Corpi Delicti?

The citizens of New Jersey seem to have a decided preference for corpi delicti rather than just a singular, paltry corpus delicti. See Suleman Din & Rick Hepp, Chesapeake discovery stymied police for a year, The Star-Ledger p. 1 (June 3, 2005)("More than a year after the dismembered body of a Middlesex County [New Jersey] man was found floating in Chesapeake Bay in three matching suitcases, his wife was charged yesterday with the murder.") The case is reminiscent of the one I reported in the post Corpus Delicti in Plures Partes Divisa Est in My Home Town (March 19, 2005) Of course whether what we have here is one corpus delicti or several depends on how you slice things (mentally, I mean). In any event, perhaps we can avoid the logical, metaphysical, and legal problem of whether we have one body of a crime or several bodies (or several bodies of several crimes?) if we do as rigorous legal thinkers counsel us to do and think of corpus delicti as equivalent to nothing more than "the metaphorical body of the wrong: the acts that constitute the wrong." But doing this would spoil the fun. In any event, logical and legal and inferential problems would still plague us -- because sometimes (as in this Chesapeake Bay case) authorities will still have to figure out answers to questions such as, "Where was the body of this wrong located, in New Jersey or in, say, Virginia (where the suitcases surfaced, so to speak)?"

The Virginia authorities washed their hands of this salty case. Apparently they decided that the victim (the husband, the ex-husband, of the accused) was sliced up into tres partes while his physical corpus was still in New Jersey.

Trial as Theater

Show trials were once something to be ashamed of. But "trial as theater" -- trial as "storytelling" -- well, that's different!?! Well, yes. But in some ways nonetheless worrisome. See the mawkish video clip at "Tom Kline on Trial as Theatre." The performer (Kline, apparently) is effective in a way. But I wonder: Do such mawkish performances really work in the courtroom? I confess: I am skeptical.

N.B. I do not mean to deny that rhetoric (of a kind) plays a legitimate role in promoting accurate fact finding in trials. The necessary role of rhetoric for this purpose is hard to deny if one concedes, assumes, or believes that judgments about factual questions necessarily depend on "subjective judgment" (as well as on other matters). But it does not follow that mawkish storytelling is effective in the courtroom or that lawyers ought to be trained in mawkish storytelling. (One trouble with mawkish storytelling is that it appears insincere, which, from an advocate's point of view, defeats its purpose. [There are other reasons to worry about mawkish storytelling.])

I really must study Robert Burns' stuff more thoroughly. Could or should a basic course in the law of evidence be combined with the topic of trial rhetoric (cf. "trial advocacy"). Issue: How is it even possible to study the process of factual inference and proof in trials without studying trial rhetoric (and trial advocacy)?

Jury Trial in Russia

See legalaffairs (archive, July-August, 2004).

The Death Penalty in Japan

"The last time a death row inmate was granted a retrial [in Japan] was in 1986."

Source: Masami Ito, Retrial a tall order in quests to prove innocence, The Japan Times (online), May 26, 2005. [If you are wondering about the date of this article, keep in mind (i) Japan's location and mine, and (ii) timekeeping conventions.]

Lacey's Biography of HLA Hart -- Redux

I have completed reading A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford 2004), Nicola Lacey's biography of HLA Hart.

The reviews of the book I have found on the web are very laudatory. But I am unsatisfied. I am not entirely sure why.

What are your sentiments?

I am a latecomer to this book. I found one interesting item: correspondence about Thomas Nagel's review of the book. See correspondence. (To get the original book review, you must, alas, subscribe to the London Review of Books -- which I just did, and thus discovered that the key to my password will arrive in 4-6 weeks. Egads, only the British!)

There is a generous obituary for Jenifer Hart, HLA Hart's spouse, at The Guardian's Obituary

One definition of "nightmare": To be male and have Nicola Lacey as your biographer.

Try this 24-hour take-home examination in the law of evidence!

Paula Pan and Harry Hanker are married on March 2, 1988.

Paula Pan gives birth to a son, Boy Pan Hanker, on July 1, 1989.

Paula and Harry are divorced on September 3, 2003. Custody of Boy is awarded to Paula.

The State of Blackacre indicts Paula on October 1, 2004. The indictment charges that Paula sexually molested her son Boy on July 1, 1992.

Temporary custody of Boy Pan Hanker is awarded to Harry Hanker on October 15, 2004.

Boy commits suicide on November 1, 2004.

The executor of Boy's estate commences a wrongful death action against Harry on December 1, 2004. The complaint in this civil action avers that Harry's negligence was the cause of Boy's death. In his answer, however, Harry denies negligence, and he avers that Paula's sexual mistreatment of Boy caused Boy to commit suicide.

In February 2005 Harry's counsel in the wrongful death action serves Carr Counselor with a subpoena duces tecum. Carr is a guidance counselor at the school that Boy attended until his death. The subpoena orders Carr to surrender his personal diary at the taking of Carr's deposition in the civil action for wrongful death. During the deposition Carr hands Harry's counsel a small book and states, "Here's the diary you asked for."

In May 2005 the sexual molestation charge against Paula proceeds to trial in a court of the State of Blackacre. Judge Major Wisdom is the presiding judge. You are Judge Wisdom's law clerk. Your name is Diligent Clerk.

The trial begins. After the opening statements, the prosecutor makes an offer of evidence at the bench (outside of the hearing of the jury). He announces that he intends to have Carr Counselor give the following testimony:

My name is Carr Counselor. I am the guidance counselor at St. Anselm's School, which is a Catholic parochial school. I had a counseling session with Boy Pan Hanker on May 24, 2004. He told me that it had "recently come back" to him that on his third birthday his mother had abused him. Specifically, he told me that after a birthday party for his third birthday his mother had taken him to her bed and had touched him "down there."

Paula's defense counsel makes the following response to the prosecutor's offer:

Your Honor, I object in the strongest possible terms to the proffered testimony. Carr has no right to testify about a private conversation with Boy. Furthermore, your Honor, anything that Boy may have told Carr is hearsay of the worst kind and it has absolutely no probative value. And I want to say one more thing, your Honor: even if Boy were alive and here in this courtroom, you would not and could not allow him to testify!

I am sure you will rule in my favor, your Honor. However, if for some inexplicable reason you do allow Carr to testify about the statements that Boy allegedly made on May 24, 2004, I respectfully request an advance ruling on evidence that I must use to counter Carr's testimony. I have in my hand Carr's diary. Carr gave his diary to Harry's counsel during a deposition, and Harry's counsel gave it to me. I ask the court to rule that I can use the diary entries -- I will recite them in a moment, your Honor --, I ask that the court rule, first, that I can to use those diary entries during my cross-examination of Carr and, second, that I can give those diary entries to the jury for its consideration.

These are the diary entries that I want to use, your Honor -- they are made in Carr's own hand; you will be able to read them for yourself, your Honor -- these are the diary entries I want to use if Carr testifies:

January 5, 2004. Lousy, depressing time of year. Boy Pan Hanker came to my office. He was upset. His parents are divorced. The divorce was bitter. I have the sense that one of them did something to him. That's always the story: parents.

January 12, 2004. Boy Pan Hanker came by again. Again he said he was upset. I asked him why. He said he didn't know. I told him that he should come back the next week and that in the meantime I would think about how I could help him. I need the time to think about this. I'm just a guidance counselor. I've been at this job for 20 yrs and I know my job. But I'm a guidance counselor, not a doctor. I don't even have a college degree.

January 19, 2004. Boy came again. I told him I had an idea. I had watched a show on Discovery Channel or some such show. But I didn't tell him that. What I did say is that he and I would do psychodynamic therapy. We would work backwards through his life until we got to the root of his problem. I would use guided imagery: I would show him pictures to make his deep-rooted memories surface into his consciousness. I told him this would not be easy or fun. We would be digging for his most shameful memories. I said it might work. He agreed to try.

February 16, 2004. We had our first dynamic imagery session a few days ago. I took him back to age 10. He lay down on the couch. I told him to relax. He did: he almost fell asleep. I showed him pictures. He reminisced. Nothing interesting.

April 12, 2004. Boy and I have been at this imagery therapy business for several weeks now. What a trip! I've taken him back to age five. He feels something terrible happened to him at age three. I think it has to do with sex. Shame almost always does. We'll dig it out. This is exciting and interesting. This kid is obsessed with sex. He dreams about sex all the time. He thinks about it all the time. I think there's something wrong with him. The root of his problem is a sexual encounter. But the root of his problem now is that he is obsessed with sex. He can't distinguish fact and fancy. Now I've got to get him to give me the true story.

May 24, 2004. Today was the bombshell, the payoff! I said, "Now take yourself back to your third birthday." I then showed him a picture of a birthday party with a bunch of smiling kids gathered around a table and a smiling mother lighting a candle on a birthday cake. He then said, "Mr. Counselor, I didn't see it before but I see it now. It's all in front of me. My third birthday party. The kids leave the party. My mother takes me to her bed, hugs me, and touches me down there. I feel ashamed; I feel awful." That's pretty much what he said. Then he ran out of my office crying. I had the sense that it would eventually come down to this -- to sex. Do I have to report to this to the police? I guess so.

The prosecutor replies:

Your Honor, Carr is plainly a competent witness. I would just like to add that I'm not sure that you can look at Carr's diary, if that's what it is. Let me make my point more emphatically, your Honor: with all due respect, neither you nor the jury can consider Carr's diary.

Judge Wisdom turns to you and whispers:

Diligent, this is all too complicated for me. I think we had better get this business straightened out now. I want to know if I should or can let Carr testify. I am willing to make an advance ruling on the other question or questions defense counsel has raised -- the question of how defense counsel can use Carr's diary if Carr does testify. You've got to help me out here as well.

Diligent, you have to put the issues into some sort of sensible order for me and then you've got to resolve those issues for me. I'm going to adjourn the trial for a day. Diligent, I want you to write a memorandum for me. I want your memo in my hands in 24 hours or less.

Where is that diary anyway? Has it been marked as an exhibit? Does he want to offer the whole thing? I guess not. I hope not. In any event, do that memo. Thanks, Diligent. Oh yes, Diligent: don't forget to do your homework. I'm sure you?'ll have to do some legal research.

Write the memorandum and submit it within 24 hours.

End of Examination Problem

Was it Dworkin who said that in law there is -- in principle -- always a right answer? Now what on earth could he have possibly meant by that?

Should Courts Use Numbers to Describe Standards of Persuasion in Legal Proceedings?

This judge is Judge Jack B. Weinstein.

The opinion is United States v. Copeland, 2005 WL 1109441 (E.D. N.Y., May 4, 2005).

Defendant was indicted for illegally re-entering the United States. Defendant had been previously deported. The issue was whether the indictment was valid or should be dismissed.

Defendant had been denied due process in the deportation proceedings that resulted in his deportation. The Second Circuit instructed the trial judge (Weinstein) that the indictment against defendant for defendant’s subsequent illegal (re)entry into the United States should be dismissed only if the trial court found that defendant was prejudiced by the due process defect in the deportation proceedings.

Judge Weinstein held that the Second Circuit’s prejudice requirement requires a determination of the probability that the result in the deportation proceedings would have been different had there been no denial of due process in the deportation proceedings that actually resulted in deportation. Judge Weinstein held that defendant did not have to show that defendant was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the result would have been “no deportation order” in the absence of the due process error; defendant’s burden was less than that.

Judge Weinstein summarized the situation this way:

The rule of law adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requires the district court to undertake the highly speculative task of determining whether, absent the constitutional violation, the immigration judge would have ordered the defendant deported. In effect, this enterprise necessitates a present reconstruction of a hypothetical deportation hearing in 1996. It requires the court to accurately predict, in the deportation context, what would have happened at another time, in another place, with different lawyers, and before another unknown judge, using variable and subjective factors.

An indictment charging Richard Copeland with illegal reentry into the United States was dismissed by this court based on a finding that the underlying prior ordered deportation was not consistent with due process. See United States v. Copeland, 228 F.Supp.2d 267 (E.D.N.Y.2002). Though the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was in agreement that due process had been denied, it nevertheless vacated dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir.2004). Concluding that the law required both denial of due process and a showing of prejudice before the dismissal of an illegal re-entry indictment, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing and findings on the question of whether the fundamental procedural error in the defendant's deportation hearing had been prejudicial.

As I have already noted, Judge Weinstein concluded that defendant did not have to show that it was more probable than not that he would not have been deported. But if defendant was not required to show by a preponderance of the evidence or to show that it was more probable than not that the result of the deportation proceedings would have been different in the absence of the due process defect, how much less of a burden did defendant have? And how is that burden to be described?

Judge Weinstein’s answer was nothing if not forthright. Judge Weinstein held defendant had to show that there was a probability of at least .2 (20%) that his deportation would not have been ordered (by another immigration judge?) if there had been no denial of due process.

The result under this liberal standard was that defendant still lost. Judge Weinstein wrote:

The [trial] court [i.e., Judge Weinstein] conducted a full evidentiary hearing. It finds that the defendant was not "prejudiced." The decision is based on a determination, by a standard of clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence--80% or more probability--that had the section 212(c) hearing and administrative appeal before deportation been properly conducted by an immigration judge, the defendant would have been ordered deported. Accordingly, the indictment is reinstated.

And how did Judge Weinstein explain his choice to use digits (80%; 20%) to describe the burden of persuasion on the issue of “prejudice”?

Judge Weinstein wrote:

Prejudice is shown where "defects in the deportation proceedings may well have resulted in a deportation that would not otherwise have occurred." Id. …

The [Second Circuit] Court of Appeals did not say what degree of "likelihood," i.e. what probability, must be established. …

It concluded that prejudice is shown where there is a "reasonable probability" that the deportation at issue would not have been ordered absent the error complained of.

…

2. Quantifying Prejudice

Typically, courts have not quantified burdens of proof. See J. MAGUIRE, J. CHADBOURN, J. MANSFIELD, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 871-73 (6th ed.1973) (collecting literature on quantification of burdens of proof); RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 20 (1992) (discussing implications of burdens of proof); TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 338 (1991) (correlating verbal and mathematical measures of certainty and doubt).

The term "reasonable probability" should be quantified to the extent possible, given the difficulty of assessing what another adjudicator would have done when applying complex and subjective criteria. One of the most astute observers of problems of proof has emphasized the importance of attempting to set standards of probability in deciding whether fact-finding burdens have been met. He wrote:

The possible frailty of the fact-finding process in adjudication is an important and complex problem. It threatens to corrode public confidence in a vital part of the legal system; it raises significant moral, ethical, and legal issues ...; it raises the possibility that legal rules cannot be efficiently or effectively administered and implemented; and it raises broader questions about the fairness, morality, acceptability, and efficiency of matters such as the legislative process and administrative rule-making proceedings. The problem of evidence and uncertainty is not simply a "technical" or "abstract" one. However one proposes to deal with the problem of uncertain inference--whether by "abstract" models, by "common sense" reasoning, by dismissing it as unmanageable by rational analysis, or in some other way--what one thinks about probability and inference in [adjudication] profoundly affects what one thinks about the "rule of law."

Peter Tillers, Introduction to the Boston University School of Law Symposium on Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (1986). Agreement on quantification, while not a solution, does help move beyond the mere anecdotal to at least a rough consensus in application.

Quantification requires analysis in terms of probability. Cf. Anne W. Martin & David A. Schum, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A Likelihood Ratio Approach, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (1987); Peter Tillers & David A. Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial Proof: Beyond Wigmore, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 910 (1988) ("The primary motivation for the use of most mathematical models of proof is to facilitate consistent thinking about very complex problems.").

While "reasonable probability," the term of art selected by the Court of Appeals, seems deliberately designed to be fuzzy in concept and articulation, it is suggested that a probability of 20%--the approximate inverse of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence"--represents a sensible and enforceable standard, considering that deportation often has such serious consequences for the deportee and his or her family.

It has been said that,

[t]ime is irreversible, events unique, and any reconstruction of the past at best an approximation. As a result of this lack of certainty about what happened, it is inescapable that the trier's conclusions be based on probabilities.

J. MAGUIRE, J. CHADBOURN, J. MANSFIELD, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed.1973). See also United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y.1978). In Fatico, the court noted: "Quantified, the preponderance standard would be 50% probable.... [T]he probabilities might be in the order of above 70% under a clear and convincing evidence burden.... In terms of percentages, the probabilities for clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence might be in the order of 80% under this standard." 458 F.Supp. at 405. Id. at 411 (concluding that "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" means a probability of "about 80%"). Cf. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 514 (E.D.N.Y.1995) ("[Non-statistical] evidence offers nothing more than a basis for conclusions about a perceived balance of probabilities."), rev'd, 103 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir.1997) ("Though [the district court's] comprehensive opinion is a valuable addition to the legal literature on the subject of evidence in particular and judicial decision-making in general, we conclude that he relied on evidence beyond the category of 'specific evidence' that our prior opinion ruled was required for determination of a "relevant conduct" drug quantity for purposes of imposing a criminal sentence ."); Peter Tillers, Introduction: Three Contributions to Three Important Problems in Evidence Scholarship, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875, 1884 (1997) ("One possible way to make sense out of [the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Shonubi ] is to view it as a condemnation of statistical evidence in general.... But there are ... problems with the view that [the opinion] is, at bottom, a repudiation of statistical evidence and statistical methods. [For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit] seems to accept the use of statistics and statistical methods for [related] purposes ....").

When, as here, a relatively "simple fact"--what happened in the real world of defendant's life--is combined with what an unknown administrative judge would have done in evaluating the evidence supporting that finding of "fact," and analyzing the "fact" in the context of a "legal rule," the problem of determining how the judge would have decided the "law-fact" issue is complex. It is compounded by many factors--among them the egocentricity of the judge. At most a band of probabilities is all that we can expect. Since the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated he is entitled, it is submitted, to the most favorable band border--here, it is proposed, 20%. An attempt to quantify in order to provide some uniformity in application of the rule is justified even though it must be conceded that the percentage chosen is based on public policy favoring enforcement of constitutional rights and somewhat arbitrary.

&&&

Do you think Judge Weinstein’s ruling will stand? Or do you think the Second Circuit Court of Appeals will again slap down Judge Weinstein, perhaps on the ground that Judge Weinstein is again improperly trying to expressly quantify, or grade numerically, things that cannot be or ought not be quantified, measured, or graded numerically?

Even though I see force in the argument that standards of persuasion such as the reasonable doubt standard should be couched in numerical terms, cf. Questions about Winship, I routinely tell my students there is not a snowball’s chance in %$^& that this will happen. But seeing a judge who has the great courage of his very determined convictions makes me wonder if I am being too timid. Perhaps the sort of “mathematical” approach that J. Weinstein favors will someday prevail, at least in some sectors of the law.

More about Biography of H.L.A. Hart

Update: As Nicola Lacey's biography of H.L.A. Hart progresses, there is increasing detail about the intellectual currents at Oxford and elsewhere. This largely answers one of the concerns I voiced earlier. See my post dated May 13, 2005.

Edinburgh Seminars on Law, Probability, and Risk

Professor Colin Aitken and the University of Edinburgh are hosting additional seminars on law, probability, and risk. See http://www.lprseminars.org.

One seminar is slated for October 14-15, 2005. The general topic topic is criminology and the organizer is Sarah Armstrong.

A second seminar is scheduled for December 2-3, 2005. The general topic is evidence evaluation and the organizer is Colin Aitken.

The seminars are free but participation is by invitation. For details about the seminars get in touch with either Sarah Armstrong or Colin Aitken at:

Sarah Armstrong: sarmstro at staffmail.ed.ac.uk

C.G.G. Aitken
School of Mathematics
The King's Building
The University of Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ
Scotland

E-mail: cgga at maths.ed.ac.uk
http://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~cgga
Phone: (0)131 650 4877
Fax: (0)131 650 6553

Forename, Surname

In her biography of H.L.A. Hart Nicola Lacey refers to Hart as "Herbert." This does not feel quite right to me. Perhaps this is because I want the biographer to distance herself from her formidable subject.

I have reached p. 118. There is a lot of personal detail here. Not all of the details about Hart's life to this point are clearly tied to Hart's intellectual interests. Without that connection, some of the details seem a bit tedious.

I still don't see much tragedy in Hart's life. (He has now gone through WWII and he is contemplating going "up" to Oxford to be a don.) But perhaps the tragedy lies in the future? Further reading will tell. (Or perhaps my benchmark for "tragedy" is different than Lacey's?)

The book jacket states: "To generations of lawyers, H.L.A. Hart is known as the twentieth century's greatest legal philosopher." Question: Does she mean English lawyers? Commonwealth lawyers? U.K., Commonwealth, and American Lawyers? In any event, there are other pretenders to the throne of 20th century legal philosophy. Hans Kelsen is one.

As Lacey recounts the details of Hart's life, she mentions numerous individuals who played a role in Hart's life. I am familiar with many but not all of the names she mentions. I wonder if Lacey gives the reader -- particularly the reader without much knowledge of those times and the intellectual currents in the U.K. and at Oxford --, I wonder if Lacey gives the reader a sufficiently good feel for those times and currents. Thus far my sense is that Lacey gives us (many) hints of what the world was like in those times and places but that her account should have been, in certain respects, more sweeping, and in other respects, more focused. Some of the individuals Lacey mentions are not interesting in their own right and it does not appear that all of them influenced Hart in significant ways. But my judgments here are thoroughly and unforgivably provisional: I have not yet seen the denouement of the very interesting story that Lacey tells.

Power Law Degree

What is a "power law degree distribution"? It's not what most of you lawyers, law teachers, and judges think it is. See Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means.

N.B. I have no idea if this book is any good.

H.L.A. Hart

I am reading Nicola Lacey's A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford 2004). So far not much of a nightmare ... but I am only at p. 56.

Postscript: In his published writings Hart did not mention Hegel -- or, if he did, he did so only in passing. But Hart knew the literature on Hegel very well. Hart really was a remarkable person.

Well-Trained Historians

So President Putin:

“If the Baltic countries became part of the USSR in 1939, then there is no way we could occupy them in 1941, since they were already part of the Soviet Union,” Putin argued. “Maybe I did not study well at the university because I drank a lot of beer in Soviet times, but I have something left in my head because the history professors were good,” he added.

ISN Security Watch, May 11, 2005

Do Inherited Beliefs and Conjectures Affect Inference?

Yes!

And sometimes the inherited beliefs and conjectures that influence inference are more than 2000 years old:

Ian Fisher, Rome Journal: Some Say His Digging Up of a Legend Is Just a Myth, NYTimes Online Edition (May 6, 2005):

[A]ndrea Carandini ...one of Italy's most renowned archaeologists ... has discovered something extraordinary underneath the tightly packed ruins of the Roman Forum: a palace that he believes belonged to the first king of Rome, who just maybe was actually named Romulus.

...

[I]n the two decades that Dr. Carandini, 68, has excavated in and around the Palatine Hill, the epicenter of successive generations of Roman rulers, he has without doubt attracted a fair share of skeptics.

...

[Dr. Carandini] says his latest discoveries show the myth to be quite possibly true, even if the king's name was not necessarily Romulus ....

Others say that in his two decades at the site, Dr. Carandini has sometimes worked backward from myth to explain what he has found, rather than waiting for evidence to emerge from the finds themselves.

Note, this is not simply an instance in which Dr. Carandini and his critics have different prior beliefs. This is equally a situation in which Dr. Carandini's prior beliefs give the archeological evidence that he finds a different flavor in his mind's eye than it has in his critics' minds' eyes.

"critics minds' eyes"? Now, really, Tillers!

Seminars in Edinburgh: Law, Probability, and Risk

Please take note of the following announcement of two transdisciplinary seminars on law, probability, and risk (venue: University of Edinburgh):

The following dates are now confirmed for the last two LPR seminars:

1. Criminology organised by Sarah Armstrong: October 14th and 15th 2005 (Friday and Saturday).

2. Evidence evaluation organised by Colin Aitken: December 2nd and 3rd 2005 (Friday and Saturday).

Details of the seminar programme, sponsored by [the Economic and Social Research Council], are available at www.lprseminars.org.

If anyone is interested in attending either or both of these seminars, please let Sarah Armstrong (sarmstro@staffmail.ed.ac.uk) know.

There is no registration fee.

Best wishes,

Colin Aitken
-------------
C.G.G. Aitken
School of Mathematics
The King's Buildings Fax: (0)131 650 6553
The University of Edinburgh, EH9 3JZ Scotland
http://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~cgga
E-mail: cgga (at) maths.ed.ac.uk

Aha! I have found a blurb about the mysterious "2029 Project." See Institute for Alternative Futures This is a biomedical research project supported by Pfizer.

More on the Architecture of the Brain

Thomas R. Insel, Nora D. Volkow, Ting-Kai Li, James F. Battey, Story C. Landis, Neuroscience Networks: Data-sharing in an Information Age, PLoS Biol 1(1): e7 (Essay, October 13, 2003)(© 2003 Public Library of Science. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Public Library of Science Open-Access License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.):

In parallel to the worldwide effort to map the human genome, investigators in neuroscience have used a range of techniques to map the brain. The efforts share some superficial similarities: the genome has 3 × [10 to the 9th power] bases and the human brain has roughly 100 × [10 to the 9th power] neurons; both the genome and the brain have embedded modules of functional units (genes versus circuits) that can be mapped in space; and localization of both genes and circuits requires computational power that can be distributed across laboratories. But the analogy breaks down quickly. Whereas fundamental genome data can be addressed as unidimensional text of four letters in varying order, a comprehensive map of the brain includes molecular, cellular, system, and behavioral data—all of which are dynamic, interacting, and interdependent. For example, brain circuitry is organized in three-dimensional space constantly changing in time, with each neuron having [10 to the 3rd power] – [10 to the 4th power] synapses and with many of those synapses capable of plasticity that may, in turn, have significant functional consequences.

Brain as Computer?

Some work in artificial intelligence (a/k/a computational intelligence) and in computer science has tried to make hay out of the analogy between computers and brains. Recent work in the biology of the brain, however, suggests that if the brain is a computer, the brain-computer is quite unlike the digital computer (this we already knew!) and -- moreover! -- that the architecture of the brain is also rather unlike computers that make use of parallel processing. Furthermore, some people in the field -- the field of the biology of the brain -- now think that at the perceptual level brains use sensory inputs to make predictions about the attributes of the thing that is being perceived: they suspect that the brain takes a few sensory inputs, does a bit of processing (but initially not much), and then proceeds by searching in memory for similar or analogous mental constructs based on similar sets or constellations of sensory inputs. This sequence of operations is not necessarily the end of the process but such a sequence, I gather, is the way (some people think) the brain gets things started, and quickly so. See the pdf manuscript by an anonymous author, Advances in Cellular and Systems Knowledge of the Nervous System(Feb. 9, 2005), document self-identified as part of something called "Nervous System 2029 Project."

If You Look for Surprising Coincidences Long Enough, You Will Find Them

Books: The Long, Strange Journey of Einstein's Brain Online Text for Morning Edition, April 18, 2005:

In another peer review, Terence Hines of Pace University, writing in Experimental Neurology in 1998, echoed Kantha's criticisms. Diamond's study, he wrote, "is so seriously flawed that its conclusions should not be accepted." Hines's complaint is the same one lodged against Paul Broca by Stephen Jay Gould in The Mismeasure of Man.

If you look long enough, if you measure a sufficient number of attributes, and if you are highly selective, you can eventually find statistical evidence to support or defeat any claim.

An Arson Investigation: Junk Forensic Science?

See (hear) the brief interview Improving the Science of Arson Detection on National Public Radio.