Thursday, August 04, 2011

A Discussion of Quantification of Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt


  • Jon O. Newman

Quantifying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt: a comment on three comments

Law, Probability and Risk (2006) 5(3-4): 267-269 doi:10.1093/lpr/mgm010

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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Computable Document Format in the Courtroom or the Law School Classroom?

I have written now and then about the possibility of using visual aids and crutches to make probabilistic evidence more intelligible to judges, lawyers, law teachers, law students, and jurors. I see that Wolfram has now created a type of document called computable document format. These are (clever!) interactive documents that allow the reader, or user, to manipulate mathematical relationships, expressions, equations, and the like. The mathematical and quantitative relationships etc. are depicted and manipulated visually. I wonder if CDFs might be used to enlighten or educate non-mathematicians. The CDF documents I have sampled are aimed mostly or exclusively at mathematicians and scientists: The accompanying prose is not easy to follow. But I wonder if the accompanying explanatory prose might sometimes be "dumbed down" (without distortion) for non-scientists and non-mathematicians.


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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

"Gene Robbing"

See Eriq Gardner Gene Swipe: Few DNA Labs Know Whether Chromosomes Are Yours or If You Stole Them ABA Journal [online] (August 1, 2011)






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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Book about Judge Jack B. Weinstein

Judge Jack B. Weinstein has had a large influence on many areas of the law. He has had an immense amount of influence on the law of evidence, including (but not limited to) the law governing expert and scientific evidence as well as the law governing statistical evidence. I am pleased to report there is a new book about this renowned and thoughtful judge: Jeffrey B. Morris, THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN: LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH (Oxford 2011). Having just gotten my hands on a copy of this book, I cannot definitively proclaim that it is a good book. But I have skimmed a few parts of the book and what I have read so far is very interesting.

The book grew out of what was originally envisioned as an oral history project. The interviews were conducted over a period of a decade! Transcripts of the interviews, the book proclaims, were to be deposited with the Columbia University libraries and the law library of the Touro Law School.

The blurb on the front flap of the book cover states (in part):
[The book] considers the ways a particularly gifted federal judge has seized the opportunities and tools available to federal trial judges to make policy which has had a national impact. ... Beginning with an explanation as to why Weinstein, as scholar and jurist, is entitled to an in-depth study, Morris then considers Weinstein's background before appointment to the bench and...offers many examples of how Weinstein's background has affected his decision making. ... A leader in the battle against harsh sentencing, Weinstein has endeavored to bring a "human face" to the law in a variety of ways.
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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

So-Called Empirical Testing of Hunches Underlying Legal Rules

Many empirical studies of legal rules are prone to complain and proclaim that this or that belief or hunch has not been tested "empirically." See, e.g., Behavioral Biases and Local Court Rules ("Many legal rules are based on hunches about human behavior that have not been tested empirically.") What these researchers often actually mean, of course, is that the beliefs and hunches they are interested in have not been tested in a fashion these researchers deem rigorous. For example, generations of students and scholars and police officers have tested the hunch that taking notes sometimes improves the note taker's "performance."


N.B. My strong hunch is that it would be unwise in the extreme to prohibit jurors from taking notes merely because one study (see above) suggests that note taking (under certain circumstances) exacerbates the "vividness effect." Some questions:
  • Does note taking improve the performance of some jurors but not others?
  • Does juror discussion -- discussion of the evidence by, e.g., 12 jurors -- dissipate the vividness effect?
  • Is note taking a substitute for the inability of jurors to see a full transcript of the proceedings?

A strong preference for "surprising" research results can be dangerous. See my Draft Reply to Mike Redmayne   

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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.

Saturday, July 23, 2011

Draft Reply to Mike Redmayne

I am drafting a short reply to Mike Redmayne's short comment "Rationality and irrationality in evidence and proof," 10 Law, Probability and Risk 10 (2011) (comment on discussion paper The Structure and the Logic of Proof in Trials). Part of my reply may say the following (footnotes omitted):
... Mike Redmayne worries that I “sometimes veer too far towards … irrationality” in my views about the role of reason and logic in juridical proof. ...
... [But] I firmly believe that human beings (including lawyers, judges, and jurors) should – whenever possible – try to discipline and tame their unruly thoughts about evidence and factual questions by using the tools of logic, including, for example, probability theory. In general, I believe that disciplined deliberation about evidence is likely to improve inference. This is the "rationalist” premise from which I begin.
But I do not believe that human beings are capable of making explicit all of the premises, presuppositions, and beliefs that lead them to a conclusion about a question of fact (or about any other kind of question).
...
Although I believe that the human animal is dependent – necessarily and to a very large extent dependent – on submerged cognitive processes, I do not believe that it follows that the human animal is therefore "irrational." A vast body of literature in cognitive science, neuroscience, and similar fields almost conclusively demonstrates that the brain and its associated mechanisms are extraordinarily powerful "computing" devices – that what is astonishing is not how often the brain, sensory organs, and other biological mechanisms make mistakes and fall victim to illusions, but how well these mechanisms usually work and how rarely they make mistakes. (To put the point differently: The natural human brain, human sensory organs, and so on are extraordinarily "intelligent.") This is why I think we must be humble and respectful when we confront and examine our hunches and intuitions about evidence and factual issues and this is why I think we must think hard and long before we reject the conclusions, judgments, and inferences that our intuitions, hunches, and so on seem to counsel. By analogy (and possibly more than by analogy), I suspect we should also approach existing systems of juridical proof with respect and humility. It is possible that much wisdom and intelligence inhabit and drive such social systems for gathering evidence and answering factual questions.







 
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The dynamic evidence page

It's here: the law of evidence on Spindle Law. See also this post and this post.