A double murder. Life in prison for 2 N.J. men. But did they do it?
Inside the fight to free 2 N.J. men serving life for murder
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Thursday, June 18, 2015
Case Study: An Exoneration Campaign
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Thursday, June 11, 2015
Sad news: Death of Mike Redmayne
Shocking news of the death of LSE's Mike Redmayne, a truly gifted scholar and a truly fine person:
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Apologies as Evidence
Faculty argues there is no good evidence apologies law would work Scottish Legal News (June 10, 2015):
The Faculty of Advocates has raised a fundamental question over planned legislation for Scotland which aims to alter attitudes to apologising – where is the evidence from anywhere in the world that such laws are an effective means of bringing about the desired change?
Under the Apologies (Scotland) Bill, an apology would be inadmissible in most civil litigation as evidence of liability and could not be used in any other way to the prejudice of the apologising person.
An “apology” in terms of the bill is a statement that someone is sorry about or regrets something, whether an act, omission or outcome. An admission of fault or statements of fact within the apology qualify as part of the apology itself.
David Stephenson QC, for the Faculty, took part in a round-table discussion of the bill before the Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament. Witnesses were asked whether the bill was a good thing or a bad thing.
...
Mr Stephenson cited a major review in 2014 which had considered the impact of such laws in countries like America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
The paper, by Professor Robyn Carroll, had stated: “The limited research available does not show that apology legislation has worked as a ‘magic wand’. To the contrary, the little data that exists as to the shift in behaviour of potential apologisers, from the field of medical practice, tells us that the legislation has been relatively ineffective.”
Mr Stephenson added: “On what basis are we to be convinced that sufficient benefit would accrue to take away existing rights and limit what courts may look at when they try to determine the truth of what happened?”
Mr Stephenson imagined a letter written by a husband to his wife, apologising for assaulting her and their children.
“Does anyone seriously believe that that letter, because it starts with the word ‘sorry’, should be inadmissible in legal proceedings…relating to the care of the children or protection of that woman from her husband?”
Saturday, June 06, 2015
Scientific Theories & Empirical Verification
A suggestive - but, alas, only suggestive - discussion of the relationship in modern physics between empirical verification and theoretical models. The question arises because some of today's physicists posit some entities (e.g., the other universes of multiverse theory) that are not (directly?) observable.
Adam Frank & Marcelo Gleiser:
A Crisis at the Edge of Physics
NYTimes (Op., June 5, 2015)
Friday, June 05, 2015
Kudos to Jennifer Mnookin (and UCLA)
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Wednesday, June 03, 2015
Paper: Fabrication of Facts
My paper P. TILERS, THE FABRICATION OF FACTS IN INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION was recently published in 9 Journal of Comparative Law No. 2 (2014). See http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com/2015/05/journal-2014-92-journal-of-comparative.html
See also the SSRN preprint at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962241
The preprint is also available on my web site at http://tillers.net/fabrication.html
Monday, June 01, 2015
Publicize or Perish
Noam Scheiber, Beyond Publish or Perish, Academic Papers Look to Make a Splash NYTimes (May 31, 2015):
[M]any social scientists have observed that their disciplines, which once regarded the ability to attract attention with suspicion, increasingly reward it.
...
[T]he benefits to academics of generating media attention may be subtly skewing their research. “The pressure is tremendous,” said James Heckman, an economist at the University of Chicago and the winner of aNobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science. “Many young economists realize that they win a MacArthur or the Clark prize, or both, by being featured in The Times.”
...
All of this has led to a new model of disseminating social science research through the media. Several economists at top departments said colleagues were now tailoring and pitching their academic papers to journalists, rather than writing papers and allowing the news media to discover them on their own.
One danger is that many journalists are not equipped to distinguish good science from shoddy science. That is a particular risk when the work does not wend its way through the usual academic channels before entering the news media’s consciousness.
Monday, May 11, 2015
Question about Waiver of Privilege Against Self-Icrimination
Both sides rest after jury is told Boston Marathon bomber is 'sorry' USA Today
Sunday, May 10, 2015
Saturday, May 02, 2015
Canada: Admissibility Requirement: Independence and Impartiaility of Expert
Supreme Court of Canada holds that expert opinion is admissible only if the expert is 'independent" and "impartial." But this rule is hedged to accommodate certain "realities" of Canada's adversary system of litigation. See White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co.
Monday, April 27, 2015
Wigmore's Influence on Australian Evidence Law
E. & P. 2015, 19(1), 29-51
International Journal of Evidence & Proof
2015
The influence of Professor J.H. Wigmore on evidence law in Australia
Nigel Wilson
© 2015 Vathek Publishing
Subject: Criminal evidence
Keywords: Australia; Children; Competence; Confessions; Legal systems; Propensity; Witnesses
*29 Abstract
Professor John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) was an immensely significant international jurist. Much has been written about his accomplishments and scholarship and his influence on Anglo-American jurisprudence. His influence on Australian law has also been extensive. It has been his influence upon Australian evidence law and scholarship where his impact has been felt most and where his legacy continues. This article analyses the influence of Wigmore on Australian evidence lawand scholarship over the last century. 2014 marks the 110th anniversary of Wigmore's remarkable Treatise on Evidence, which has had enormous impact on Australian evidence law jurisprudence and scholarship and immense significance in the common law world. Wigmore's enduring legacies in Australia are the pre-eminence and breadth of his scholarship and the clarity, consistency and considered nature of his analysis of evidential principles. It is anticipated that his influence will continue unabated in evidence cases of significance in Australian courts and in evidence law reform and remain a powerful guiding force on Australian evidence scholarship in the 21st century.
Keywords
Australia, courts, evidence, High Court of Australia, Professor J.H. Wigmore
Sunday, April 26, 2015
An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics
An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics
Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure
| ISBN | 9781137400727 |
| Publication Date | April 2014 |
| Formats | Hardcover Ebook (EPUB) Ebook (PDF) |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mathematics breaks the impasse between Platonist and nominalist views of mathematics. Neither a study of abstract objects nor a mere language or logic, mathematics is a science of real aspects of the world as much as biology is. For the first time, a philosophy of mathematics puts applied mathematics at the centre. Quantitative aspects of the world such as ratios of heights, and structural ones such as symmetry and continuity, are parts of the physical world and are objects of mathematics. Though some mathematical structures such as infinities may be too big to be realized in fact, all of them are capable of being realized. Informed by the author's background in both philosophy and mathematics, but keeping to simple examples, the book shows how infant perception of patterns is extended by visualization and proof to the vast edifice of modern pure and applied mathematical knowledge.
AN ARISTOTELIAN REALIST PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Monday, April 13, 2015
Kant, Evidence, Bulgaria, and John G. Roberts, Jr.
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Example of Retroductive Reasoning
NYTimes report:
" As officials struggled Wednesday to explain why a jet with 150 people on board crashed in relatively clear skies, an investigator said evidence from a cockpit voice recorder indicated one pilot left the cockpit before the plane’s descent and was unable to get back in.
A senior military official involved in the investigation described “very smooth, very cool” conversation between the pilots during the early part of the flight from Barcelona to Düsseldorf. Then the audio indicated that one of the pilots left the cockpit and could not re-enter.
“The guy outside is knocking lightly on the door and there is no answer,” the investigator said. “And then he hits the door stronger and no answer. There is never an answer.”
He said, “You can hear he is trying to smash the door down.”
...
.......
QUESTION: What are some possible explanations; what is their relative (comparative) plausibility; and what further evidence would you seek to strengthen or weaken each possible explanation?
1. The pilot in the cockpit had had heart attack. (Alternative: He or she had a stroke. Etc.)
2. A terrorist (or flight attendant) forced the pilot in cabin to crash the plane. (Variants of this explanation.)
3. The pilot in the cabin decided to crash the plane. (Etc.)
4. Etc.
......
See generally
The Fabrication of Facts in Investigation and Adjudication
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962241
Monday, March 16, 2015
Trial by Jury in China?
| Jury System and China |
| 发布日期：2012-02-24 21:34:16 |
By Linchang Shen Ⅰ Introduction Ⅱ Decline vs. Reintroduction Ⅲ Is Jury System Totally an Imported Institution for China? Ⅳ Should China Adopt Some Kind of Jury System? Ⅴ Is Anglo-American Jury System Suitable for China? Ⅵ How to Reform the Current People’s Assessor System? Ⅶ Conclusion ABSTRACT It is quite interesting that since the turn of 20th and 21st century the jury system has attracted enormous attention throughout the world. Unexceptionally, this institution has also aroused heated debates in China. The purpose of this dissertation is to study whether China should adopt some kind of jury system and which style of jury system is more suitable for China if one is adopted, and further to explore how to reform the current jury system in China. The dissertation first looks through the reintroduction of jury system in Russia, Spain and Japan, analyzes the underlying motives of the important judiciary reforms and extracts the implication for China. Afterwards, the article researches whether China should adopt a jury system and then explores the suitable style jury system for China. Finally, the article examines the current jury system in China, points out the defects, and then correspondingly puts forwards some suggestions for reform of the current jury system. |
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Saturday, January 03, 2015
Taking Inference Seriously
Taking Inference Seriously
I
am deeply honored to be here – to be virtually here – to receive
the Wigmore Lifetime Achievement Award.
There
is relatively little doubt that some of you associate my name with
the so-called (and now not so new) New Evidence Scholarship. The New
Evidence Scholarship began roughly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Mathematics and statistics have played a prominent role in the New
Evidence Scholarship, and a good deal (though by no means all) of the
new scholarship whose study I have promoted over the years makes use
of mathematics and statistics. The
underlying reason for my interest was never just the idea that
mathematical tools can shed light on the nature of evidence and
inference. I have always had a broader
and fuzzier goal, the goal of advancing the study of evidential
inference by employing a wide variety of conceptual tools and
branches of human knowledge, including but not limited to
mathematics, formal logic, and matters of that sort.
In
my own work I have used mathematical tools only sparingly, and
generally I have used only very simple mathematics (primarily
arithmetic and simple algebra). When I have used mathematical tools,
I have used them, in the main, not to construct models of the world
but, rather, to explore the nature of argument
from and about evidence. Mathematics
is, among other things, a special grammar or language that can be
used to construct arguments.
When I have used mathematics in my work, I have used it primarily to
explore the nature of evidential argument.
It
is fortunate (or perhaps it was just inevitable) that evidential
argument has been the focus of my sporadic efforts to use mathematics
in my scholarship. The role of argument in inference has been my
focus because I strongly believe that human beings do not directly
perceive the world that they believe surrounds them; I have long
believed that human beings use their minds, brains, and senses to
construct the world, to form images of the world that they believe or
assume surrounds them. Give this, it should be apparent why I think
that argument – including
mathematical evidential argument – is subjective.
And given this, you can understand why I reject the notion that an
argument about evidence couched in mathematical language is an
algorithm, or a fixed formal recipe for the solution of an evidential
problem. Logically valid arguments can and do produce false
conclusions. (For example, a formally valid argument may rest on
false premises.) Finally,
it should now also be
apparent why I do not believe that an evidential argument couched in
mathematical language is necessarily a “model” of actual
evidential inference. The reason is the same as before: an argument
is an argument – whether mathematical language is used to make the
argument or not. For me, mathematics is a guide to the nature of
certain kinds of argument.
Although
I believe evidential argument and evidential inference are
necessarily subjective, I do not believe that inference from evidence
is or should be nothing more than an act of free creation or pure
invention. I am too much of an admirer of science and common sense to
believe any such thing. In most legal settings the aim of factual
inference is to produce factual conclusions that have a good chance
of being true, that have a good chance of approximating actual events
and states of affairs in the world. For this reason, if for no other,
it is fortunate that legal systems worthy of the name demand that
important factual conclusions must rest on at least some evidence: a
requirement of evidentiary support imposes at least some
veritistic (truth-seeking) constraints on fact-finding.
But although I concluded
that that evidence and argument are two essential ingredients of
reliable factual inference, I also reached the conclusion that these
two ingredients cannot by themselves explain how human inference in
legal settings actually works or how it should work. Although the
requirement of evidentiary support insures that some of the premises
of an argument about facts have a basis in evidence, a bare
requirement of evidentiary support allows the formation of distinct
valid inferential arguments that lead to a variety of factual
conclusions, including disparate factual conclusions. This
consideration, along with my experience as a litigator in law
practice and my experience more generally as a human being in the
world, led me to the conclusion that any adequate account of the
actual or proper working of factual inference must take intuition
into account.
But
to assign intuition a central role in fact-finding in the legal
process is almost a show-stopper. That's because “intuition”
seems to refer to beliefs, principles, propositions, and other such
matters, or matters that are not arrived at through conscious
deliberation but are simply given or implicit, that just happen to be
there in our minds, in our brains, or somewhere else in ourselves.
If this is what intuition is, and if fact-finding in the legal
process is importantly driven by intuitions, it hardly seems possible
to regulate fact-finding in a rational fashion. The notion of
rational intuitive inference appears to be an oxymoron! This is the
puzzle I have wrestled with most of my working life.
Although
I may strike you as an unduly obsessive fellow, allow me to say that
I believe and I hope I have made some progress in solving the puzzle
about the relationship between reason and intuition in inference. One
of my insights (which is not necessarily an original insight) is that
the answer to the question of the role of reason and intuition in
inference cannot be given in either/or form: the correct answer
cannot be that inference is always driven either by reason or
intuition but not by both. Reason and intuition both play a central
role in inference.
In
addition, the boundary between intuition and reason is not fixed, it
is not immutable. When I engage in introspection, I often conclude
that many of my intuitions are at least in part a product of my
earlier conscious ruminations (sometimes, to be sure, very
fragmentary and disordered ruminations, but conscious ruminations
nonetheless). If my experience is not atypical and if it is not a
product of delusion, perhaps it is possible to get decision makers
who are involved in the legal process to reflect on and sometimes
revise the intuitions with which they begin; evidence and argument
can be directed at such intuitions.
As
I struggled to work out the role of intuition in fact-finding in the
legal process, it became apparent that such insights, even if valid,
do not guarantee that fact-finding in the legal process will be
accurate. For even if some intuitions are penetrable by reason, human
beings seem to have some or many intuitions that are largely
impenetrable to introspection and deliberation; many of the
intuitions that play a role in fact finding probably lie entirely
beneath reach of conscious thought. So I was forced to confront the
following question: even if we recognize that both intuition and
reason play a role in factual inference and even if we acknowledge
that we can consciously evaluate some of our intuitions, are we
forced, in the end, to conclude that no matter how much we human
beings reflect and deliberate, our factual inferences are generally
not trustworthy because at least some of the premises of our
inferential processes are largely or entirely beyond the reach of
conscious thought – and, for that
reason, are therefore necessarily
untrustworthy?
As
I struggled with this question intermittently, for literally decades
– I consulted literature in fields such as neuroscience, artificial
intelligence, psychology, and cognitive science. I was trying to find
out whether there is much reason or logic involved in subconscious
inferential processes. And much of the literature I examined does
assert or assume that some sort of logic or logics control, regulate,
or structure subconscious inferential processes. To be sure, some of
the literature that I examined emphasizes the fallibility of
subconscious (and conscious) human judgment, inference, and
deliberation. Moreover, none of that literature asserts that human
judgment is infallible. But at least some of the literature asserts
that at least some subconscious human judgments about at least some
aspects of the world are not only produced by natural processes that
are governed by some sort or logics but are also, in the end,
miraculously enough!, fairly reliable.
But
after reaching these conclusions, I was left with a nagging question:
how does the recognition that (a) subconscious inference exists (and
is omnipresent in human inference) and (b) some sort of logic or
logics are involved, bear on the puzzle I posed earlier, that is,
does the unavoidable role of intuition in human inference necessarily
frustrate any effort to make the process of factual inference in the
legal process both rational and reliable? Eventually I arrived at two
conclusions that are pertinent this puzzle – but, as you will see,
they are not entirely reassuring conclusions.
First,
although there is ample reason to
believe that a logic or logics of some kind play a critical role in
subconscious inference, the nature of that logic or logics is not yet
well understood. If that is true, the notion that we might use some
sort of logic-based technology to improve subconscious human
inference in general is only a fantasy at this point in human
history.
Second,
even if we grant the general supposition that subconscious human
inference is "fairly reliable," we cannot extract from this
fuzzy general supposition A. exactly how reliable subconscious human
inference is, and B. the circumstances that render subconscious
human inference either more or less reliable. Given these two
desultory conclusions, does it follow that my extended exploration of
the literature in fields such as artificial intelligence and
cognitive science was pointless?
I
am inclined to think that the literature I examined offers rational
grounds for the hope that two important propositions about human
inference are true:
First,
as I have already said, that
many of our subconscious or
tacit inferences are "fairly reliable." Unlike some
students in the fields of "heuristics and biases" and
behavioral economics, I am impressed by how often human beings get
their inferences right rather than by how often they get their
inferences wrong. A belief in the reliability of much subconscious
inference counsels against too strong a general distrust of the
substrate of subconscious human inference.
Second,
as I noted earlier, even if one supposes (as I do) the existence and
omnipresence of subconscious inference in human inference, it does
not follow that all
subconscious human inference is entirely inaccessible to conscious
thought. Although the structure of some subconscious human
inferential processes is likely to remain entirely impenetrable to
conscious human thought, it is possible as I said earlier, and even
likely, that there are degrees of subconsciousness, and that careful
and persistent deliberation can bring to consciousness some thoughts
and feelings that initially lurk largely beneath conscious awareness,
that swim between consciousness and unconsciousness. If so, as I
noted earlier, it is possible that actors in the legal process can,
with effort, make themselves more conscious of, more attentive to,
more aware of some of the intuitions that seem to play a role in
their thinking about evidence – and it is possible (though not
inevitable) that by doing this such actors will improve the quality
of their inferences.
Of
course, even if I am right about all of this it remains true that a
vast number of subconscious inferential processes will remain largely
beyond the reach of conscious human deliberation and introspection,
and such subconscious inferential processes will remain, by
definition, impervious to conscious critical examination. But perhaps
this is a limitation that we must just accept; perhaps all that we
can ask of human actors is that they deliberate as carefully as they
can about their intuitions and, taking whatever advice they can from
other people and outside sources, decide as carefully as they can.
For the foreseeable future, fact-finding in the legal process
necessarily involves human actors. It
is too much to ask human beings to do more than the best that they
can, but perhaps these insights can help us better understand what
constitutes the best that human beings can do.
Tuesday, December 02, 2014
Profiling and the hopeless yearning for "specific evidence"
If the DOJ's promised new anti-profiling guidelines rely to any significant extent on the notion of "specific evidence," the new guidelines will be a hopeless mishmash. Cf. Peter Tillers, If Wishes Were Horses: Discursive Comments on Attempts to Prevent Individuals from Being Unfairly Burdened by their Reference Classes, 4 Law, Probability and Risk 33 (Oxford University Press, 2005).
&&&
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Is fuzzy logic passé?
|  | | ||
******************************
Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing (BISC)
******************************
Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing (BISC)
******************************
Dear members of the BISC Group:
For your information, following is an updated version of a brief report on the impact of fuzzy logic. Comments are welcome.
Regards,
Lotfi
Factual Information about the Impact of Fuzzy Logic
L.A. ZADEH
COUNT of PUBLICATIONS
• Total number of papers with “fuzzy” in title (Google Scholar): 360,000
• Count of publications containing the word “fuzzy” in title, as cited in INSPEC and
MATH.SCI.NET databases.
Compiled on September 11, 2014.
INSPEC Database
1970-1979: 569
1980-1989: 2,375
1990-1999: 21,572
2000-2009: 44,695
2010-present: 31,826
Total: 101,037
MathSciNet Database
1970-1979: 446
1980-1989: 2,474
1990-1999: 5,526
2000-2009: 10,295
2010-present: 7,131
Total: 25,872
Count of citations
• Number of citations/results of papers by L. Zadeh (Google Scholar): 138,270
• Number of citations of L. Zadeh’s paper “Fuzzy sets,” Information and Control, 1965 (Google Scholar): 52,484
• Number of members of the BISC Group (subscribers on BISC mailing list)
worldwide: 990
PATENTS
• Number of fuzzy-logic-related patents issued: 560,000
JOURNALS
Fuzzy in title
1. Fuzzy Sets and Systems
2. IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems
3. International Journal of Fuzzy Logic and Intelligent Systems
4. Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making
5. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems
6. Fuzzy Economic Review
7. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
8. Journal of Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Systems
9. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems
10. International Review of Fuzzy Mathematics
11. Fuzzy Systems and Soft Computing
12. Turkish Journal of Fuzzy Systems
13. Annals of Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Systems
14. Iranian Journal of Fuzzy Systems
15. Fuzzy Information and Engineering
16. Advances in Fuzzy Systems
17. International Journal of Fuzzy System Applications
18. Advances in Fuzzy Sets and Systems
19. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems and Rough Systems
20. International Journal of Fuzzy Logic Systems
21. Journal of Biomedical Fuzzy Systems Association
22. Advances in Fuzzy Mathematics
23. Journal of Fuzzy Mathematics
24. Journal of Advanced Research in Fuzzy and Uncertain
25. Fuzzy Systems & AI—Reports & Letters
26. Neural and Fuzzy Modeling Technology in Economics
27. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems and Advanced Applications
28. International Journal of Fuzzy Computation and Modelling
29. International Journal of Fuzzy Information and Engineering
Soft Computing in title (soft computing=fuzzy logic, neurocomputing and evolutionary computing)
1. Soft Computing
2. Applied Soft Computing
3. Mathware & Soft Computing
4. Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing
5. Applied Computational Intelligence and Soft Computing
6. Autosoft Journal. Intelligent Automation & Soft Computing
7. International Journal of Advances in Soft Computing and Its Applications
8. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing
9. International Journal of Soft Computing Applications
10. International Journal on Soft Computing
11. International Journal of Soft Computing
12. International Journal of Mathematics and Soft Computing
13. International Journal of Soft Computing Simulation and Software Engineering
14. International Journal of Soft Computing and Bioinformatics
15. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research
16. International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering
17. Fuzzy Systems and Soft Computing
18. International Journal of Research and Reviews in Soft and Intelligent Computing
19. International Journal of Factory Automation, Robotics and Soft Computing
20. International Journal of Biomedical Soft Computing and Human Sciences
21. Archives for the Philosophy and History of Soft Computing
Impact on pure mathematics
• Total number of papers with “fuzzy topology” or “fuzzy topological spaces” in title (Google Scholar): 1417
• Total number of books with "fuzzy topology" or "fuzzy topological spaces" in title (Google Books): 148
For your information, following is an updated version of a brief report on the impact of fuzzy logic. Comments are welcome.
Regards,
Lotfi
Factual Information about the Impact of Fuzzy Logic
L.A. ZADEH
COUNT of PUBLICATIONS
• Total number of papers with “fuzzy” in title (Google Scholar): 360,000
• Count of publications containing the word “fuzzy” in title, as cited in INSPEC and
MATH.SCI.NET databases.Compiled on September 11, 2014.
INSPEC Database
1970-1979: 569
1980-1989: 2,375
1990-1999: 21,572
2000-2009: 44,695
2010-present: 31,826
Total: 101,037
MathSciNet Database
1970-1979: 446
1980-1989: 2,474
1990-1999: 5,526
2000-2009: 10,295
2010-present: 7,131
Total: 25,872
Count of citations
• Number of citations/results of papers by L. Zadeh (Google Scholar): 138,270
• Number of citations of L. Zadeh’s paper “Fuzzy sets,” Information and Control, 1965 (Google Scholar): 52,484
• Number of members of the BISC Group (subscribers on BISC mailing list)
worldwide: 990
PATENTS
• Number of fuzzy-logic-related patents issued: 560,000
JOURNALS
Fuzzy in title
1. Fuzzy Sets and Systems
2. IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems
3. International Journal of Fuzzy Logic and Intelligent Systems
4. Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making
5. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems
6. Fuzzy Economic Review
7. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
8. Journal of Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Systems
9. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems
10. International Review of Fuzzy Mathematics
11. Fuzzy Systems and Soft Computing
12. Turkish Journal of Fuzzy Systems
13. Annals of Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Systems
14. Iranian Journal of Fuzzy Systems
15. Fuzzy Information and Engineering
16. Advances in Fuzzy Systems
17. International Journal of Fuzzy System Applications
18. Advances in Fuzzy Sets and Systems
19. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems and Rough Systems
20. International Journal of Fuzzy Logic Systems
21. Journal of Biomedical Fuzzy Systems Association
22. Advances in Fuzzy Mathematics
23. Journal of Fuzzy Mathematics
24. Journal of Advanced Research in Fuzzy and Uncertain
25. Fuzzy Systems & AI—Reports & Letters
26. Neural and Fuzzy Modeling Technology in Economics
27. International Journal of Fuzzy Systems and Advanced Applications
28. International Journal of Fuzzy Computation and Modelling
29. International Journal of Fuzzy Information and Engineering
Soft Computing in title (soft computing=fuzzy logic, neurocomputing and evolutionary computing)
1. Soft Computing
2. Applied Soft Computing
3. Mathware & Soft Computing
4. Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing
5. Applied Computational Intelligence and Soft Computing
6. Autosoft Journal. Intelligent Automation & Soft Computing
7. International Journal of Advances in Soft Computing and Its Applications
8. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing
9. International Journal of Soft Computing Applications
10. International Journal on Soft Computing
11. International Journal of Soft Computing
12. International Journal of Mathematics and Soft Computing
13. International Journal of Soft Computing Simulation and Software Engineering
14. International Journal of Soft Computing and Bioinformatics
15. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research
16. International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering
17. Fuzzy Systems and Soft Computing
18. International Journal of Research and Reviews in Soft and Intelligent Computing
19. International Journal of Factory Automation, Robotics and Soft Computing
20. International Journal of Biomedical Soft Computing and Human Sciences
21. Archives for the Philosophy and History of Soft Computing
Impact on pure mathematics
• Total number of papers with “fuzzy topology” or “fuzzy topological spaces” in title (Google Scholar): 1417
• Total number of books with "fuzzy topology" or "fuzzy topological spaces" in title (Google Books): 148
--
Lotfi A. Zadeh
Professor Emeritus
Director, Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing (BISC)
Address:
729 Soda Hall #1776
Computer Science Division
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1776
zadeh@eecs.berkeley.edu
Tel.(home): (510) 526-2569
URL:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~
Lotfi A. Zadeh
Professor Emeritus
Director, Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing (BISC)
Address:
729 Soda Hall #1776
Computer Science Division
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1776
zadeh@eecs.berkeley.edu
Tel.(home): (510) 526-2569
URL:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~Wednesday, November 05, 2014
National Academies Press: Eyewitness Identification
Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan
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