In this case the nature of the claim is one which "by its very nature [is] subject to long-repressed memories." Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Pedigo v. Pedigo, 292 Ill. App. 3d 831, 839, 686 N.E.2d at 1185 (1997). Any statute of repose applicable to incidents of childhood sexual abuse inherently fails to recognize that the nature of the claim is subject to long-repressed memories. Applying the repeal of the statute of repose retroactively to allow plaintiffs to bring suit long after the alleged abuse occurred would correct that problem and bring the current application of the law into line with the nature of the claim.This opinion, by itself, leaves a theoretical possibility that in a sexual abuse case that is considered on the merits, a trial judge might condemn expert evidence to support a claim of allegedly long-repressed memories as irrelevant, unscientific, unreliable, or, more simply put, as junk science. Let's hope that this possibility materializes (or has materialized) in the courts of the State of Illinois.
It's here (more or less): the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post.
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