Supreme Court's Unacknowledged Recognition of Fuzzy or Rough Sets

The important thing about Griswold v. Conecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) was not what it said about privacy or sex. The important thing about Griswold v. Connecticut is that in it the Supreme Court of the United States put its constitutional imprimatur on the proposition that sets (classes, categories, concepts), in the constitutional realm, are fuzzy or rough. For example, the Supreme Court said:

The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees create zones of privacy.

Lotfi Zadeh's seminal article in fuzzy sets was published in 1965. It is extremely unlikely that any of the Justices had read the article or had even heard of the article or the theory. So there is no direct lineage from Zadeh's theorizing to the Supreme Court's theorizing in Griswold v. Connecticut. Nonetheless, ...

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