Making Sense of Common Sense in Inference

Residues of positivism present in this person persistently if painfully push the present person to proclaim that if we are to make sense of common sense we must -- at the extremes -- distinguish between common sense about "hard facts" -- e.g., soil, flowers, table tops, fog [a soft hard fact :-) ] -- and common sense about soft moral questions -- e.g., polygamy, deceit by doctors to alleviate patients' dread & fear.

But does the positivist distinction between values and hard, brute facts get us anywhere? There is, first, the considerable difficulty that in real-world affairs real-world people often do gather evidence when they confront moral and "normative" questions. See P. Tillers, "The Value of Evidence in Law," 39 No. Ire. Leg. Q. 167 (1988).

But there is a second difficulty, and it is perhaps more serious for present purposes.

The general object of my interest at the moment is not the question of the sense or nonsense of common sense about moral and normative issues. I am now investigating how much sense there is in our inferences about questions of fact. So it appears, does it not, that the positivist insistence on the distinction between "facts" and "values" is beside the point?

But wait ... er ... hold on ...

The positivist distinction between facts and values -- though it may not show that common sense about questions of fact is always sensible --, that distinction is perhaps not entirely beside the point.

Various observers have noted -- for decades! -- that questions of "fact" in legal proceedings sometimes and perhaps often have soft rather than hard edges and that -- worse(?) yet -- such "factual" issues often seem to have a moral or (at least) a normative character -- e.g., was the alleged tortfeasor's behavior about some matter "reasonable," did the used-car salesman make the representation in "good faith"?

So perhaps some of the uncertainty of judgments about such questions is attributable to the (alleged) inherent "subjectivity" -- which in this context means "unverifiability" -- of judgments about questions of (moral) value. (A close relative of this particular line of reasoning is that questions about matters such as "good faith" involve an admixture of [i] pure factual inference, deliberation about the existence or nonexistence of possible states of the world and [ii] "ascription" of moral or normative qualities or attributes to possible states of the world.)

But where do these ruminations leave us? They do not, it should be noted, address the possibility that at least some questions in legal proceedings about normative matters are questions about the existence or non-existence of some moral, normative, evaluative, or ascriptive criteria in some pertinent sector of the cosmos (e.g., on Tuller Street in Columbus, Ohio, in 1959) rather than the decision maker's -- e.g., a juror's or trial judge's or mediator's -- moral or normative preferences and sentiments.

And the reasoning above does not yet address the fact -- is it a fact? -- that the common sense -- or, in any event, the ordinary common sense -- of people about questions with hard edges also sometimes or often diverges (but perhaps people without much sound common sense about matters such as diseases, explosives, and diet live, in the long run, shorter or less satisfying lives).

Well, these last two objections are not necessarily fatal to the proposition that common sense about at least some types of questions ("almost always"? "generally"? "under the right introspective or dialogic circumstances"?) makes a great deal of sense. But the above objections and the above discussion do suggest that we need to make many, many distinctions if we are to make headway in our deliberations about the question of the reliability or unreliability of common sense and the question of the possibility of ridding ourselves (in legal proceedings, in any event) of rotten common sense.

Incidentally: Might it ultimately be both necessary and correct to suppose that some good ideas are buried in our heads and that (only) if we think about them well enough and conscientiously enough -- no Thrasymachuses here, if you please! --, that then (and only then) we can discern, disinter them, bring them to light? To wit: are some good ideas "hard-wired" in the human brain or mind?

Stay tuned!

Judicial Proof, Common Sense, and Common Nonsense

Being a common man and a bit of a populist, I am reluctant to admit it, but admit I must:

Common sense is sometimes nonsense.

See Marilyn MacCrimmon, "What is 'Common' About Common Sense: Cautionary Tales for Travelers Crossing Interdisciplinary Boundaries," 22 Cardozo Law Review 101(2001).

So if inference is a matter of common sense (see the preceding post), what follows?

Specifically: how do we distinguish common sense from common nonsense?

Note bene: It is not really possible to "scientifically validate" (or invalidate) or "empirically verify" (or disprove) all of the many common sense propositions that are deployed in even "simple" inference from "ordinary" evidence about a "common" factual issue. (Proof: just think -- carefully -- about any concrete -- any actual -- problem involving actual evidence and any real-world factual issue.)

But if "science" and empirical tests fail us, how do we -- how can we -- gain an external vantage point on our presuppositions and "common sense"? Is it -- inference, that is --, is it all then just a matter of personal preference -- or "politics" -- or prejudice?

Can "dialogue" save us? Introspection? Vox populi?

Stay tuned.

Common Sense and Inference

Evidence scholarship -- the kind of evidence scholarship conducted by legal scholars, I mean -- has a variety of common presuppositions. Two presuppositions -- or are they canards? -- are very common:

P or C #1: factual inference involves common sense.

P or C #2: common sense involves ineffable intuition.

But now consider this: Douglas Lenat is engaged in an audacious effort to "formalize" and "computerize" common sense knowledge and reasoning.

Is this project not only audacious, but also ... quixotic? Absurd? Bizarre?

Perhaps. But first give the man a break -- and consider the following account in Stanford Magazine (March/April 2002):

To become smarter, the former Stanford professor [Lenat] argues, computers don’t need faster chips or bigger memories. They need an infusion of common sense—all those ordinary facts and assumptions about the world that enable people to survive and communicate with each other. ...

The fruit of his work is Cyc, smart software that according to Lenat knows and applies common sense. Cyc’s schooling has consumed $60 million and 600 person-years of effort from programmers, philosophers and others—collectively known as Cyclists—who have been codifying what Lenat calls “consensus reality” and entering it into a massive database.

...

No other AI project comes close to Cyc’s scale and ambition, says Nils Nilsson, MS ’56, PhD ’58, an emeritus professor of computer science at Stanford. Though AI researchers acknowledge that the “common sense problem” has to be cracked, most are trying to solve it part by part, he says. “I don’t know that anyone is trying to master all of common sense, apart from Doug.”

...

After 18 years of painstaking tutorial sessions, Cyc now holds some 1.5 million mostly banal assertions of this kind, all rendered in a formal language developed for the purpose. A few examples:

Water is wet.

Every person has a mother.

When people die, they stay dead.

...

Will his brainchild live up to its billing? Vaughan Pratt ... expresses doubt. ... [Pratt, an emeritus professor of computer science at Stanford,] ... thinks the problem is Cyc’s premise. Instead of stuffing computers full of knowledge to make intelligent machines, he says, we need to focus on improving their ability to reason and manipulate facts.

Lenat derides this approach as the result of physics envy. He says many AI researchers are consumed with finding the “Maxwell’s equation of human thought”—a simple, elegant formulation that “you could put on a T-shirt and that would unlock the secret of intelligence.” Until that happens, Lenat says, his way is the only way to get a computer to learn common sense.

Is Doug Lenat a post-modern Don Quixote? Or does he hold an important key to intelligence, even human intelligence?

To find out, come to my conference on "inference, culture, and ordinary thinking in dispute resolution" in New York City! Doug will deliver his spiel on Monday, April 28, 2003, at 2:15 p.m. et seq.; and then Henry Prakken, Glenn Shafer, other panelists, and, yes, even you Dear Reader!, will have the chance to question Doug and challenge his views and his audacious bodacious project.

Does Posner Say What Simon Says?

A friend -- another knowledgeable observer (who I think wishes to remain anonymous) --, this extremely astute and knowledgeable friend & observer has confirmed my suspicion that (Richard) Posner (in his recent paper on evidence) does not say what (Herbert) Simon says. But in mentioning information theory in my earlier post I was not trying to delve into theories of "bounded rationality," which are now much in fashion. [For one interesting collection of papers about this topic, see G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten, BOUNDED RATIONALITY : THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (MIT, 2001).] I wanted, instead, merely to get a handle on the type of "search" or "value of information" theory that Richard Posner embraces in his recent paper on evidence in litigation.

My knowledgeable friend's comment indirectly supports a hunch that I had had about Posner's theory making rational decisions about gathering evidence: Posner's theory of "search" is an application of EU theory, "expected utility" theory -- or MEU theory, "maximization of expected utility" theory; or, SEU, "subjective expected utility" theory; or, a bit redundantly: MSEU, "maximization of subjective expected utility" theory --, a theory that, in this context, would assert, I would think, that a rational decision maker will or should continue to invest in gathering new evidence or information only as long as the marginal (expected) benefit of gathering new evidence exceeds the marginal (expected) cost of doing so -- or, more precisely, only as long as (S)EMC ([subjectively-] expected marginal cost) of gathering new evidence does not exceed (S)EMB ([subjectively-] expected marginal benefit) of gathering additional evidence. {My notation is both unorthodox and crude, but ... you follow me, right, Dear Reader?}

Dear Reader, is this -- such talk about subjective expectations of marginal benefits and the like -- does such talk capture (roughly) the way Posner thinks about the problem of determining an appropriate individual or institutional "stopping point" for further investment in information or evidence? {N.B. There is the complication that in an institutional context -- e.g., a societal context -- we would need to determine whose (subjective) expectations count. But let's leave this little(?) complication aside.}

Here again is my principal argument about Posner's account of evidence in litigation: if Posner does indeed adhere to a simple and "classic" version of value of information theory, the sort of simple MEU theory that I have just tried to describe, then my original thesis holds: viz., the project of calculating benefits and costs of acquiring additional (unknown) information or evidence becomes more difficult -- and, in extremis, perhaps impossible; or, in any event, rather mysterious, a bit ineffable -- to the extent that new evidence contains "surprises," to the extent that new evidence routinely generates new hypotheses or produces mutations in previous hypotheses.

Glenn Shafer has pointed out that bits of evidence often function as "hints," that bits of evidence suggest previously unimagined hypotheses and refinements of existing hypotheses. [Here I must concede, Dear Reader, that Shafer's emphasis seems to be on the capacity of evidence to produce refinements of existing hypotheses rather than on its capacity or tendency to generate entirely novel hypotheses.] If one thinks that the suggestive, abductive, or hint-like character of evidentiary details is pronounced, very substantial, one must, at a minimum, concede -- yes? no? -- one must then concede the possibility that the ability to calculate -- even intuitively -- the probable costs and benefits of acquiring previously unknown information or evidence is limited, perhaps radically limited.

Consider the converse proposition: if one is able to identify the hypotheses about which there is uncertainty (and about which one would like to improve the quality of one's judgments & guesses), then one may (sometimes) be able to make some good guesses -- if one has some knowledge of the pertinent portion of the cosmos, if one has some pretty good "ontologies" at hand -- then one may be able to make better than random estimates about the knowledge-payoff that will result if one takes the time, trouble, and resources to examine particular sources of evidence and information that one had not hitherto examined. But this sort of calculation becomes more "problematic" if one thinks that the process of examining previously-unexamined sources of evidence and information will generate new hypotheses or cause original hypotheses to mutate. (And if one cannot predict such hypothesis-mutation -- to any extent -- then the project of making guesses and estimates about the value of new information becomes altogether inconceivable, no? -- a fact that suggests that human beings to have, must have, some way of guessing about the value or fruitfulness of the "surprises" that acquisition of new evidence might generate. Right? Or? [The moral of this last hedge: it is not my ambition here to turn us all into radical fact-skeptics. I just want to have a theory of evidence that is adequate to the way the world, the mind, and evidence work. In reality, of course, human beings sometimes do {seem to} have an ability to sense which lines of factual investigation are likely to prove fruitful. This sense, one would think, characterizes both good detectives and great scientists.])

Memory & Metaphysics

After many years of meaning to do so, I finally read Giuseppe di Lampedusa's THE LEOPARD. As an Evidence teacher -- and just as a simple human being -- I was struck by the following passage in the book's last chapter, "Relics":

If Tassoni had told the truth, then the long hours spent in savoring her hatred before her father's picture ... had been stupidity .... From the timeless depth of her being being a black pain came welling to spatter her all over at that revelation of the truth.

But was it the truth? Nowhere has truth so short a life as in Sicily; a fact has scarcely happened five minutes before its genuine kernel has vanished, been camouflaged, embellished, disfigured, squashed, annihilated by imagination and self-interest; shame, fear, generosity, malice, opportunism, charity, all the passions, good as well as evil, fling themselves onto the fact and tear it to pieces; very soon it has vanished altogether. And poor Concetta was hoping to find the truth of feelings that had never been expressed but only glimpsed half a century before! The truth no longer existed. Precarious fact, though, had been replaced by irrefutable pain.

***

Speaking of Charles Peirce (as I did in a recent post) I (once again, finally!) purchased a copy of Louis Menand's book THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001). The book was well reviewed in the New York Times Book Review. I sense that the book will charm, but also edify, partly by making connections between the Americans and broader European intellectual trends. Will my hopes be met? In any event the telling of the story of the main characters -- Oliver Wendell Holmes, William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey -- surely cannot entirely disappoint!

Peirce Pronounced; Of Abduction, Seduction, and Deduction

Having mentioned "abduction" several times, I feel obliged to mention Charles Peirce, who, it seems, first gave "abduction" its modern philosophical-epistemological-logical connotation.

Having mentioned Charles Peirce, I feel obliged to remind you, gentle readers, that "Peirce" rhymes with "purse." The reason for this counterintuitive pronunciation, it is said, is that the aforesaid CP's surname is descended from the surname "Pers." See, e.g., 1 Peirce Project Newsletter Nos. 3/4 (December 1994). But, as with all things scholarly, there is some dispute about this explanation for the pronunciation of CP's "Peirce."

Having mentioned Charles Peirce and abduction, I also feel impelled to mention that when Peirce used the word "abduction" he probably generally had "deduction" rather than "seduction" in mind; i.e., he probably was thinking that the formation of possible conclusions by deduction is one thing; and by abduction, another. This hypothesis about CP's mental states, however, might also be disputed: CP was a notorious "womanizer."

A Further Note about Information Theory

Isn't the following proposition true: it is possible to calculate the probable benefits of acquiring unknown evidence only if one can make a judgment in advance that the unknown evidence will (certainly or probably) be pertinent to a hypothesis or hypotheses of interest; and, if so, isn't it true that to the extent newly-acquired evidence causes unanticipated and unforeseeable mutations in hypotheses of interest, to that extent it is difficult ("impossible"?) to calculate -- or, even, intuit -- the probable benefits of evidence and information that one does not yet have?

I wonder if my comments about Posner's theory of "search" should be directed at some version of what is sometimes called "value of information" theory. Can someone enlighten me on this point?

Varieties of Information Theory

There are various species of information theory. I by no means claim (see my prior post) that Richard Posner embraces all varieties of that theory. If Posner embraces information theory ("properly so-called"?) -- if Posner embraces information theory at all, he embraces a particular version of that theory. (A knowledgeable person has told me, for example, that Posner does not use Herbert Simon's version of this theory. Whether or not this is true, I don't know.)

I will do some research and post a further note later -- in a day or two, perhaps.

Law and Economics in Search of Evidence

To the extent that law and economics people think about the law of evidence at all, they tend to focus on the notion of "search." See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence." The notion of "search" seems to be rooted in information theory. (Do I have this right? I readily confess to not knowing many curlicues in the law and economics field.)

My second assumption about the argument made by people such as Posner is that the notion of "search" concerns the problem of figuring out a rational strategy for investing in the acquisition of evidence or information when one has some uncertain hypotheses in hand and wants or needs to collect evidence or information that may tend to confirm or disprove those uncertain hypotheses. Posner (and other law and economics people?) seem to think ("assume"?) that the prescriptions of economic theory and information theory for dealing with this problem -- the problem, "When should one stop investing resources in information?" -- can explain much about (at least) a rational version of the law of evidence.

Perhaps information theory does shed some light on the treatment of evidence in litigation; I suspect that it does. But I suspect that information theory does not shed as much light on evidence in litigation as some law & economics scholars and similar people might suppose. That's because one key assumption that Posner and some other law and economics people make about evidence may not be "as true" -- or as often -- as such people suppose. I am referring to the assumption that the decision makers -- the players in litigation -- know what the (factual) issues are. This state of affairs -- i.e., perfect, certain, and complete knowledge of the hypotheses in question; i.e., perfect knowledge of the identity of the uncertain hypotheses that are in play --, this kind of certainty about what the issues are sometimes -- and, very probably, frequently or always -- does not obtain or does not fully obtain.

Any account of evidentiary processes in litigation -- the dynamics of evidence and inference in litigation -- must take into consideration that actors in the process of litigation sometimes -- and perhaps always; indeed, probably always --, actors in litigation are bereft of perfect or certain knowledge of the identity and countours of pertinent (uncertain) hypotheses (e.g., the factual issues "in contention" or "in play" in a particular episode of litigation) and that one of the central purposes for the gathering of evidence and information -- the "search" for evidence -- is the search for information -- evidentiary information -- that generates (suggests, inspires) new hypotheses or refinements of hypotheses (e.g., including, of course, factual hypotheses or issues in litigation). To wit (in fancy but accurate language): evidentiary trifles have "abductive" force.

A recognition that evidentiary trifles have suggestive or abductive force -- that they have the capacity to generate novel and unexpected hypotheses -- does not mean that what economists and information theorists have to say about "search strategies" is useless and pointless. But if evidence does have the capacity to generate novel hypotheses (or novel and typically-unforeseen refinements of hypotheses), it does follow that the search strategy that a decision maker employs -- and the kinds of search strategies that a system of legal rules permits or encourages -- must be much more subtle and supple and complex than the search strategy that might rationally be employed or favored when the hypotheses in play are known. This seems to follow because the premise that evidence has abductive force -- the hypothesis that evidentiary trifles, for example, suggest new hypotheses (and new refinements of hypotheses) --, this premise suggests that as new new evidence accumulates the number of hypotheses in play both can and will both mutate and greatly multiply. See P. Tillers, "Weighing Decisions about Proof in Litigation" (alternative title: "Is Proof in Litigation Predictable?: Some Obstacles to Systematic Assessment of Decisions about Proof in Litigation"); P. Tillers, "The Explosive Dynamic Complexity of Evidentiary Processes" (alternative title: "Can AI Help Resolve Some Fundamental Puzzles of Judicial Proof?: Introductory Comments about the "Explosive Dynamic Complexity" of Evidentiary Processes associated with Litigation"); and P. Tillers, "Spotty Semiotics: Further Notes on the Unpredictability of Investigation & Proof in Litigation."

What say you all? Do I have it (roughly) right? Wrong?

Chirac: Man of Peace

William Drozdiak, "Gulf Crisis [1990] Ends 15 Years Of French-Iraqi Closeness; Paris Was Baghdad's Prime Patron in West," The Washington Post, First Section p. A-13 (October 12, 1990, Friday, Final Edition):

Jacques Chirac, prime minister under president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, launched France's quest for high-stakes contracts with Baghdad and soon cultivated a warm rapport with Saddam. Welcoming the Iraqi leader on a visit to France in September 1975, Chirac surprised even his staff by speaking of his affection for his "personal friend."    

A year later, France began constructing the Osirak nuclear research facility at Tammuz that would be bombed in 1981 by Israeli aircraft. Even though France insisted that sufficient controls would have prevented any misuse of the center, Saddam declared in 1976 that "the accord with France is the first concrete step toward the production of an Arab nuclear weapon."    

The close rapport established by Chirac between Paris and Baghdad persisted through several changes of government, as French politicians from right to left on the ideological spectrum helped sustain the strategic friendship. Even the left-wing Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the current defense minister, became so enamored of Iraq that he helped found the French-Iraqi Friendship Society in 1985.

***

Douglas Davis, "An explosion of Gallic chutzpah," Jerusalem Post, News p. 14A (February 14, 2003):

"The Americans think they have a monopoly on the truth, and they think they have a right to impose it on us," an outraged French guest told me at a smart dinner party in Paris last weekend. "Well, we don't accept it. We don't accept their imperial ways."    

Even the Picasso figure on the wall behind him, which had remained impervious to this haughty explosion of Gallic chutzpah, seemed to blush slightly when high principle turned to hypocrisy and then to outright opportunism.

***

Joshua Glenn, "The Examined Life; Chirac's Other Iraq Policy," Boston Globe, Section Ideas p. E3 (March 2, 2003, Third Edition):

   JACQUES CHIRAC'S OPPOSITION TO the Bush administration's march to war may have won him the applause of antiwar activists, but others have noted that the French president may have less than principled reasons for his position. After all, France has economic ties to Iraq, and Chirac has millions of Muslim voters to worry about, too. And a photograph which has recently been circulating online offers a mute, though eloquent, J'accuse of its own.

In this 1975 photo, then-Vice President Hussein is seen touring the Cadarache nuclear power station in France, accompanied by a bespectacled Chirac, France's prime minister at the time. Chirac freelanced a deal to sell Saddam two nuclear reactors, and arranged to have French nuclear scientists and engineers train their counterparts in Iraq-most of whom are now on the list of Iraqi scientists and engineers that UN weapons inspectors want to chat with. Not only did Chirac help build Iraq's "Osirak" reactor-the Israelis dubbed it "O-Chirac"-near Baghdad, but he also sought to ship Iraq weapons-grade uranium, even though a safer grade was available. (France's president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, scotched the plan.) By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was France's single largest arms customer; Iranians referred to Chirac as "Shah-Iraq."  In 1981, Israeli fighter pilots-including a 26-year-old Ilan Ramon, who died last month on the space shuttle Columbia-destroyed the Osirak reactor shortly before it was due to deliver nuclear capacity to Iraq. Chirac, echoing the views of many world leaders at the time, described the Israeli raid as "unacceptable."

Does the Character Evidence Rule Exist in Colorado?

The Supreme Court of Colorado says that such a rule does exist in Colorado. But if the reasoning in Colorado v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002), is followed, when (if ever) would the Colorado character evidence rule require the exclusion of the "other bad acts" of an alleged rapist or similar [alleged] miscreant -- or any alleged criminal miscreant of any kind (e.g., alleged robber, burglar, murderer, thief)?

Of course, irrelevant bad acts would {presumably} still be inadmissible in Colorado. But Colorado trial judges don't need a character evidence rule to figure that out: the familiar maxim that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible should suffice.

If the Colorado Supreme Court wants to do away with the character evidence rule in Colorado, perhaps it should 'fess up and do so openly.

Dogs Have the Wrong Kind of Character

Do dogs have character? Well, yes, perhaps they do. But, it seems, dogs don't have enough character -- or, in any event, they don't have enough of the right kind of character -- to make them subject to the prohibition against "circumstantial" use of character evidence. See Brown v. Eberly, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22012 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 14, 2002). So, dogs, take notice: anything you bark can be used against you!

President Putin Presses for Peace ... in Iraq

"Russian artists condemn war in Chechnya," Agence France Presse, International News Section (Monday, March 17, 2003):

Nearly 50 prominent figures of Russia's artistic elite joined in an appeal to Russia's authorities to halt the war in Chechnya and launch peace talks to end the longstanding conflict.

"The government must make the first step to reconciliation and begin talks. Rational, legal and humane reasons demand this, and Russian culture's humanist traditions must be the basis for state policy," said the appeal's signatories, who include chess master Garry Kasparov and writers Viktor Yerofeyev and Vladimir Voinovich among others.

Meanwhile, "though its condemnation of guerrillas' cruelty is just, Russia must renounce barbaric 'cleansing sweeps', torture, summary executions and other senseless acts that only add to extremist ranks," the statement added.

Call for a Really New Evidence Scholar(ship): A Pressing Need for a Really Good Translator

During the last thirty years there has been an explosion in the systematic study of methods of analyzing and arguing about evidence and evidentiary processes. The depth and variety of the study of such methods have increased enormously. For example, Bayesians are exploring Bayesian logic and methods with a depth & subtlety not seen before. Beyond these novel approaches to old-hat Bayesian theory, non-law scholars in many fields are plumbing matters such as temporal & tense logic; planning theory; artificial or computational intelligence; artificial life; various theories of "argumentation" (including dialogue and the logic of rhetoric); various and numerous methods of making use of networks & graph theory (e.g., David Schum's directed acyclic graphs embedded in ancillary networks, Judea Pearl's causal networks, Howard's or Schachter's version of influence diagrams, social network analysis); connectionist processing; parallel & distributed processing; data mining (including "intelligent" data mining); various theories and methods of abduction or abductive inference (see, e.g., John Josephson, David Schum, Umberto Eco); fuzzy and rough set theory; theories of self-regulating agents; new theories of induction; and on and on and on. Many of these "arcane" methods are now deployed in the "real" world -- some of them, for example, help make Japanese trains run fast and others help Microsoft search engines and software bug diagnosis programs work, and some of these methods help to predict the weather.

Despite the importance of such developments & fields -- developments & fields that hold important keys to the way human beings do or might make sound judgments about the world --, most legal scholars in Evidence are only faintly aware of these disciplines and studies (even though some of our number know a fair amount about a relatively small sample of these disciplines, fields, and studies). This kind of ignorance is practically inevitable: just keeping up with diverse developments in modern logic is a full-time job. And that's why I am issuing this plea.

Legal scholars - Evidence scholars, in particular - need an interpreter: they need the services of scholars who know something about the sorts of matters just mentioned and can explain their meaning to Evidence scholars. Formerly, there were a few scholars did a bit of this sort of thing - this important job of translation - but those erstwhile and occasional translators are now busy with other matters. Therefore I urge you to be on the lookout for enterprising new scholars who can help educate legal scholars in evidence about the new wave of logic and evidence scholarship -- and who can do so well enough so that legal scholarship in evidence has the right to keep the name it claims for itself.

Those who do not know history ...: The Importance of Keeping Centripetal Forces in Check?

New York Times Section A; Page 8; Column 4; Foreign Desk (Aug. 2, 1991):

Following are excerpts from President [George H.] Bush's speech today to the Ukrainian Parliament:

In Ukraine, in Russia, in Armenia and the Baltics, the spirit of liberty thrives. But freedom cannot survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly minor restrictions multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles...

And yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek freedom in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.

***

BLACK FAMINE IN UKRAINE 1932-33: A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE by Andrew Gregorovich:

UKRAINE, "the breadbasket of Europe" is a land famous for its fertile black earth and its golden wheat. Yet, only forty years ago seven million Ukrainians starved to death although no natural catastrophe had visited the land. Forty years ago the people starved while the Soviet Union exported butter and grain. While Moscow banqueted, Ukraine hungered.

Stark, cold, statistics, the accounts of thousands of Ukrainian survivors and German; English and American eyewitnesses, as well as confessions of Moscow's agents and the admission of Stalin himself: All these have slowly seeped out of the Iron Curtain and have been piled into a tremendous mountain of facts. The whole story, pieced together like a jig-saw puzzle, ends with the biggest puzzle of all: Why did Moscow decide to starve to death seven million Ukrainians?

***

William Safire, "Victory in the Baltics," New York Times Section A; Page 37; Column 1; Editorial Desk (Late edition, Nov. 21, 2002):

In those days, the breakup of the powerful Soviet Union was not so inevitable. But because of their unique diplomatic status, the Baltic States -- Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania -- were seen by U.S. hard-liners as the path to the end of the hollowed-out Soviet empire.

The elder President Bush was blind to this opportunity. On the contrary, on a visit to Kiev he urged Ukrainians to stay with Moscow. (He was furious when his talk was labeled the "Chicken Kiev" speech in this space, and has not spoken to me since.)

...

With freedom comes opportunity: In no-longer-occupied Latvia today, the average age of ministers is 38, and the president, foreign minister and speaker of Parliament are all women.

So is the crusading editor of Diena, Latvia's most influential newspaper. Those were hard but exciting times, says Sarmite Elerte in Riga, remembering the heady days of rising resistance to tyranny. Now we are a happily boring Western country..)

***

So what say you all: should the Kurds in Iraq be trusted to exercise the autonomy - not independence, for this they have forsworn -, can and should the Kurds in northern Iraq be trusted to exercise responsibly the autonomy within Iraq that they already have and that they want to preserve? Or must the United States betray the Kurds - again -, this time for the purpose of persuading the Turks to collaborate with the coalition of the willing in the armed struggle against Saddam Hussein? Do we face a tragic choice? Or is this - the [possible] breaking of Kurdish eggs - just another example of countless instances of the callousness of the powerful toward powerless ethnic and national groups? (I wonder: if the Russians continue to offer resistance to American suasion in the Security Council, will the State Department be moved, now, to complain, loudly, about Russian atrocities in Chechnya?)

Kurds, Eggs & Omelettes

Is it true that a President Bush is about to betray the Kurds -- again? See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Torture, Beyond Saddam," New York Times (online) (March 14, 2003).

Readin', Writin' & -- yes -- 'Rithmetic Too

I almost forgot: if you want to write about evidence, you should also read about it. A good place to start -- and finish? -- your reading is M. MacCrimmon & P. Tillers, eds., THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL PROOF: COMPUTATION, LOGIC, AND COMMON SENSE (Physica- & Springer-Verlag, 2002) (vol. 94 in series STUDIES IN FUZZINESS AND SOFT COMPUTING, Janusz Kacprzyk, editor).

table of contents

There is a bit of 'rithmetic in this readin' material. But there is also common sense there. You can't ask for more than that!

Achieve Knowledge and Renown: Study Evidence and Write about It Too!

Begin by attending the conference on "Inference, Culture, and Ordinary Thinking in Dispute Resolution" -- see conference home page; conference program ; and registration page and information -- and see and hear notables such as the [literal] inventor of [the phrase] "artificial intelligence," John McCarthy (see his home page).

Follow up by composing an article relating to law, probability, and risk; and then publish your article in a pioneering -- "pathbreaking"? -- Oxford University Press journal, "Law, Probability and Risk: a journal of reasoning under uncertainty."

Famous Lost Words: Looking Forward to War with Iraq

Gary Hart, "The Military's New Myths," New York Times, Section A p. 23 (January 30, 1991):

[T]he real combat -- on land -- has yet to begin. There we face a numerically equal, reasonably well-armed opponent defensively deployed. The Iraqi Army has 28,000 Milan antitank weapons, 2,000 Hot airborne antitank weapons, 700 Exocet air-to-surface missiles and 60 Roland mobile antiaircraft missiles. All make the Scuds primitive by comparison.

They will do great damage to allied armored columns and cause considerable inconvenience to supporting air and sea assets.

The Ancestral French Spirit: Flora Lewis, "Mitterrand's Cynical Gaullist Posturing," New York Times, Section A p. 23 (January 16, 1991):

Domestically, Mr. Mitterrand is affected by a new wave of anti-Americanism emanating from an unusual combination of the left, and not only the Communists, and part of the right. Both have decried the prospect of war and what they consider weak-kneed submission to America's will. Some critics make President Bush and Saddam Hussein equivalent, and some argue that Mr. Bush is mainly to blame. France, they say, should show its "difference."

...

France has long claimed "privileged relations" with Iraq, earned by massive supplies of advanced arms and credits for some 15 years. The press still likes to quote Baghdad bazaar merchants saying, "We trust France more than anybody." Whatever Mr. Hussein does to the French and everybody else, the French believe this because they feel they ought to be liked best.

... [T]here have been no political polemics and little public reminder of the French role -- second only to Moscow's -- in building Iraq's arsenal. That is because all governments have sustained the policy, established by Premier Jacques Chirac [emphasis added] under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, of shoveling weapons to Iraq.

From the beginning of the crisis, France dithered, making appropriate noises of shocked disapproval and suggesting ways of "saving face" for Saddam Hussein. The first French gesture of armed participation was to send the carrier Clemenceau with a great departure ceremony--and no planes, only helicopters.

Meanwhile, Mr. Mitterrand's Defense Minister, Jean-Louis Chevenement, made clear his disagreement about acting against Mr. Hussein. He had been a leader of the Franco-Iraqi friendship society and told people he admired Mr. Hussein because he "is secular and a socialist." Anyplace else, he would have been fired. He was only quietly reminded of his duty and kept on, free to say a week ago that war could be avoided if Mr. Bush would make "a very little gesture" of promising a conference on Israel.

Richard H. Ullman, professor of international affairs at Princeton University, "Flunking World Order 101," New York Times, Section 1 p. 25 (January 12, 1991):

The President has declared that his patience with Iraq is wearing thin. But patience is just what is needed for this one or two or even three year experiment to succeed. If Mr. Bush decides to attack, the experiment will be ruined. The world will not learn whether strong economic sanctions, imposed by a nearly united international community, are sufficient to reverse an act of armed aggression.

New York Times, "CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; War and Peace: A Sampling From the Debate on Capitol Hill," Section A p. 8 (January 11, 1991):

Senator George Mitchell

Despite the fact that his own policy of international economic sanctions was having a significant effect upon the Iraqi economy, the President, without explanation, abandoned that approach and instead adopted a policy based first and foremost upon the use of American military force. As a result, this country has been placed on a course toward war. This has upset the balance of the President's initial policy, the balance between resources and responsibility, between interest and risk, between patience and strength.

. . .

Senator Edward Kennedy:

War is not the only option left to us in the Persian Gulf. The President may have set Jan. 15 as his deadline, but the American people have not. Sanctions and diplomacy may still achieve our objectives, and Congress has the responsibility to insure that all peaceful options are exhausted before resort to war. Unless we reach that stage, Congress ought not to authorize the President to use force.

At this historic moment, it may well be that only Congress can stop this senseless march toward war.

It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, but because war is such a grave undertaking, with such serious consequences, we must make certain that war is employed only as a last resort.

...

... Most military experts tell us that a war with Iraq would not be quick and decisive, as President Bush suggests; it'll be brutal, and costly. It'll take weeks, even months, and will quickly turn from an air war to a ground war, with thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of American casualties.

The Death Penalty and the Risk of Judicial Error: An Irreverent Question from an Opponent of Capital Punishment

For the record: subject to an "Adolf Eichmann exception" -- i.e., subject to an exception for mass murderers --, I oppose capital punishment. Nonetheless, I have a question.

Ex-Governor Cuomo was fond of saying -- in his inimitably-condescending way -- that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a punishment that is worse than death.

Suppose that ex-Governor Cuomo was right. If now-ex-Governor Ryan was right in saying that the risk of error in the Illinois criminal justice system is sufficiently great to make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, does it follow that it is also unjust for Illinois to imprison people for life?

Where do we draw the line?

Or perhaps we should not agree with Mr. Cuomo's thesis that imprisonment for life is as bad as death?

I applaud the conviction and imprisonment of murderers, rapists, robbers, and sexual predators. Nonetheless, I wonder: does anyone who is reasonably familiar with the workings of the U.S. criminal justice system seriously believe that a system of criminal justice as starved of money as ours does not produce many more errors (of two kinds: (i) conviction of the innocent and (ii) acquittal of the guilty) than any civilized society should tolerate?

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An Irreverent Question of a Different Kind

Perhaps New York State did the right the right thing in vacating the convictions of the (former) youths for mauling the "Central Park jogger." But is it appropriate to celebrate this result -- given that it seems reasonably clear -- so reputable newspapers say -- that at least some of those "children" were "up to no good" in other parts of Central Park that same night? Not all victims of legal wrongs deserve beatification.

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Yes, I admit it: I am a curmudgeon. But I like to think that I just detest cant.