Sociological Jurisprudence, Logical Jurisprudence, and Factual Proof

In years past I have not been much interested in sociological jurisprudence. It seemed to me that talk about social forces, social interests, social preferences, etc., as a basis for legal interpretation (or lawmaking) lacks theoretical rigor. But I now find that I am somewhat attracted to the idea of some kind of sociological jurisprudence when I ponder the "logic(s)" of factual inference and proof in legal settings.
That's in part because I think (contrary to some or much rational choice theory?) it does make sense -- and it is necessary -- to think and talk about the "purposes," "functions," "interests," "preferences," etc. of societies and parts of societies (including systems of legal proof) and that it is not enough to conceive of the "interests" and "preferences" etc. of social groups as being nothing more than an aggregation of the interests, preferences, etc., of the individual members of such social groups.
I also think a connection must be made between logic(s) in the abstract and the logic(s) that is (are) in actual use in societies and their parts: we need to look in part to how lawyers, judges, jurors, etc. actually reason and deliberate about matters such as evidence and facts. But, if possible, an attempt to link logic with actual legal practice, or conventional legal practice, should be done in a way that tends to preserve (so to speak) the logical character(s) of the method(s) of reasoning and deliberation that is (are) customarily used in investigation and proof in trials and other such legal settings. Is this possible? I propose to find out. (More accurately said, Joannes Pilapil and I will try to find out.) Hint: I suspect it is possible.

 
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James H. Chadboun, Deans, Roscoe Pound, Loyalty Oaths, and UCLA in the 1950s

James Chadbourn in the 1950s

From the Wikipedia entry for James H. Chadbourn:

Peter Tillers recounts...:

I did research for James H. Chadbourn for a number of years while he taught at Harvard Law School. ... Chadbourn hated deans -- without exception. ... I don't know what lay at the root of Chadbourn's contempt for deans. Part of the reason may have been philosophical and temperamental: he was a curmudgeon -- a gentle curmudgeon -- and a skeptic, and he was generally distrustful of authority. Another part of the reason may have been his experiences with authority while he taught at UCLA: the story has it that he fought bitterly against a McCarthyite attempt to purge two junior faculty members who were accused of being Communist sympathizers. ...

Peter Tillers reports that he heard from Chadbourn's friends or family, not only that Chadbourn came to detest the dean that he initially served under at UCLA, but also that Chadbourn, after declining to become one of the law school's founding faculty members, agreed to join the law school in 1950. Chadbourn, who had been teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, thought he would become one of the senior faculty members at UCLA. But on arriving at UCLA, he discovered, to his horror, that Roscoe Pound had become a faculty member at UCLA's new law school. Chadbourn - for some reason - detested Roscoe Pound.

It turned out that Chadbourn had ample reason to detest both Roscoe Pound and the first dean of UCLA Law School, L. Dale Coffman. The wave of the post-World War II anti-communist fervor had reached California by 1950. The board of regents of the University of California resolved that all faculty members had to take loyalty oaths. Dean Coffman and Roscoe Pound agreed that law faculty members should also be required to do so.[1]

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1. Renee Y. Rastorfer, "THOMAS S. DABAGH AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS OF THE UCLA LAW LIBRARY: A CAUTIONARY TALE," 95 Law Library Journal 347, 357 (2003) ("[T[he dean of the law school, L. Dale Coffman, became a vocal supporter of the loyalty oath. In later years, he recalled that Regent Edward Dickson was unhappy about the controversy embroiling the system. 'Indeed so. As a matter of fact, that's why he came to me to see if [Roscoe] Pound and I and other members of the faculty would make public statements in that regard. I did to the Examiner. Pound did, too .... I stated publicly that I'm not a communist, I never have been, I never expect to be, and I don't see where in it interferes with my academic freedom to say so.')

See generally, N.E.H. Hull, Chapter 6 ("Pound Moves to the Right and Llewellyn Applies Himself") in Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: searching for an American jurisprudence (Chicago, 1997).

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The dynamic evidence page
It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.