb. 14, 2011). 
Gladwell discusses, inter alia, the difficulty of ranking Penn State and Yeshiva University with a single set of criteria. (In 2011 US News ranked Penn State 47th and Yeshiva University 50th.)
Are even faculty members "heterogeneous entities"? I suppose they are.

Would you rank Einstein above Beethoven or vice-versa? Which of the two is better or higher than the other?



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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan


Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Jury Foreman in Samsung-Apple Trial Has a Smartphone-Related Patent!

Can the result in the Apple-Samsung patent trial stand?
The foreman said "that the intent was to send a message to Samsung that 'patent infringing is not the right thing to do.'"
But it turns out that the jury foreman "has a patent that could be used in smartphones."
 
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Friday, August 24, 2012

Justices of the Australia High Court on Relevance & Sexual Propensity Evidence

In BBH v R, B76/2010, 2012 HCA 9 (High Court of Australia, 28 March 2012), Chief Justice French, dissenting, wrote (footnotes omitted):

On 25 January 2006 an indictment was presented against the applicant in the District Court of Queensland alleging a number of sexual offences against the Criminal Code (Q) (''the Code'') in relation to his daughter (''the complainant''). The complainant was born on 5 July 1983. The offences were alleged to have been committed at different times between 1987 and 1999. The indictment contained 12 counts. The first count charged that, between 3 July 1989 and 31 March 1999, the applicant had maintained an unlawful sexual relationship with the complainant contrary to s 229B of the Code. There were six counts of unlawful and indecent dealing when the complainant was under 14 and under 16 years of age. In four counts it was alleged that the applicant had sodomised the complainant. On another count it was alleged that he unlawfully procured the complainant to do an indecent act when the complainant was under 12 years of age.

[snip, snip]

The application was concerned with the reception at trial of evidence, given by the applicant's youngest son, concerning an uncharged incident involving the applicant and the complainant, which the son said he had observed in 1994 or 1995. The son, who was 10 or 11 years of age at the time of the incident, said that while on a farm holiday with the applicant, the complainant and his older brother, he had observed the applicant and the complainant together at the caravan in which they were all staying. The complainant was undressed from the waist down and bending over. The applicant had his hand on her waist and his face close to her bottom. After making a statement to the police in 2005, the son volunteered to the applicant's partner that what he saw was consistent with the applicant looking for an ant bite or a bee sting. He gave evidence to that effect and said he saw nothing untoward about the incident. The complainant did not recall the incident, which did not follow the pattern of conduct of which she gave evidence. The applicant denied it ever occurred.

The son's evidence was admitted, over objection, as propensity evidence tending to show ''a guilty passion between the accused and the complainant.'' It should not have been admitted. It was equivocal. It could achieve relevance only by a process of reasoning conferring probative significance upon it by reference to direct evidence of the conduct it was adduced to prove. Its prejudicial effect was the invitation it offered to circular logic.

[snip, snip]

The question of relevance

The evidence of the complainant's brother was admitted on the basis that it was propensity evidence. That term includes, but is not limited to, what has been called ''similar fact evidence'', ''relationship evidence'' and ''identity evidence''. In the context of sexual offences it extends to evidence said to demonstrate ''guilty passion'' or sexual interest or feeling towards another. In so saying, I agree with the cautionary remarks of Hayne J that the adoption of classificatory labels can obscure the proper identification of applicable principle. In this case the key principle is relevance. All evidence must pass the threshold test of relevance which is the necessary condition of admissibility. As was said in Smith v R :

"Evidence is relevant or it is not. If the evidence is not relevant, no further question arises about its admissibility. Irrelevant evidence may not be received."

Relevance is determined by reference to the content of the proposed evidence and the issues at trial, including the elements of the offences with which the accused is charged, issues about the facts constituting those elements and issues about facts relevant to facts in issue. There being no applicable statutory test of relevance under the Evidence Act 1977 (Q), the court is in the realm of the common law.

[James Bradley] Thayer wrote that ''[t]he law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logic and general experience''.  According to Stephen's Digest, in a definition adopted in the eighth Australian edition of Cross on Evidence, ''relevant'' means that:

"[A]ny two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the other."

Logical relevance is a precondition of admissibility. It is not itself a rule of law. It does not incorporate questions of sufficiency. As Tillers stated in his revision of Wigmore:
There is a basic distinction between the relevancy of evidence and its sufficiency. In the immortal words of Professor McCormick, ''A brick is not a wall.'' (citations omitted)
In the context of sexual offences, the logical relevance of propensity evidence said to demonstrate ''guilty passion'' was simply explained in the 1979 [James H.] Chadbourn revision of Wigmore's Evidence in Trials at Common Law:
The evidence as offered ... consists in conduct, and from this the first inference is to the then emotion, from this next to the emotion at the time charged, and from this to the act charged.
In this case the acts in question were those alleged in the substantive counts of sodomy and unlawful and indecent dealing and the acts, charged or uncharged, which might be relied upon to constitute the offence, alleged in count 1, of maintaining an unlawful relationship of a sexual nature contrary to s 229B(1).

Typically the cases about the admissibility of propensity evidence in relation to sexual offences have been decided on the premise that logical relevance has been established. The species of propensity evidence designated ''similar fact evidence'' has been admitted or excluded by reference to whether or not the probative force of the evidence outweighs its merely prejudicial effect. Evidence excluded by this criterion is excluded because of:
the concern of the law about the prejudicial effect of such evidence and ''the possibility that the jury will treat the similar facts as establishing an inference of guilt where neither logic nor experience would necessitate the conclusion that it clearly points to the guilt of the accused''. (citation omitted)
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman , which is said to have marked a shift from admissibility conditioned upon accepted categories of uses of propensity evidence to admissibility conditioned upon cogency, Lord Wilberforce said:
The basic principle must be that the admission of similar fact evidence ... is exceptional and requires a strong degree of probative force. This probative force is derived, if at all, from the circumstance that the facts testified to by the several witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they must, when judged by experience and common sense, either all be true, or have arisen from a cause common to the witnesses or from pure coincidence.
That passage was quoted with approval by Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ in Hoch v R . Their Honours' reasons left open the possibility that a question of admissibility might collapse into a question of logical relevance if the tendered evidence lacked any probative force. Their Honours posited the case in which the existence of a rational view of similar fact evidence inconsistent with the guilt of the accused ''destroys the probative value of the evidence which is a condition precedent to its admissibility.'' In that limiting case, the evidence would be capable of proving nothing about any fact in issue. In Phillips v R the court observed that:

On one view, the problems presented by the tender of similar fact evidence are merely problems of relevance. On another view, evidence tendered as similar fact evidence must first be assessed for relevance, and, if that hurdle is overcome, must satisfy some additional test based on probative force. (citations omitted)

Although there was reference to the exclusionary rule for propensity evidence enunciated in Pfennig v R , the problem presented by the complainant's brother's evidence in this case was one of relevance. It was a limiting case of the kind adverted to in Hoch. To subject it to the Pfennigcalculus is to do no more in this case than to take a path that leads, in any event, to a conclusion of logical irrelevance.

The evidence was irrelevant because it was equivocal. As counsel for the applicant said, all the complainant's brother was able to give was a snapshot of an incident. The brother offered, in retrospect, an innocuous explanation for what had occurred. Whatever arguments might be constructed to support the proposition that, for reasons to do with the potential consequences of his testimony for his father, he was stating a theory in which he did not believe, the explanation he gave was rationally open. His evidence was not admitted as evidence of an uncharged act although, as noted earlier, the trial judge's directions may have left the jury with the belief that they could treat it as such. Despite being admitted as evidence of ''guilty passion'' it was not probative of a sexual act. In the circumstances, if it was not probative of a sexual act, it was not probative of guilty passion.

END OF EXTRACT FROM OPINION OF CJ FRENCH

Tillers:

French's bottom line conclusion that the evidence was irrelevant may or may not make sense. But the notion that evidence is irrelevant because it is "equivocal" does not make sense if one accepts that evidence is relevant (in the eyes of the law) if the evidence increases or decreases the probability of a legally-material fact to the slightest degree. But perhaps Chief Justice French was being just a bit careless with the language he(?) chose to use. Perhaps French's rationale really has to do with the notion of conditional relevance, which, as commonly explained in the United States, goes beyond the principle, or requirement, of relevance. That this is the explanation for French's conclusion about the irrelevance of the evidence is suggested by the following comment by French, a comment that buys into the "bootstrapping" objection (an objection now generally rejected in the United States): "The jury were effectively invited to engage in circular reasoning. The evidence itself could only be characterised as evidence of guilty passion if some additional element of conduct at the farm, not observed by the brother, was to be inferred. Alternatively, the jury were invited to characterise the incident as indicative of sexual interest. Neither of those inferences was open without reference to evidence which the brother's testimony was adduced to support. The only way in which the brother's evidence gained probative force was by a process of circular inference. It invited reasoning from conclusion to conclusion. That it indicated guilty passion could only be inferred by referring to the very evidence which it was adduced to support. The testimony should not have been admitted. It carried with it its own rational explanation consistent with the absence of any guilty passion."

See the separate opinion of Justice Gammow, also dissenting. Gammow discusses the harmful effects of the use of bad labels, or classifications, such as "relationship evidence" in sex crime cases. In the course of that opinion, Justice Gammow wrote (footnotes omited), "This court's decision in Pfennig, especially in the light of its earlier decisions in Markby v R , Sutton v R , Hoch v R and Harriman v R  and the decision of the House of Lords in R v Boardman , must be read as recognising that the supposed categories of exception [to the inadmissibility of similar fact evidence] are derived from a more fundamental principle: that the evidence of other discreditable conduct of an accused is admissible only if the evidence has particular probative value (or 'cogency' or 'particular relevance' or 'strength'). And Pfennig requires that this more fundamental principle be applied to determine whether evidence of an accused's other conduct may be admitted. That is, Pfennig decided that other discreditable conduct by the accused is admissible -- has sufficient probative value -- only where the evidence, if accepted, bears no reasonable explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged. This, not whether the evidence falls into some supposed category of subject matter, is the question for decision."

The opinions of several Justice in the majority on the question of the relevance of the admitted evidence differed markedly from French's opinion. For example, Justice Heydon wrote:

In assessing questions of relevance in relation to admissibility, it is not for judges to speculate about possible constructions of the evidence which are adverse to the interests of the tendering party. It is necessary to assess relevance by taking the proposed evidence at the highest level it can reasonably be put at from the tendering party's point of view. It is not correct for judges in jury trials to assess the probative value of the evidence for themselves and reject it as irrelevant if they identify aspects of it which may make it unconvincing or not probative in the fashion which the tendering party alleges. The possibility or likelihood, even, that evidence is fabricated does not make it irrelevant. When it is said that judges in jury trials in determining the admissibility of evidence have regard to the weight of the evidence, what is meant is not that they determine for themselves whether it is to be or may be believed, but that they determine what weight it would have in the case as a whole if it were believed.

Justice Bell, who was also in the majority, wrote (footnotes omitted):

The suggested character of the camping incident as equivocal is pertinent to the determination of admissibility under the Pfennig test, but it does not deprive the evidence of its relevance. It is the distinction drawn by Hayne J with respect to the evidence of the purchase of the underwear in HML. All evidence having anyprobative value is admissible, subject to any rule of exclusion. W's evidence was tendered as an item of circumstantial evidence to prove the applicant's sexual interest in the complainant. Its capacity to prove that fact is not to be assessed without regard to the other evidence in the trial. Proof of what W saw was capable of supporting an inference that the applicant was, on that occasion, indecently dealing with the complainant.

W's evidence was relevant. However, because it was tendered as evidence of sexual misconduct for the purpose of proving propensity, the trial judge was required to exclude it unless she was satisfied that it was not susceptible of a rational explanation consistent with the applicant's innocence. Pfennig was a wholly circumstantial case in which the propensity evidence was not disputed. The application of the ''no rational view'' test, formulated in the Pfennig context, to the admission of disputed propensity evidence to prove motive or sexual interest in the prosecution of sexual offences, is explained in Phillips v R and HML. The propensity evidence must be viewed in the context of the prosecution case, upon the assumptions that the propensity evidence would be accepted as true and that the prosecution case (as revealed in the evidence or in the statements or depositions of witnesses to be called) may be accepted by the jury. The trial judge is not required to conclude that the propensity evidence standing alone would establish guilt of the offence or offences with which the accused is charged. If, viewed in this way and upon these assumptions, there exists a reasonable view of the propensity evidence that is consistent with the accused's innocence, the evidence must be excluded.

The only innocent explanation for a father making a close visual examination of the naked bottom of his pubescent or pre-pubescent daughter that was suggested on the hearing of the application was the explanation offered by W. To the possibilities of looking for a bee sting or an ant bite may be added other ''quasi-medical'' investigations, such as inspecting a rash or the like. It is convenient to refer compendiously to these as ''the sting or bite explanation''. The applicant placed considerable emphasis on the circumstance that W had himself volunteered the sting or bite explanation for what he had seen. The circumstance that W offered an innocent explanation on an occasion when he was challenged to explain why he was ''doing this to [his] father'' does not make the suggestion a rational explanation for what it was that he saw. W's account of the incident does not suggest that, at the time of the incident, it occurred to him that he had chanced upon his father examining his sister to detect a sting or a bite. W turned around and left the campsite without making his presence known. In the result, he did not collect the pocket knife that had been his object in returning to the campsite. W did not ask the complainant later that day or in the days thereafter about what misadventure had led to their father inspecting her bottom. The inference from W's conduct is that his reticence reflected his instinctive understanding that he was witnessing something that was not intended for his eyes.

The reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the camping incident involves the assessment of probabilities. It is an assessment that must take into account the other evidence in the prosecution case. In the light of the whole of the evidence, a possible explanation may cease to be a rational one. The circumstance that the complainant alleges that the applicant sexually molested her and that incidents of abuse occurred on camping trips is relevant to the assessment of whether the sting or bite explanation is a rational one for what W saw. This is not to engage in unacceptable circular reasoning. It may involve, as Crennan and Kiefel JJ explain, a legitimate consideration of the improbability of events occurring by coincidence.

In the ordinary course of events, the occasions calling for a father to examine his 11 or 12-year-old daughter's naked bottom are likely to be few. When they occur, they are likely to be memorable to the father and the daughter. In considering whether the sting or bite explanation is a reasonable view of the camping incident, it is appropriate to have regard to the circumstance that neither the complainant nor the applicant have any recall of such an event. A reasonable explanation for the complainant's lack of recall of an occasion on the camping trip when the applicant inspected her naked bottom is that she was accustomed to being indecently dealt with by him and, until she was 13 years old, individual incidents of abuse were a blur. On the other hand, it is improbable, had there been an occasion when the complainant sought her father's assistance following a sting or a bite to her bottom, that the fact of being stung or bitten would not have impressed itself on her memory. A further improbability is that the occasion calling for the inspection of the complainant's bottom should occur at a time when all of the other members of the party were believed to be absent.

The admissibility of W's evidence fell to be determined after the complainant's evidence was completed. The question of whether there was a rational view of the camping incident consistent with the applicant's innocence did not depend upon the applicant advancing an innocent explanation for the incident. However, it was apparent from the cross-examination that the occurrence of the incident was in issue. In determining whether the sting or bite explanation was a rational one, it was appropriate to consider the improbability of that explanation being true, in circumstances in which it appeared the applicant had no recall of such an event.

In the context of the prosecution case as revealed by the complainant's evidence (and foreshadowed in the statements of witnesses to be called), the sting or bite explanation was not a rational view of what W had witnessed.

The complainant gave direct evidence of the acts that were the subject of the charges. The jury might have assessed her evidence as credible but considered as a reasonable possibility that, in the emotional atmosphere of her parents' separation, the complainant had sided with her mother and made up her account of abuse. In such an event, proof of the camping incident was capable of resolving that doubt in favour of a conclusion of the applicant's guilt.  W's evidence was rightly admitted. Proof of the applicant's unnatural sexual interest in the complainant did not support acceptance of the reliability of the complainant's account of the acts particularised in each count. Appropriate directions respecting the need to consider each count separately were given. The discrimination of the verdicts shows that those directions were understood.

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Tillers: Debates and disagreements about the meaning of "relevance" never end!




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