In my view, it is appropriate to give weight to Mr. Jack's evidence with respect to his normal practice [of driving a bus]. The propriety of such evidence was noted by Seaton J.A., for the court, in Belknap v. Meakes,  B.C.J. No. 2187 (C.A.):But cf. P. Tillers, "The Death of a Youth and of a Drunkard: A Remarkable Story of Habit and Character in New Jersey," in Richard Lempert, ed., Evidence Stories (Foundation Press, 2006).
If a person can say of something he regularly does in his professional life that he invariably does it in a certain way, that surely is evidence and possibly convincing evidence that he did it in that way on the day in question.
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IA (Tillers Rev. 1983), states that there is no reason why habit should not be used as evidence either of negligent action or of careful action (Para. 97), and that habit should be admissible as a substitute for present recollection. Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed., para. 9-22, reaches a similar conclusion.
The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.