Sunday, September 01, 2013

University and Law School Finances, Faculty Salaries, and Golden Bears

I was rummaging through my old papers when I found the following churlish memo from a colleague who teaches at a law school somewhere in the U.S.:


Thursday, October 3, 2002

To:      Tenured Faculty
From:  Prof. XXXXXX (Room [...])
Re:    Salary Increases (Decreases)

We are now more than more than three months into the fiscal year, and salary increases (decreases) have not yet been announced or implemented. Given these uncertain times, I would like to make several modest proposals:

1. The current practice of not discussing possible salary increases (decreases) with individual faculty members before individual salary increases (decreases) are determined should continue. Faculty members plainly cannot give disinterested opinions about their own salary increases (decreases).

2. The policy of not announcing salary increases (decreases) a significant amount of time before they are implemented should continue. Faculty members will be more content with their present salaries - unless, of course, decreases are awarded - if they do not know in advance the salaries they will later receive.

3. The policy of making decisions about salaries after all other budgetary decisions have been made should continue. It is clear that faculty members can be given only the money that is left over after matters such as heat, electricity, photocopying expenses, building renovations, painting, floor waxing, computers, journal subscriptions, and the like have been taken care of. (If there's no money, there's no money.)
  • Indeed, the law school and the university have been too timid in their treatment of the date of the implementation of salary increases. Salary increases should be made effective no earlier than ten months after the start of the fiscal year. This would give the university and the law school substantial new interest income - without adversely affecting [my law school]'s status in the U.S. News & World Report rankings. The amount of interest foregone by individual faculty members is relatively minuscule and most of faculty members won't notice the difference between the present value and the future value of their salary increases, and they may even appreciate the opportunity to defer payment of taxes on the delayed salary increases.

4. Youth is good. And the youth movement should continue. In particular: the law school and the university ought to continue the present policy of granting younger faculty members (relatively) substantial salary increases while granting the "golden bears" very small salary increases. (I put aside here the phenomenon of aggressive golden bears; these are people who know how to lobby for themselves. Passive golden tears deserve what they get, which is very little.) The older folks aren't going anywhere. Besides, they don't need the money. To avoid problems with legislation prohibiting discriminatory treatment on the basis of age, the unproductivity of the "golden bears" and their inadequate performance, or both, should be meticulously documented.

5. It seems likely that the law school and the university will continue to use the number of articles published in American law journals as the primary benchmark of faculty productivity. This is clearly the right thing to do. The U.S. News & World Report rankings are all that count (unless, of course, the question is the appropriate student-faculty ratio). Fluff - publication of books, online publishing, publishing in foreign journals, standing in one's field, and similar matters - should count much less, if at all. We have to take the world of rankings as we find it.

Well, that's about it for now.

But remember: ABC University [our university] cares for you. If you don't get what you want, there is always an open door somewhere where you can hash things out and perhaps achieve satisfaction. And I don't need to tell you that our law school is a community in which all watch out for the interest of all.

Now let's get on with faculty recruitment. We have a great story to tell!

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Tuesday, August 27, 2013

"I feel better now."


Do you suppose Pres. Obama will say to himself Thursday, "I feel better now"?

Will he feel the same way Friday?

A year from now?

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Saturday, August 24, 2013

Right of Confrontation in China?



According to English-language CCTV and other media, a recorded videotape of Bo Xilai's spouse Gu Kailai was admitted against Bo Xilai in his criminal trial for corruption and other charges. Should I assume that the PRC does not recognize (even on paper) a right of confrontation that resembles the current form of the Confrontation Right in the United States?


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Brazil's Interesting Chief Justice


Simon Romero, A Blunt Chief Justice Unafraid to Upset Brazil’s Status Quo NYTimes (August 23, 2013).

I wonder if debates about (liberal or left-wing) "judicial activism" are being replayed in Brazil.



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Monday, August 19, 2013

Does Thomas Nagel Say Anything about "Evidence"?

Does Thomas Nagel's recent theorizing about "materialism" (see below for the link to his summary) say anything about the nature of evidence? I believe it does. Cf. Part III of P. Tillers, Are There Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference?

Go thou and read Thomas Nagel, The Core of 'Mind and Cosmos' NYTimes (August 18, 2013)!

Nagel's introduction to his summary:

This is a brief statement of positions defended more fully in my book “Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False,” which was published by Oxford University Press last year. Since then the book has attracted a good deal of critical attention, which is not surprising, given the entrenchment of the world view that it attacks. It seemed useful to offer a short summary of the central argument.

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Thursday, August 15, 2013

Peggy Noonan on Privacy and the Surveillance State


Peggy Noonan, What We Lose if We Give Up Privacy, Wall Street Journal (August 15, 2013).

Snippet:

Privacy is connected to personhood. It has to do with intimate things—the innards of your head and heart, the workings of your mind—and the boundary between those things and the world outside.

A loss of the expectation of privacy in communications is a loss of something personal and intimate, and it will have broader implications. That is the view of Nat Hentoff, the great journalist and civil libertarian. He is 88 now and on fire on the issue of privacy. "The media has awakened," he told me. "Congress has awakened, to some extent." Both are beginning to realize "that there are particular constitutional liberty rights that [Americans] have that distinguish them from all other people, and one of them is privacy."

Mr. Hentoff sees excessive government surveillance as violative of the Fourth Amendment, which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that warrants be issued only "upon probable cause . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

But Mr. Hentoff sees the surveillance state as a threat to free speech, too. About a year ago he went up to Harvard to speak to a class. He asked, he recalled: "How many of you realize the connection between what's happening with the Fourth Amendment with the First Amendment?" He told the students that if citizens don't have basic privacies—firm protections against the search and seizure of your private communications, for instance—they will be left feeling "threatened." This will make citizens increasingly concerned "about what they say, and they do, and they think." It will have the effect of constricting freedom of expression. Americans will become careful about what they say that can be misunderstood or misinterpreted, and then too careful about what they say that can be understood. The inevitable end of surveillance is self-censorship.

All of a sudden, the room became quiet. "These were bright kids, interested, concerned, but they hadn't made an obvious connection about who we are as a people." We are "free citizens in a self-governing republic."


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Thursday, August 08, 2013

"Targeted" NSA Electronic Surveillance


For certain purposes NSA claims it conducts surveillance only of "targets." But in NSA-speak "target" is a very squishy word. See Mark Rumold, What It Means to Be An NSA "Target": New Information Shows Why We Need Immediate FISA Amendments Act Reform (blog) Electronic Frontier Foundation (August 8, 2013):
An important New York Times investigation from today reporting that the NSA "is searching the contents of vast amounts of Americans’ e-mail and text communications into and out of the country," coupled with leaked documents published by the Guardian, seriously calls into question the accuracy of crucial statements made by government officials about NSA surveillance.
The government has previously tried to reassure the public about its use of FISA Amendments Act Section 702 surveillance practices, emphasizing that, under Section 702, the government may not “intentionally target any U.S. citizen, any other U.S. person, or anyone located within the United States." Indeed, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee Senator Feinstein, in a letter to constituents who wrote to her expressing concern about the NSA's spying program,said this: "[T]he government cannot listen to an American’s telephone calls or read their emails without a court warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause."
We’ve written before about the word games the government plays in describing its surveillance practices: “acquire,” “collect,” and “content” are all old government favorites. The New York Times report proves Feinstein statement is false, and it's clear it’s time to add “target” to the list of word games as well.
When “Target” Means Searching a Specific Person’s Communications
First, at least this much is clear: a “target” under the FAA must be (a) a non-US person and (b) not physically located within the United States. A “person,” for purposes of the FAA, includes individuals as well as “any group, entity, association, corporation, or foreign power.”  Under the FAA, the government can thus "target" a single individual (e.g., Vladimir Putin), a small group of people (e.g., Pussy Riot), or a formal corporation or entity (e.g., Gazprom).
So, when the NSA decides to “target” someone (or something), it turns its specific surveillance vacuum at them. The NSA then believes it can intercept and analyze all electronic communications of the target (telephone conversations, email conversations, chat, web browsing, etc) so long as the “target” is overseas and remains overseas. As others have noted, this includes conversations the “target” has with Americans, which would then be “incidentally” collected. Keep in mind this does not require a warrant or even the approval of a court, which is only one way Senator Feinstein's reassurance was demonstrably false. But there's still more.
When “Target” Means Searching Everyone’s Communications
Once a target is established, the NSA believes it can expand the sweep of its interception far more broadly than the communications of the particular, identified target. Notably, the NSA’sprocedures state (emphasis added):
[I]n those cases where NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to or from the target, NSA will either employ an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas, or it will target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.
In plain English: the NSA believes it not only can (1) intercept the communications of the target, but also (2) intercept communications about a target, even if the target isn’t a party to the communication. The most likely way to assess if a communication is “about” a target is to conduct a content analysis of communications, probably based on specific search terms or selectors.
And that, folks, is what we call a content dragnet.
Importantly, under the NSA’s rules, when the agency intercepts communications about a target, the author or speaker of those communications does not, thereby, become a target: the target remains the original, non-US person. But, because the target remains a non-US person, the most robust protection for Americans’ communications under the FISA Amendments Act (and, indeed, the primary reassurance the government has given about the surveillance) flies out the window. If you communicate about a target of NSA surveillance, your citizenship is irrelevant: the only thing standing between you and NSA surveillance is your IP address or the fiber optic path through which your communications flow.
Privacy Protections Must Be Stronger than an IP Address or the Path our Communications Happen to Take
The NSA only limits this type of broad content dragnet in two ways: a filter based on IP addresses or directing its surveillance at “Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.”1
Presumably, the IP filter is used in circumstances where the NSA’s surveillance is being conducted on U.S. soil. The agency simply filters out known U.S. IP addresses and scans the content of the rest. But there are a host of reasons that an American’s IP address might not be representative of their location. First, there are a variety of privacy-enhancing technologies – like Tor or VPNs – that could easily make wholly domestic communications appear as though they were occurring overseas. Second, IP addresses, in general, are imperfect measures of a person’s location: if a large ISP (like, for example, AT&T) is assigned a block of IP addresses, an IP address assigned to someone in Canada one day could be assigned to an American the next, and vice versa. And all this, of course, says nothing about nationality or legal status: a given IP address says nothing about the citizenship of the person using the device.
The only other limitation on this type of content dragnet is targeting Internet links in foreign countries. Again, like IP filtering, this is not an effective way to ensure that Americans’ communications are not intercepted and analyzed. In particular, because third-party providers (like Google, Yahoo, or Microsoft) tend to have redundant and distributed operations around the world, there’s a very real chance that your wholly domestic email, sent between two U.S. citizens might travel and be "stored" on data centers around the world. Targeting an “Internet link” that terminates abroad would inevitably carry large amounts of purely "domestic" communications.
An Example: Targeting Vladimir Putin (and Everyone Else)
At this point, it might be useful to provide an example. Say the NSA wants to target Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, under Section 702. Putin is (a) a non-US-person, (b) (usually) located outside the United States, and (c) would clearly be expected to communicate foreign intelligence information. He is thus eligible for targeting under Section 702. The NSA would then intercept Putin’s calls, emails, chats, and other communications (including those directed at the United States and involving United States citizens).
Under the NSA’s rules, though, the agency can also intercept all communications about Putin. To accomplish this, NSA presumably performs a content analysis -- probably occurring both within the United States and overseas -- of large swaths of communications, using deep packet inspection to root out electronic communications about Putin.
In this example, under the NSA’s procedures, a U.S. citizen sending an email about Putin’sfrequent, shirtless poses to another U.S. citizen could have their communications intercepted and analyzed by NSA under a variety of conditions:
  • if they're outside the U.S.;
  • if they're inside the U.S., using Tor, and their IP address looks like it's outside the U.S.;
  • if they're inside the U.S., using a VPN, and their IP address looks like it's outside the U.S.;
  • if they're inside the U.S. and their IP address doesn't accurately reflect their location for any host of reasons;
  • if they're inside the U.S. and their communications are backed up or stored abroad.
In each of these examples, the NSA believes it has the authority to intercept your communications, even though in most examples the person doing the communicating is (1) a US person, (2) located within the United States, (3) communicating with someone within the United States, and (4) not communicating with the "target" of an investigation. While the NSA may not intercept every email about Putin’s shirtless poses, based on its procedures, it believes it has the authority. Such an interpretation of the government’s authority under the FAA violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. Not to mention the Constitution.
After a Full and Public Investigation, We Need to Rein in the NSA's Use of Section 702
Lately, the focus of the NSA debate has shifted to the NSA’s domestic associational tracking program — the collection and storage of millions of Americans call record information. And rightly so: the program is unconstitutional, and EFF has filed suit to stop it immediately. But Section 702 should not be forgotten: it needs attention ­— and reform —as well.  
As the debate continues, when Diane Feinstein tells you that “the government cannot listen to an American's telephone calls or read their emails without a court warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause,” she’s not telling you the truth: the government can read your emails without ever even asking a judge and without even attempting to demonstrate that probable cause exists, just so long as your emails have a “foreign” IP address or your communications happen to leave the country.
Our constitutional right to communicate without our government listening in has been fundamentally reinterpreted and diminished in secret: the NSA's procedures show that all that stands between government surveillance of our communication is an IP address. But the constitution demands more. Join us, and over 500,000 others, in calling on Congress to establish a special committee to investigate the NSA’s domestic spying operation, to rein in the laws the government uses to conduct this type of spying, and to hold elected officials accountable for misleading the American public.  
  • 1.The NSA’s use of the term “internet links” is not clear, and the procedures don’t spell out precisely what they mean. We assume “internet link” to mean telecom switches and hubs located overseas.


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Ross Douthat on Steven Pinker


A clever essay by Ross Douthat on Steven Pinker's (alleged) scientism: The Scientism of Steven Pinker NYTimes (August 7, 2013)




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Thursday, July 25, 2013

DSM & Botanical Psychology


Ian Hacking, Lost in the Forest London Review of Books (August 8 [sic], 2013) (on the DSM as a sad exemplar of botanical psychology).

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Why DNA Is Not an Infallible Indicator of Guilt or Innocence

Obasogie, High-Tech, High-Risk Forensics (Op-Ed), NYTimes (July 24, 2013):

SAN FRANCISCO — WHEN the police arrived last November at the ransacked mansion of the millionaire investor Raveesh Kumra, outside of San Jose, Calif., they found Mr. Kumra had been blindfolded, tied and gagged. The robbers took cash, rare coins and ultimately Mr. Kumra’s life; he died at the scene, suffocated by the packaging tape used to stifle his screams. A forensics team found DNA on his fingernails that belonged to an unknown person, presumably one of the assailants. The sample was put into a DNA database and turned up a “hit” — a local man by the name of Lukis Anderson.

Bingo. Mr. Anderson was arrested and charged with murder.

There was one small problem: the 26-year-old Mr. Anderson couldn’t have been the culprit. During the night in question, he was at the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, suffering from severe intoxication.

...

In one famous case of crime scene contamination, German police searched for around 15 years for a serial killer they called the “Phantom of Heilbronn” — an unknown female linked by traces of DNA to six murders across Germany and Austria. In 2009, the police found their “suspect”: a worker at a factory that produced the cotton swabs police used in their investigations had been accidentally contaminating them with her own DNA.

Contamination is not the only way DNA forensics can lead to injustice. Consider the frequent claim that it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, for two DNA profiles to match by coincidence. A 2005 audit of Arizona’s DNA database showed that, out of some 65,000 profiles, nearly 150 pairs matched at a level typically considered high enough to identify and prosecute suspects. Yet these profiles were clearly from different people.

There are also problems with the way DNA evidence is interpreted and presented to juries. In 2008, John Puckett — a California man in his 70s with a sexual assault record — was accused of a 1972 killing, after a trawl of the state database partially linked his DNA to crime scene evidence. As in the Anderson case, Mr. Puckett was identified and implicated primarily by this evidence. Jurors — told that there was only a one-in-1.1 million chance that this DNA match was pure coincidence — convicted him. He is now serving a life sentence.

But that one-in-1.1 million figure is misleading, according to two different expert committees, one convened by the F.B.I., the other by the National Research Council. It reflects the chance of a coincidental match in relation to the size of the general population (assuming that the suspect is the only one examined and is not related to the real culprit). Instead of the general population, we should be looking at only the number of profiles in the DNA database. Taking the size of the database into account in Mr. Puckett’s case (and, again, assuming the real culprit’s profile is not in the database) would have led to a dramatic change in the estimate, to one in three.

...

DNA forensics is an invaluable tool for law enforcement. But it is most useful when it corroborates other evidence pointing to a suspect, or when used to determine whether any two individual samples match, like in the exonerations pursued by the Innocence Project.

But when the government gets into the business of warehousing millions of DNA profiles to seek “cold hits” as the primary basis for prosecutions, much more oversight by and accountability to the public is warranted. For far too long, we have allowed the myth of DNA infallibility to chip away at our skepticism of government’s prosecutorial power, undoubtedly leading to untold injustices.

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N.B. The thesis of the above article cuts two ways: The discovery of non-matching DNA is also not always powerful evidence of innocence.

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Monday, July 22, 2013

Was Trayvon Martin an "Innocent Child"?

This conservative commentator - Shelby Steele - thinks not:

"Why did the civil-rights leadership use its greatly depleted moral authority to support Trayvon Martin? This young man was, after all, no Rosa Parks—a figure of indisputable human dignity set upon by the rank evil of white supremacy. Trayvon threw the first punch and then continued pummeling the much smaller Zimmerman. Yes, Trayvon was a kid, but he was also something of a menace. The larger tragedy is that his death will come to very little. There was no important principle or coherent protest implied in that first nose-breaking punch. It was just dumb bravado, a tough-guy punch."

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Friday, July 19, 2013

New Jersey Decision on Cell Phone Location Tracking

State v. Thomas W. Earls (A-53-11) (068765) (July 18, 2013) (7-0):

In this appeal, we consider whether people have a constitutional right of privacy in cell-phone location information. Cell phones register or identify themselves with nearby cell towers every seven seconds. Cell providers collect data from those contacts, which allows carriers to locate cell phones on a real-time basis and to reconstruct a phone’s movement from recorded data. Those developments, in turn, raise questions about the right to privacy in the location of one’s cell phone.
   Historically, the State Constitution has offered greater protection to New Jersey residents than the Fourth Amendment. 3Under settled New Jersey law, individuals do not lose their right to privacy simply because they have to give information to a third-party provider, like a phone company or bank, to get service. See State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 399 (2008). In addition, New Jersey case law continues to be guided by whether the government has violated an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
...
Because we find that cell-phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information, and that police must obtain a search warrant before accessing that information, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. To determine whether the emergency aid doctrine or some other exception to the warrant requirement applies to the facts of this case, we remand the matter to the Appellate Division for further proceedings.
...
We granted defendant’s petition for certification “limited to the issues of the validity of defendant’s arrest based on law enforcement’s use of information from defendant’s cell phone provider about the general location of the cell phone and the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.” 209 N.J. 97 (2011). 

...
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Despite the similarity in language, the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures “are not always coterminous.” State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344 (1982). ...

...

For the reasons discussed, we conclude that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protects an individual’s privacy interest in the location of his or her cell phone. Users are reasonably entitled to expect confidentiality in the ever-increasing level of detail that cell phones can reveal about their lives. Because of the nature of the intrusion, and the corresponding, legitimate privacy interest at stake, we hold today that police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone.

...

Our ruling today is based solely on the State Constitution. We recognize that Jones and Smith [U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution], to the extent they apply,would not require a warrant in this case.


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Sunday, July 14, 2013

Professor Jonathan Turley on the George Zimmerman Trial


In Why was Zimmerman overcharged? USA Today (July 14, 2013), Jonathan Turley writes:

"With the verdict, the Zimmerman case entered the realm of legal mythology -- a tale told by different groups in radically different ways for different meanings. Fax machines were activated with solicitations and sound bites long ago programmed for this moment. The legal standards long ago seemed to be lost to the social symbolism of the case.

"Criminal cases make for perfect and often dangerous vehicles for social expression. They allow longstanding social and racial issues to be personified in villains and victims. We simplify facts and characters -- discarding those facts that do not fit our narrative. We pile meanings on the outcome that soon make the actual murder secondary to the message. Zimmerman and Martin became proxies in our national debate over race. There was little patience or need for the niceties of rules of proof and adjudication."

Turley then recounts a variety of blunders by the prosecution but concludes:

"Ultimately, it was the case and not the prosecutors that were weak."

Turley then explains why he thinks the evidence did not support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But he ends with this observation:

"Of course, little of this matters in the wake of a high-profile case. The case and its characters long ago took on the qualities of legend. People will make what they will of the murder trial of Zimmerman. However, this jury proved that the justice system remains a matter not of legend but law."

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Saturday, July 13, 2013

Professor Randy Barnett on NSA Surveillance


Randy Barnett, The NSA's Surveillance Is Unconstitutional (Op.-Ed.), Wall Street Journal (July 11, 2013):

Due largely to unauthorized leaks, we now know that the National Security Agency has seized from private companies voluminous data on the phone and Internet usage of all U.S. citizens. We've also learned that the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has approved the constitutionality of these seizures in secret proceedings in which only the government appears, and in opinions kept secret even from the private companies from whom the data are seized.
If this weren't disturbing enough, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform, is compiling a massive database of citizens' personal information—including monthly credit-card, mortgage, car and other payments—ostensibly to protect consumers from abuses by financial institutions.
All of this dangerously violates the most fundamental principles of our republican form of government. The Fourth Amendment has two parts: First, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Second, that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
By banning unreasonable "seizures" of a person's "papers," the Fourth Amendment clearly protects what we today call "informational privacy." Rather than seizing the private papers of individual citizens, the NSA and CFPB programs instead seize the records of the private communications companies with which citizens do business under contractual "terms of service." These contracts do not authorize data-sharing with the government. Indeed, these private companies have insisted that they be compelled by statute and warrant to produce their records so as not to be accused of breaching their contracts and willingly betraying their customers' trust.
[snip, snip]
Still worse, the way these programs have been approved violates the Fifth Amendment, which stipulates that no one may be deprived of property "without due process of law." Secret judicial proceedings adjudicating the rights of private parties, without any ability to participate or even read the legal opinions of the judges, is the antithesis of the due process of law.
In a republican government based on popular sovereignty, the people are the principals or masters and those in government are merely their agents or servants. For the people to control their servants, however, they must know what their servants are doing.
[snip, snip]



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Monday, July 08, 2013

The Role of "Relevance" for the Scope of Government Surveillance

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides:


Evidence is relevant if:

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and

(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

I pointed out in 1983 (I was not alone) that the test of whether evidence makes a fact in issue more or less probable to any degree is extremely liberal and that this liberal test, if taken literally, renders little if any evidence "irrelevant." I have also pointed out at various times (see, e.g., Sections 9 & 10, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (Tillers rev. 1983); again, I was certainly not alone in doing so) that elimination or dilution of the equivalent of a materiality requirement - the requirement that only evidence that bears on an issue that matters in the eyes of the substantive law - either eliminates or further dilutes the exclusionary force of the relevance requirement.

If the Wall Street Journal is to be believed, the FISA court opened the door to broad data collection by the federal government - almost unconstrained domestic data collection - by taking two steps:

adopting the equivalent of a literal interpretation Federal Evidence Rule 401's codification of the so-called logical relevance principle - the principle that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to affect the probability of a fact in issue;

and

adopting (to boot) extremely broad characterizations of the factual questions (e.g., "terrorism") to which any sought-for evidence must be relevant.

See Valentino-DeVries & Gorman, Secret Court's Redefinition of 'Relevant' Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering (July 8, 2013):

Snippets:

"The National Security Agency's ability to gather phone data on millions of Americans hinges on a secret court ruling that redefined a single word: 'relevant.'

"This change—which specifically enabled the surveillance recently revealed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden—was made by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a group of judges responsible for making decisions about government surveillance in national-security cases. In classified orders starting in the mid-2000s, the court accepted that "relevant" could be broadened to permit an entire database of records on millions of people, in contrast to a more conservative interpretation widely applied in criminal cases, in which only some of those records would likely be allowed, according to people familiar with the ruling.
...
"'Relevant' has long been a broad standard, but the way the court is interpreting it, to mean, in effect, "everything," is new, says Mark Eckenwiler, a senior counsel at Perkins Coie LLP who, until December, was the Justice Department's primary authority on federal criminal surveillance law.
...
"Under the Patriot Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation can require businesses to hand over 'tangible things,' including 'records,' as long as the FBI shows it is reasonable to believe the things are 'relevant to an authorized investigation' into international terrorism or foreign intelligence activities.
"The history of the word 'relevant' is key to understanding that passage. The Supreme Court in 1991 said things are "relevant" if there is a 'reasonable possibility' that they will produce information related to the subject of the investigation. In criminal cases, courts previously have found that very large sets of information didn't meet the relevance standard because significant portions—innocent people's information—wouldn't be pertinent.
"But the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FISC, has developed separate precedents, centered on the idea that investigations to prevent national-security threats are different from ordinary criminal cases. The court's rulings on such matters are classified and almost impossible to challenge because of the secret nature of the proceedings. According to the court, the special nature of national-security and terrorism-prevention cases means 'relevant' can have a broader meaning for those investigations, say people familiar with the rulings.
...
"Former Sen. Jon Kyl spoke on the floor of the Senate in favor of the 'relevance' standard. 'We all know the term "relevance." It is a term that every court uses,' he said in 2006. 'The relevance standard is exactly the standard employed for the issuance of discovery orders in civil litigation, grand jury subpoenas in a criminal investigation,' he said.
"But a few people cautioned that 'relevant' could be defined to the point of irrelevance. 'Relevance is a very broad standard that could arguably justify the collection of all kinds of information about law-abiding Americans,' former Sen. Russ Feingold said on the Senate floor in February 2006. He argued for stricter wording, and failed."
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