Notes on MarshalPlan: Theoretical Underpinnings

In my evidence marshaling software - MarshalPlan - I have a note that might be of general interest.  The note is called "A Note on the Theoretical Underpinnings and Purposes of MarshalPlan." I said this (sometime in 2012 or earlier):

A Note on the Structure of This Note
My motivations for developing MarshalPlan have been theoretical as much as practical. But I did not and I do not see a tension between my theoretical and practical ambitions. My neo-empiricist inclinations lead me to conclude that a sound theory of inference must be able to prove itself in the world. By developing MarshalPlan I wanted to both explore and illustrate some basic hypotheses about the nature of (wo)man's acquisition of knowledge about his (her) world.
Since my constructivist agenda was positive rather than negative, I have not used any part of the  other notes embedded in MarshalPlan to make arguments against views of evidential inference that I think are mistaken. My thought was that the success or failure of MarshalPlan would be the primary test of whether my own views are or are not mistaken. However, now that I have largely completed the outline of a working model of MarshalPlan, I think it might now be useful for me identify the theoretical premises and perspectives that I do not have and that do not undergird the MarshalPlan project. So I will do that. But I will describe (below) those rejected perspectives only in a shorthand way. This is why I use the word "dogma" below to refer to my view about this or that perspective that I find wanting.
After identifying some theoretical perspectives that I do not embrace, I describe (below) some of my key affirmative hunches about the nature and foundations of empirical human knowledge. These are theses that either have supported the development of MarshalPlan or they are theses that are supported by the development of MarshalPlan.      Theoretical Dogma Number 1
There is a long-running debate in the American legal academy and elsewhere about the use of mathematics to analyze evidence in trials. This debate is a red herring; it misses the boat; it does not address the fundamental issues about evidential inference. This is not to say that questions about when mathematics might or should play a role in evidential argument in legal settings are uninteresting or unimportant; they are both interesting and important. I also do not claim that discussions that focus of the role of mathematics can or have said nothing about fundamental epistemological issues. That's not the case. Such discussions can and sometimes do touch on fundamental questions and in this way shed light on key facets of inference and reasoning from evidence.  But such a defense of the debate about mathematical analysis of evidence is a bit like saying that WWII was a good thing because it led to the development of V-2 rockets. The debate about mathematical analysis of evidence has caused more intellectual havoc than enlightenment.
   Theoretical Dogma Number 2
There have been arguments, both within the literature on evidential inference narrowly conceived and in the broader philosophical literature, that inference is fundamentally subjective. I have occasionally made such arguments myself.
The claim that human inference is subjective is true but trivial.
Human beings (and sharks and other organisms [see below]) do have some capacity to draw accurate inferences about the world. If they did not, they could not have survived as long as they have -- unless they had an extraordinary amount of dumb luck. In any case, accomplishments such as the development of the internal combustion engine, the development of nuclear weapons, the development of the microchip, and the construction of cathedrals that often manage to stand for decades and sometimes for centuries is evidence enough that accurate factual inference is sometimes possible. Complete epistemological or inferential relativism or skepticism is a non-starter for any serious student of human evidential inference.
   Theoretical Dogma Number 3
The opposing thesis -- the thesis that there are objective methods of drawing inferences about human behavior -- is, however, also incorrect. This thesis is incorrect if by the word "objective" we mean self-standing (or autonomous or largely-autonomous) methods of reasoning, artificial methods of reasoning that can replace ordinary, seemingly-sloppy, and commonsense human methods of reasoning about matters such as human behavior.
Usually such objective methods are not available. This is true even though it is also true that some problems or questions in our world are now configured in such a way that artificial and autonomous methods of ratiocination, rumination, or computation can yield solutions that are less likely to be wrong than those reached by unaided human common sense.
As you can see, this dogma -- Dogma Number 3 -- is closely related to Dogma Number 1, my dogma about the irrelevance of much of the longstanding debate about mathematical analysis of evidence and inference.
The brain -- or the neurobiological system -- or possibly we will have to call it the neuro-electro-magneto-biological system -- is a very complex mechanism. Some persons say that it is the most complex mechanism in the universe. They may be right about that. Whether they are or not right about that, it is unlikely that artificial methods of computation (such as computer-based computation) can replace the human brain anytime soon. True, as I said earlier, in some domains computers can outperform humans; for example, computers can now play chess and checkers better than even the most extraordinary humans can. But in most arenas computers do far less well than human beings do. That's likely to be the case for some time to come.
   Theoretical Dogma Number 4
Given Dogma Number 3, it does not follow that theorizing about inference is pointless. On the contrary: it is possible for theorizing about inference to have both theoretical value and cash-value: it is possible that theorizing about inference can lead to improvements in both our understanding of evidential inference and in the quality of real-world inference in legal settings.
Given our present understanding of evidential inference and given the limitations on our current understanding of evidential inference, there is reason to believe and hope that images of reasoning about evidence can improve human inference if such images are used ctogether with with ordinary reasoning and common sense logic. More precisely stated,  it is possible for images (or pictures) of inference to be a useful tool of common sense, it is possible for images of evidential inference to support, facilitate, and enhance natural, or pre-existing, methods of human reasoning about evidence. This is roughly the fundamental insight that Timothy van Gelder holds and purveys, and I align myself with him. (However, Tim bears no responsibility for the details of the MarshalPlan system or for its many defects and failings.)
(No more dogmas!)
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Those are some of my theoretical beliefs and dogmas. But now I must tackle a hard question rather than an easy one:
What sorts of images of inference, what sorts of cognitive tools, what sorts of models of inference are likely to be helpful?
I begin my attack on this question by making a few more comments about the general direction that theorizing about inference might take and why this general tack might turn out to be productive.
The brain -- or the human neurobiological system, or possibly the human electro-magneto-neuro-biological system -- is a computational mechanism of enormous complexity, subtlety, and power. A model of inference -- an artificial construct -- might try to capitalize on the power of this natural mechanism and make it function more effectively.
How could an image or images of inference do that?
Stated most abstractly, my answer is this: an image or model of evidential inference could improve the quality of human inferential performance if it could trigger natural computational mechanisms and processes (such as those in the brain) and make it possible for human beings to use their native, or inbred, computational mechanisms and processes more efficiently, more effectively, and more productively.
That artificial devices might be helpful or useful in this derivative way -- that images or models of evidential inference could serve as handmaidens of natural human reason -- that some artificial constructs depicting inference might be useful cognitive tools, or helpful cognitive crutches -- that appropriately-drawn images of inference might function as supports for native human reasoning -- is suggested by two considerations.
First, any particular line of reasoning about any real-world problem almost inevitably involves multiple steps. Properly designed artificial devices -- cognitive tools, heuristic devices, inference support tools, whatever they are called -- might well improve the ability of humans literally to keep in mind -- to keep in conscious thought, to be more aware of, to have more awareness of -- the steps in any train of reasoning that they decide to follow when considering any particular factual hypothesis.
Second, human beings reason about evidence and the world along multiple tracks, in a multitude of ways. Even though the brain is a very powerful mechanism, it is not an infallible one, and the different ways of thinking or reasoning or the different tracks the mind takes are difficult to keep in mind (so to speak) at the same time. But these different tracks, these different ways of thinking about a problem, influence each other. So keeping multiple lines of reasoning in mind at the same time is important; indeed, it is essential. Cognitive crutches can help mortals keep in mind the many different tracks along which their minds are running.
In sum, there is reason to think or hope that artificial tools (including, for example, simple diagrams and checklists drawn on paper) can make it easier for human beings to literally better keep in mind their various ways of thinking about a factual question and the numerous steps that human beings characteristically take and construct within each track of the many tracks of thinking that they follow.
The next question is what particular sorts of images or models of evidential inference are likely to be useful and necessary.
Overview of Evidence Marshaling Methods in MarshalPlan
Much recent theoretical work on inference centers on inference networks. Such work is very important and it must continue. However, MarshalPlan has relatively little to say about inference networks. It focuses on other methods or marshaling or organizing evidence. MarshalPlan emphasizes comparatively simple evidence marshaling strategies methods such as event time lines, scenarios, and marshaling of evidence by legal rules.
Card Number 2 of the stack Network Manager -- the card in which this notes is embedded -- serves in part as an outline of the evidence marshaling methods found in MarshalPlan.

Card 2
The evidence marshaling strategies pictured on Card Number 2 can be sorted into several broad categories.
In one set of methods TIME plays a central role. This is is true of event chronologies, or time lines. It is true of scenarios. And it is true, in a more complicated way, of narrative and story-telling.
Nota Bene: There are several sub-categories of time lines: (1) time lines of the events at issue in a case, (2) time lines that show the history of sources of evidence (both so-called real evidence and human sources, or witnesses), (3) time lines showing the order in which evidence is collected, handled, and presented. Each of these categories can have subcategories or subdivisions: For example, time lines for events at issue include time lines showing the possible events over time related to possible actors in the possible events at issue.
Another set of evidence marshaling methods deals with the influence of legal doctrines and norms on evidence marshaling, analysis, collection, and assessment in legal settings. I am now referring, for example, to the red buttons (or links) called Legal Rules, Legal Argument, Legal Source Material, and Evidence and Material Facts. These and other stacks deal, in the aggregate, with "legal marshaling," which is my shorthand phrase for the way that legal doctrines and legal norms influence the gathering and assessment of evidence.
Another set of evidence marshaling methods amounts to little more than a system for filing evidence and information. These are the methods (or stacks) called Raw Evidence, Legal Source Material, Persons, Analysts, Legal Actors, and so on. It is probably true that the filing of information on the basis of such categories ordinarily does not require great intellectual labor. Nonetheless, the filing of evidence and information on the basis of such categories is not a trivial act. Evidence and information can be more easily accessed and recalled and evidence and information are also more suggestive and evocative if they are stored on the basis of meaningful concepts, i.e., according to categories or classifications that are meaningful to the user.
Another group of evidence marshaling strategies in MarshalPlan's collection of evidence marshaling strategies inches toward the development of inference networks. Thinking of inference as a network or web of inference is mainly but not exclusively useful when the factual questions are stable and the available evidence is know. In situations such as this -- in situations in which the facts in issue seem relatively stable -- a decision maker is most likely to want to focus on evidence sorting methods such as Evidence of Material Facts, Evidence for and against Material Facts, Witness Credibility, and Argument about Evidence, or Probative Value.
This above outline of types of evidence marshaling strategies two important strategies shown on Card Number 2 of Network Manager unaccounted for.
One important strategy not yet discussed is is the cognitive strategy or process here called Case Theory.
As it now stands, the stack Case Theory is less a picture of how this evidence marshaling strategy works than it is a general reminder that, first, there is a very important synthetic or constructive aspect to factfinding and evidential inference, second, the various evidence marshaling strategies identified and described by MarshalPlan influence each other and depend on each other, and,  third, the strength of a claim to have correctly or plausibly determined the important legally-material facts depends in large part on the extent to which the various evidence marshaling strategies that a decision maker uses are in harmony with each other and reinforce each other and, thus, on the the extent to which evidence marshaling strategies taken together generate a state of mind of epistemic equanimity, an epistemic reflective equilibrium. (If I were a brilliant programmer, which I am not, I could figure out how to develop a Case Theory stack that would allow the user to rotate through all of the evidence marshaling strategies shown in the Network Manager stack while still keeping, to some substantial degree, all evidence marshaling strategies in the mind's eye.)
Another group of stacks (or evidence marshaling strategies) lies at almost the opposite pole from the case theory stack (that is, at the opposite pole from thinking about the whole ball of wax). Case theory development involves synthetic thinking -- which in this instances involves the attempt to view the various parts of evidence marshaling in relationship to each other and the attempt to sense the degree to which the results of various evidence marshaling strategies are consistent with each other. This kind of synthetic and global thinking becomes tends to become most explicit once the key ingredients of an inferential puzzle have been identified and studied. But reasoning about evidence also involves and requires exploratory thinking. Several stacks in Network Manager are designed to facilitate and support imaginative thinking about possibilities. See, for example, the stack Possibilities and the stack Loose Thoughts.
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You have been presented with a general sketch of the evidence marshaling strategies that are collected in MarshalPlan. The collection of strategies I have described looks a bit like a network. But the collection of  strategies in MarshalPlan is not a true network; it is a quasi-network. This is not an accidental feature of MarshalPlan; it is a central feature of MarshalPlan.
In my picture of evidence marshaling, the results of any one kind of evidence marshaling -- for example, of marshaling by time line, legal rules, etc. -- the results of any one kind of marshaling do not have determinate, or computable, implications for any other type of evidence marshaling. For example, any specific time line is logically compatible with innumerable scenarios. However, it is my hypothesis that the evidence marshaling strategies in my collection nevertheless do influence each other. For example, an assessment of the plausibility of some scenario may be affected and is likely to be affected by my assessment of the credibility of this or that witness. This is why I call my network a quasi-network even though MarshalPlan is not a true network.
On this point, I entirely embrace David Schum's thesis (which he advanced in a different context) that marshaling evidence in one particular way may be evocative of or suggestive of evidence marshaling that has a different axis and follows a completely different logic.   I believe that a quasi-network better portrays how the mind -- the accessible part of the human mind, in any event --, how the mind works when it ruminates about evidence in legal settings (and, putting aside legal marshaling, how the mind works in other settings as well).
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But how, you might ask, did I arrive at the evidence marshaling strategies and methods that are included in MarshalPlan, that are found in the catalogues of evidence marshaling operations or methods found in places such as Card Numbers 2 and 3 of Network Manager and in places such as the stack Loose Thoughts?
The answer is that a variety of considerations -- a bit of logic, a bit of philosophy, some personal legal experiences, and so on -- led me to the list of evidence marshaling strategies now found in MarshalPlan. But it is very important for me to say and forthrightly admit that subjective introspection was a critical source of my catalogue of evidence marshaling strategies; that is, I peered into my own mind and I tried to see how I think about evidence and how I organize evidence in legal contexts such as litigation; I tried to identify the different ways that I, Peter Tillers, think about evidence when I try to understand evidence and assess its implications.
So it is fair to say that in many respects MarshalPlan has an affinity with mind maps. However, a mind map isn't worth much if it's just a map of one person's idiosyncratic mind. You and I may think in different ways about evidence. The fact that I think one way may just demonstrate that I have an enormous capacity for self-delusion or that I am very stupid. It is also possible that things I do not understand or see drive me to think the way I do. But there is reason to think and hope that MarshalPlan is more than just a map of the way one particular human creature, Peter Tillers, thinks.
I do have an quasi-objective explanation or justification for some of the methods on my list of evidence marshaling strategies. For example, I believe that plausible ontological considerations support the thesis that almost every factual issue either explicitly or implicitly also presents a question about scenarios. I have similar quasi-objective explanations and justifications for several other evidence marshaling strategies. Beyond that, I appeal to common experience -- both your subjective sense of how you think when you think about evidence and how society (e.g., particular legal rules) tends to say that evidence should be marshaled and analyzed.   Conscious Logic (or Folk Logic) versus Subconscious Logic
But if I purport to be thinking rigorously, I cannot ignore the type of challenge laid down by some very serious students of artificial intelligence, brain science, and consciousness: What is my justification or explanation for focusing on conscious mental processes rather than the real logic that perhaps drives or might drive the workings of our brains?
My general answer is this: although I entirely agree that at least some subterranean brain processes may help to shape the way we think, it does not follow that conscious mental processes are nothing more than epiphenomena. In any case, we do not yet understand subterranean brain processes well enough to show in detail how they make us think as we do. So the thesis of the reality and potency of mental processes that are visible to our consciousness, to introspection, is, at a minimum, a good working hypothesis. (This working hypothesis might even turn out to be true in the long run and it might turn out to be the case that the influence of subterranean neural processes on human thinking has been exaggerated by critics of so-called folk logic.)
Multiplicity and Simplicity
The evidence marshaling methods found in MarshalPlan are both varied and relatively simple. In some quarters, these features of MarshalPlan might be considered defects because, first, it might be supposed that the process of drawing inferences cannot be that messy and inelegant and because, second, it might be supposed that the process of assessing evidence and drawing inferences from evidence really can't really be as simple as I seem to suggest or suppose.
My general answer would be that the real-world drawing of inferences about real-world factual questions is in fact a very messy business -- a process that involves a large variety of ways of thinking.
If some one were to ask me, What is the key to factual inference?, I might give a variety of answers. But my first response should be to say that there is no magic key to factual inference. I should begin by saying that drawing inferences requires the use of many keys. If someone were to say to me that one logic (e.g., Bayesian logic) animates or underlies all valid factual inference, I should then say, Even if that is true -- even granting your premise -- it does not follow that only that one logic is needed to do inference. It is as if you said to me, A trip to Mars requires the equation F = MA. In response, I would say, Yes, perhaps you're right, but making a trip to Mars requires a great many other things as well. In any event, although some of the things I must do to get to Mars -- for example, get astronauts to read dials carefully or get machines to record sensory signals to a certain degree of accuracy -- may well be governed by F = MA (or by some other universal equation or equations of your choice), I don't yet understand precisely how reading dials is governed by that equation and, until and unless I do, I will have to use something other than F = MA to teach astronauts (or machines) how to read dials carefully and accurately. So, you see, in addition to a rule such as Bayes' Theorem, I need procedures for storing legal rules, making legal arguments, constructing time lines, keeping track of persons, thinking about possibilities, and so on, and on, and on.
This point moves us to the second major feature of the evidence marshaling strategies found in in MarshalPlan: their seeming simplicity. Those methods seem to be little more than common sense. Is that a defect?
Not necessarily.
Common sense is, yes, aw shucks!, quite common. But it does not follow that common sense lacks intelligence. If common sense and intuitive sense were not intelligent, (wo)man would long since have perished from the earth. (I grant you that this argument suggests that sharks are quite intelligent. Yes, in certain respects, they are quite intelligent. That is one reason why they have existed -- apparently -- for hundreds of millions of years.)
The miracle of the human mind is some respects like the miracle of human life: we do not understand very well how we manage to think as well as we do but in fact our seemingly shoddy and shabby and sloppy and simple methods of thinking often work quite well, thank you. So if the evidence marshaling strategies found in MarshalPlan look and are relatively simple, that does not necessarily count against them. Those simple methods may be effective tools for evoking simple but intelligent, or effective, ways of thinking. Yes, I grant you, it almost surely must be the case that very complex processes produce, or underlie, these simple forms of conscious thinking and ordering, and it may also be the case that if we could grasp and explicitly describe those complex processes, we could think and infer much better than we do at present. But we cannot wait until heaven arrives. We must make our best guesses now.
I have often puzzled over fuzzy logic. Despite occasional claims to the contrary (see, e.g., the work of Susan Haack), I have the sense that fuzzy logic is sometimes a powerful tool for the management (control) of real-world processes. That this should be so may seem a mystery -- because fuzzy logic, to the extent that I understand it, is far more akin to a semantic theory than to a causal theory; that is, although fuzzy logic largely or entirely abjures causal accounts of natural processes, it often seems to control those selfsame natural processes quite nicely, thank you. How is this possible?
My guess is that the power of fuzzy logic in the world of nature is possible because (i) fuzzy logic is indeed at heart a semantic theory and (ii) our words and concepts (including our ordinary words and concepts) somehow harbor, in a way we do not understand, much knowledge about our world. An analogous notion may explain why the ordinary and commonsense procedures found in MarhalPlan work -- and why they work as well as they do (if, that is, they do indeed work well, which remains to be seen): carefully disassembling and then reassembling some of our common ways of making good guesses about our world may lead to important advances in our general understanding of how human beings manage to understand the world to the extent that they do.
 Postscript
I cannot claim sole credit for MarshalPlan. I have hesitated to identify my collaborators because I don't know if they want to take credit or blame (as the case may be) for the current version of MarshalPlan. But I do feel impelled to note that the current version of MarshalPlan grew out of a joint NSF reserach project that David Schum and I conducted years ago. We summarized many of the major results of our research in P. Tillers & D. Schum, "A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation," 24 University of California at Davis Law Review 931 (1991).
I may not know much about evidential inference or much about matters such as investigative discovery. But if I know anything worthwhile about such things, it is largely because I had a master teacher, David A. Schum. (I am also deeply indebted to William Twining, Richard Lempert, David Kaye, and many other luminous intellects and wonderful human beings. I hope they will forgive me for failing to name them here.)
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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

The Ideological and Intellectual Detritus of a Tragedy: premature judgments in investigations

There were two bomb explosions in Boston yesterday. Little if anything is known about the possible culprit or culprits. Nonetheless...

a commentator on a left-leaning public radio station in Boston said (s)he thought the most likely culprits were right-wing Minutemen
a commentator on a right-leaning radio station in New York City said (s)he thought the most likely culprits were radical Islamists
Both commentators are feckless idiots.

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The dynamic evidence page

Brainless at the Office

Gregory Sorenson,  The White House Brain Initiative Hits a Tax Hurdle  (Op-Ed) Wall Street Journal (April 15, 2013):
"Robert Frost once wrote that 'The brain is a wonderful organ; it starts working the moment you get up in the morning and does not stop until you get into the office.'" 

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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

"Deep Learning" versus Data Crunching?

This interesting article describes a China research venture that rests on the assumption that truly intelligent machines must engage in "deep learning" rather than (merely) data crunching: Daniela Hernandez, ‘Chinese Google’ Opens Artificial-Intelligence Lab in Silicon Valley Wired (April 12, 2013). Hernandez seems to assert that the China AI lab's research project rests on the assumption that conceptual structures, or representations, must be used to develop the most intelligent nonhuman machines possible, machines that are capable of "deep learning." But in at least part of this article Hernandez also seems to assert that the backers of this AI research project assume that such representations, or conceptual structures, can be identified simply by discovering and studying the physical structure and operations of the human brain (e.g., neural networks). It is not at all clear to me that this assumption (if it is in fact made by the AI lab) is warranted. The assumption does not follow merely from the plausible premise that the logical operations of human machines must be done in or through the brain.

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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

Open Source Live Code

RunRev has released the first version of its open source Live Code software. Go to this page for the announcement and details.

This free software -- called Live Code Community Edition -- is a very welcome development. I expect to make some use of it in my further tinkering with evidence marshaling software.
Live Code is an ideal vehicle for non-programmers: you can program without knowing much of anything about programming. That's why Live Code is very popular among the public at large.
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

In Jersey City August may be the cruelest month...

No, in Jersey City August is more cruel than any other month: it is insufferably hot and humid in Jersey City in August. Time to move elsewhere? Probably so. (There is no real spring here: the seasons in Jersey City skip directly from winter to summer, spring is generally forgotten by the weather gods.)
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

March?

Well, perhaps March is the cruelest month.
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

April's Cruelty

April is the cruelest month.
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

The Growth of Litigation Finance

This article discusses the growth of litigation finance: Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits Wall Street Journal (April 7, 2013).

What does litigation finance portend for and reveal about the workings of proof in American litigation?

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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

Right to Silence in Australia; New Limits

Harriet Alexander, Right to Silence reforms based on out-of-context British law Sydney Morning Herald (April 8, 2013):
"As the [New South Wales] government overturned one of the most tightly held principles of criminal law - the right to silence - it brandished two arguments in support.

"First, abolishing the right to silence had the support of the police. Second, it was far from the revolutionary move its critics claimed. Britain enacted the same legislation nearly 20 years ago.

"The ''evidence of silence'' laws passed last month were designed to make trials more efficient and stop the defence from springing surprises on the prosecution.

"They require the defence and prosecution to outline the key aspects of their cases weeks before trial, and allow the jury to draw an unfavourable inference if an unexpected defence is raised at trial.

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"They also abolish the right to silence, so juries will be able to draw adverse conclusions if accused people choose not to participate in police interviews, but later rely on evidence that they could have brought up in the first place.

"But Britain's Justice and Public Order Act 1994, on which they were modelled, was formulated in an entirely different context.

"In Britain, duty solicitors are stationed at police stations 24 hours, and one of their roles is to advise the accused on the implications of remaining silent.

"In [New South Wales], there is no funding to place a duty solicitor in every police station around the clock, although the law will still only apply to people who have been cautioned in the presence of a lawyer.

"President of the NSW Bar Association Phillip Boulten also warns that while in Britain there is a culture of continuous disclosure, that does not exist in Australia."

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The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

A Modest Proposal for a Solution to the Sexual Abuse Crisis (Crises?)

It seems to me this is a good time to reproduce my modest proposal of 2010 for a final solution to sex abuse scandals:

A Modest Proposal

What a dimwit I have been! I apologize. A light has dawned in my foggy noggin. I now realize what the solution to the problem is. (You do know what the problem is, don't you, dear Reader?)

The solution to the problem is this:

All organizations that harbor any sexual predators must be done away with.

This of course includes, not just the Roman Catholic Church, but also Protestant churches, Jewish synagogues, high schools, middle schools, junior high schools (and, of course, elementary schools), universities, research institutes, newspapers, TV and radio stations, courts, police departments, large corporations, all large associations & organizations of any description whatever, any small association or organization in which there has been child abuse (as a prophylactic measure, the institution of the family should be abolished since it is in the family that child abuse happens most often), Congress, and so on.

Yes, I know: the destruction of such organizations & associations is a high price to pay. But at least we could all go to sleep at night knowing that our children are safe. (They would be sleeping safely in schools run by the government. They would be safe there.)

Would hanging or shooting the leaders of such organizations and associations be an even more effective remedy? Perhaps such capital remedial measures should be considered (along with, in the U.S., an amendment to the Constitution). Monetary penalties may not be enough. Prison may not be not enough. Even flogging may not be enough.

In any event, it is clear, isn't it, that if the Catholic Church, Protestant churches, schools, universities, newspapers, etc, were abolished, we would be rid of the pestilence of child sexual abuse, yes?

Well, OK. Perhaps I am getting carried away just a bit: I acknowledge that abolition or destruction of such organizations or institutions might be a bit extreme in some cases. I see a possible alternative:

Organizations should be required to make sure that their members regularly engage in gratifying sexual intercourse or other satisfying sexual activity with other freely-consenting adults.

For example, perhaps organizations should be required to levy fines against any of their members who choose to remain celibate. This way we would know that the people who come into contact with our children are sexually gratified and have no reason to seek further gratification by molesting our children.

Short of this sensible remedy (i.e., the imposition of fines against sexually inactive people for being sexually inactive), organizations & associations of every stripe should be liable in spades (i.e., many dollars) for every sexual misdeed -- known or not, foreseen or not -- of every one of its members. That's clearly necessary. And, of course, such monetary penalties fall far short of lynching or shooting -- even though it must be admitted that in some instances monetary penalties could destroy or severely damage institutions such as schools, churches, and hospitals.

We can & should invert Kant's dictum about the horror of punishing the innocent thus:

It is better for the world to perish than for any institution (particularly a religious one) that harbors & succors -- whether wittingly or unwittingly -- even a single sexual miscreant to escape severe punishment.

This reformulated maxim is a fitting tribute to our modern sense of justice and proportion; it reflects the enlightened temper of our times. See Editorial, The Pope and the Pedophilia Scandal New York Times (March 24, 2010).

 

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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

"Private School Sex Abuse Scandal"

We had the "clergy sex abuse scandal." Now it seems that it's time for the "private school sex abuse sandal." See Jess Bidgood, Abuse Charge at Exclusive Boarding School [Deerfield Academy] Stirs Inquiry, NYTimes. (March 29, 2013). Other cases of this sort have (unsurprisingly) surfaced in recent months. See, e.g., the Horace Mann Case. Will the Deerfield Academy investigation and cases like it garner a journalist or a news organization a Pulitzer Prize? Will it and cases like it lead to the formation of of SNAPS ("survivors network of those abused by private schools"). Will such cases lead to a campaign to discredit and bankrupt private schools? Will such cases produce a new generation of multimillionaire tort lawyers? Will such cases lead to attacks on the religious organizations with which schools such as Horace Mann are affiliated? Will they lead to calls for faculty members who are sworn to celibacy? Compare:

Thursday, March 25, 2010

News Flash: The BBC and the New York Times Discover Sexual Sinners in the Roman Catholic Church!

Child sexual abuse is a horrible, grievous crime. Homosexual child abuse by priests is a terrible wrong.

But this non-Catholic (Lutheran) & heterosexual has a few questions:

...

6. It is often suggested that clerical celibacy is the root of the problem among the Catholic clergy. SNAP seems to think that celibacy is the root of the problem. See Comment of David Clohessy, National Director, SNAP ("Sometimes, sexually troubled young Catholic men will turn to the priesthood, hoping and praying that if they promise to be celibate, God will give them the gift of celibacy, and help them overcome the troubling sexual urges they feel. Obviously, often that doesn't happen.") Cf. Clifford J. Levy, A Flock Grows Right at Home for a Priest in Ukraine, New York Times (March 23, 2010).

But question: If celibacy of the Catholic clergy were abolished, would the problem of child sexual abuse go away or diminish? Or would the phenomenon just migrate?

Was I mistaken in believing that the most common instances of child sexual abuse are those committed by parents on their children?

Perhaps the rule should be: sex by clergy: OK; having children: not OK? Is this the idea here?

Is child sexual abuse by married adults less common than child sexual abuse by unmarried adults?

Should celibacy by Tibetan monks also be done away with? Or should we embrace celibacy there on the ground that celibacy in Tibet is quaint & admirable -- and an effective form of birth control in a part of the world that very much needs effective birth control, perhaps even more effective than the PRC's one child policy?

&&& The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

Impartial Judge

Martha Neil, Judge admits sex with witness in chambers, but says it didn’t affect his decision-making (March 29, 2013):

"T]he judge admitted, in response to a claim that he had sex in chambers with a witness in a child-support case, that he indeed 'made the unfortunate decision to engage in a sexual relationship with [the witness] and also admits that on a few occasions, the relationship took place in his chambers.'...
...
"But [the trial judge denied" that he allowed his relationship with Mott 'to influence his judicial conduct or judgment" and says it "did not impact any of Judge McCree's decisions'...."
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

Social Intelligence

Social ant intelligence -- or the social whole -- sometimes is, or becomes, more intelligent than its parts:

Robot Ants Could Make Us More Efficient

Posted by Mollie Bloudoff-Indelicato in Weird & Wild on March 29, 2013

With their tiny wires and circuits, robotic ants won’t be taking over the world anytime soon.

But what these artificial insects lack in processing power, they make up for in efficiency: Robotic ants can automatically choose the shortest route from their food sources back to their nests, just like real ants, a new study says. This gives valuable insight into how people should plan transportation and communication systems.

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Wild Tapestry in Cape Onion, Newfoundland

This is evidence of ... ? &&& The dynamic evidence page

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Our Future: A Sky Dark with Drones?

Mathhew Wald, Domestic Drones on Patrol, NYTimes (March 17, 2013). &&& The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

John Sexton and NYU

Although I personally very much dislike the "superstar" system that President Sexton apparently has run at NYU - faculty superstars, so-called, get paid a lot more than "ordinary" faculty members - I find it hard to sympathize with the NYU arts & science faculty's vote of no confidence in him. Sexton has done an awful lot to make NYU one of the world's leading universities.

Your opinion?
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Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

A Proposal to Imitate the Medical Model of Education

The dean of Boston College Law School has proposed that law schools imitate at least part of the medical "model" of education. See Vincent D. Rougeau, Law schools should consider med-school model—a dean’s view  Legal Rebels (blog) (March 13, 2013).

This is not a new idea. But it is an interesting one. But ... but ... the idea will only work if law teachers adopt a more "scientific" attitude toward "theory" -- which means in part that they must come to think of "legal theory" as consisting in important part of hypotheses that may be shown  to be true or false by "empirical observation," by observation, that is, of how legal theories play out in the real world. (This sort of empirical "verification" is not an exact analogue to empirical testing of scientific hypotheses, but it moves in that direction.) The Legal Realists were onto something.
&&& The dynamic evidence page

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Federal Judge Rules Surveillance Provisions Unconstitutional

Federal Judge Rules Surveillance Provisions Unconstitutional, NYTimes (Reuters Story, March 15, 2013):

A federal judge has ruled unconstitutional national security provisions that permit federal investigators to access customer information from some companies without court approval.

The provisions "suffer from significant constitutional infirmities," and violate the First Amendment and separation of powers, Judge Susan Illston of the District Court for the Northern District of California wrote in an order on Thursday.

The judge's decision stems from a "National Security Letter" that the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued to an unnamed telecommunications company, according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

[etc.]

&&& The dynamic evidence page

Evidence marshaling software MarshalPlan

Some Readings on Theories of Evidence and Inference

This old list of useful readings needs to be updated and supplemented:

 

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  Cardozo Law School

[2005] Seminar: Theories of Evidence
Professor Peter Tillers

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Literature & Links about Evidence and Inference

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

James Franklin, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND PROBABILITY BEFORE PASCAL (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)

Lorraine Daston, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Princeton, 1988)

William L. Twining, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)
George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L. J. 575 (1997)
Peter Murhpy, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACTS: A BOOK OF SOURCES (Oxford, 2003)

INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Mirjan R. Damaška, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (Yale U. Press, 1997)

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

James D. McCawley, EVERYTHING THAT LINGUISTS HAVE ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT LOGIC* *but were ashamed to ask (2nd ed., 1993)

INFERENCE, IF-THEN LOGIC & THE LOGIC OF UNCERTAINTY

J.S. Covington, Jr., THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND PROOF (1993)
Brian Skyrms, CHOICE & CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC (4th ed., 2000)
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. & Choh Man Teng, UNCERTAIN INFERENCE (2001)
Richard Lowry, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC AND ARITHMETIC OF PROBABILITY (Oxford, 1989)

INFERENCE, INTUITION & COMMON SENSE

Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (assessment of evidence involves more than "linear reasoning")
Judge Jack B. Weinstein in United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (lengthy and interesting opinion includes discussion of role of judicial judgment and discretion in assessment of evidence) (caveat emptor: P. Tillers served as a court-appointed expert witness in this case)
Ronald J.Allen, Common Sense, Rationality, and the Legal Process, in Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., The Dynamics of Judicial Proof: Computation, Logic, and Common Sense (Physica- & Springer-Verlag, 2002)
Marilyn MacCrimmon, What Is "Common" about Common Sense? Cautionary Tales for Travelers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries, in Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., The Dynamics of Judicial Proof: Computation, Logic, and Common Sense (Physica- & Springer-Verlag, 2002)
The Cycorp Project (formalized common sense becomes profitable -- and practicable?)
Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 Hastings L.J. 1039 (1998) (emphasis on holism)
Michael S. Pardo, Comment: Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward Evidentiary Holism, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 399 (2000)

INFERENCE, LANGUAGE & FUZZY THINKING

VAGUENESS IN LANGUAGE & LEGAL LANGUAGE (conceptual vagueness)

Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale, 1st ed., 1969, 2nd ed., 1977)Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1962)

FUZZY & ROUGH SETS

Susan Haack, DEVIANT LOGIC, FUZZY LOGIC: BEYOND THE FORMALISM (1974 & 1996)

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, MODERN BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY & COGNATE PERSPECTIVES ON REAL-WORLD INFERENCE

Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Cambridge U. Press, 2002)

Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (2000)

INFERENCE & PERCEPTION

Alva Noë & Evan Thompson, VISION AND MIND: SELECTED READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION (MIT Press, 2002)

Irvin Rock, THE LOGIC OF PERCEPTION (MIT Press, 1983)VISUAL PERCEPTION: http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/~edelman/Course/perception/perception.html
Richard L. Gregory, Knowledge in Perception and Illusion
Tillers, Blog, Monday, June 02, 2003 Reason and Intuition in the Assessment of Evidence in Litigation
Hermann von Helmholtz, 1866/1962 Treatise on Physiological Optics volume 2, translated by J P L Southall (New York: Dover) pp 264--301 [originally published as Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (1866, Leipzig: Voss)]
Claire F. Michaels and Claudio Carello, DIRECT PERCEPTION (1981)
Patrick McDonald on Helmholtz

PROBABILITY THEORY & INFERENCE

Alan Hájek, Interpretations of Probability, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
THOMAS BAYES' ESSAY!
Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Trial Process, 84 Harvard Law Review 1329 (1971)
Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Michigan Law Review 1021 (1977)
Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 Boston University Law Review (1986 )
Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell Law Review 43 (1996)
Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE (Wiley, 1995)
Peter Tillers & Eric Green, eds., PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE; THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (1988)

STATISTICAL INFERENCE

Richard Lowry, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC AND ARITHMETIC OF PROBABILITY (Oxford, 1989) (focus on probability in statistics)
Koehler on Background Statistics in the Courtroom
Charles O. Shonubi's Saga
State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 852; 690 P. 2d 1186 (Wash. App. 1984) (testimony that 43 percent of child molestations were committed by "father-figures," in a case where defendant was a father-figure, was "extremely prejudicial and should not have been admitted")
State v. Steward, 34 Wash. App. 221, 223-4; 660 P. 2d 278, 280 (1983) (testimony that the perpetrator in 8 out of 16 child abuse cases in which serious injuries "were inflicted by either live in or babysitting boy friends," in a case where defendant was a babysitting boyfriend, was "certainly highly prejudicial").
Daniel Shaviro, Statistical Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 Harvard Law Review 530 (1989)

BACONIAN INFERENCE

John Maynard Keynes, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (Macmillan and Co., 1921)
L.J. Cohen, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977)

INFERENCE & DISCOVERY

KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
Karl Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (Basic Books, 1962)
Arthur Koestler, THE ACT OF CREATION (Reissue edition, 1990)
Charles S. Peirce: books & online extracts
Umberto Eco & Thomas Sebeok, eds., THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE (Indiana U. Press, 1983, 1988)
John Josephson & Susan Josephson, ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE: COMPUTATION, PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY (Cambridge U. Press, 1994) (download the elegant discussion of abduction in Chapter 1 of this book by clicking on this link)
Lorenzo Magnani, ABDUCTION, REASON, AND SCIENCE: PROCESSES OF DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION (2001)
D. Binder & P. Bergman, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984)
P. Tillers & D. Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, 24 University of California at Davis Law Revview 931 (1991)

COMPLEX (multistage) INFERENCE

P. Tillers, Webs of Things in the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, (review essay), 87 Michigan Law Review 1225 (1989)
D. Schum, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (Wylie, 1994)
Joseph Kadane & David Schum, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI EVIDENCE (Wiley, 1996)
Terence Anderson & William Twining, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE (Little, Brown & Co., 1991 or 2d ed., Northwestern U. Press, 1998)
A MODERN WIGMOREAN CHART
INTRODUCTION TO GRAPHS

which are very important for an understanding of some important theories of evidence and inference

INFERENCE & ARGUMENTATION THEORY

Chaïm Perelman, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (trans., John Wilkinson, University of Notre Dame Press, December 1969)
Stephen Toulmin, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958; 1st paperback ed., 1964)
John L. Pollock, COGNITIVE CARPENTRY (1995)
DOUGLAS WALTON, LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND EVIDENCE (2002)
Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum & Chad S. Carr, eds., VISUALIZING ARGUMENTATION: SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR COLLABORATIVE AND EDUCATIONAL SENSE-MAKING (2003)
Reason!Able software (trial version), available at http://www.goreason.com/

VALUES & INFERENCE

Robert P. Burns, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999)
David T. Wasserman, The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability, 13 Cardozo Law Review 935 (1991) (base rates are immoral because they offend a defendant's right to be treated as an individual)
Alvin I. Goldman, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999)

INFERENCE, PREFERENCE & CHOICE

Richard Jeffrey, THE LOGIC OF DECISION (University of Chicago Press; 1966; 2nd ed., 1983)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stanford Law Review 1477 (1999) & draft version, Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 66

INFERENCE IN AND ABOUT SPACE & TIME

Peter Øhrstrøm & Per F. V. Hasle, TEMPORAL LOGIC: FROM ANCIENT IDEAS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Kluwer, 1995)
A link to Temporal Logic
Dov M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger & J. A. Robinson, eds., EPISTEMIC AND TEMPORAL REASONING (Clarendon-Oxford, 1995) (Vol. 4 of HANDBOOK OF LOGIC IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LOGIC PROGRAMMING)

INFERENCE AND CAUSALITY

Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, 1984)
Judea Pearl, CAUSALITY (Cambridge University Press, 2000)
Glenn Shafer, THE ART OF CAUSAL CONJECTURE (MIT Press, 1996)

INFERENCE IN TIME: DYNAMIC INFERENCE

Jim Blythe, Decision-theoretic Planning (Feb. 11, 1999)
John L. Pollock, Evaluative Cognition
David Schum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 Boston University Law Review 825 (1986)
Marilyn MacCrimmon & Peter Tillers, eds., The Dynamics of Judicial Proof: Computation, Logic, and Common Sense(Physica- & Springer-Verlag, 2002)
Peter Tillers, The Explosive Dynamic Complexity of Evidentiary Processes
Peter Tillers, The Fabrication of Facts in Investigation and Ajudication

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On Probability and Uncertainty in Law

Konstanz 2003 International Summer School Lecture Notes

Readings (Extracts) from Charles Saunders Peirce:Of Inference, Deduction, Induction,
and Abduction (Retroduction)

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Some of the above material rearranged and mixed with some additional material:

Terence Anderson & William Twining, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE (Little, Brown & Co., 1991 or 2d ed., Northwestern U. Press, 1998)

D. Binder & P. Bergman, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984)

Robert Burns, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999)

Robert P. Burns, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999)

L.J. Cohen, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977)

J.S. Covington, Jr., THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND PROOF (1993)

Mirjan R. Damaška, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (Yale, 1997)

Lorraine Daston, CLASSICAL PROBABILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Princeton, 1988)

Keith Devlin, LOGIC AND INFORMATION (1991 & various reprints)

Umberto Eco & Thomas Sebeok, eds., THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE, (Indiana U. Press, 1983, 1988)

James Franklin, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND PROBABILITY BEFORE PASCAL (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)

Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1st ed., 1969; or 2nd ed., 1977)

Dov M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger & J. A. Robinson, eds., EPISTEMIC AND TEMPORAL REASONING (Clarendon-Oxford, 1995) (Vol. 4 of HANDBOOK OF LOGIC IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LOGIC PROGRAMMING)

Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Cambridge U. Press, 2002)

Alvin I. Goldman, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (Harvard, 1986)

Alvin I. Goldman, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999)

Susan Haack, DEVIANT LOGIC, FUZZY LOGIC: Beyond the Formalism (1974 & 1996)

Susan Haack, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY (Blackwell, 1993)

Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod & Nancy Pennington, INSIDE THE JURY (1983)

Hermann von Helmholtz, 1866/1962 TREATISE ON PHYSIOLOGICAL OPTICS volume 2 (1866/1962, trans., by J P L Southall; New York: Dover) (see esp. pp. 264-301; originally published as HANDBUCH DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN OPTIK (1866, Leipzig: Voss)]

Richard Jeffrey, THE LOGIC OF DECISION (University of Chicago Press; 1966 & 2nd ed., 1983)

John Josephson & Susan Josephson, ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE: COMPUTATION, PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY (Cambridge U. Press, 1994) (download the elegant discussion of abduction in Chapter 1 of this book by clicking on this link)

Joseph Kadane & David Schum, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI EVIDENCE (1996)

Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Cambridge U. Press, 2000)

John Maynard Keynes, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (Macmillan and Co., 1921)

Paul A. Kirschner, Simon J. Buckingham Shum & Chad S. Carr, eds., VISUALIZING ARGUMENTATION: SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR COLLABORATIVE AND EDUCATIONAL SENSE-MAKING (2003)

Arthur Koestler, THE ACT OF CREATION (Reissue edition, 1990)

Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. & Choh Man Teng, UNCERTAIN INFERENCE (2001)

Edward Levi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (Chicago, 1962)

Richard Lowry, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC AND ARITHMETIC OF PROBABILITY (Oxford, 1989)

Lorenzo Magnani, ABDUCTION, REASON, AND SCIENCE: PROCESSES OF DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION (2001)

James D. McCawley, EVERYTHING THAT LINGUISTS HAVE ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT LOGIC* *but were ashamed to ask (2nd ed., 1993)

Peter Murphy, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACTS: A BOOK OF SOURCES (Oxford, 2003)

Alva Noë & Evan Thompson, VISION AND MIND: SELECTED READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION (MIT Press, 2002)

Peter Øhrstrøm & Per F. V. Hasle, TEMPORAL LOGIC: FROM ANCIENT IDEAS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995)

Andrew Palmer, PROOF AND THE PREPARATION OF TRIALS (Thomson, 2003)

Judea Pearl, CAUSALITY (Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Chaïm Perelman, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (trans., John Wilkinson, University of Notre Dame Press, December 1969)

John L. Pollock, COGNITIVE CARPENTRY (1995)

John L. Pollock, NOMIC PROBABILITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTION (Oxford, 1990)

John L. Pollock & Joseph Cruz, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE (Rowman & Littlefield, 2d ed., 2002)

Karl R. Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (Basic Books, 1962)

Karl R. Popper , THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (any edition, including Routledge, 5th ed., March 29, 2002)

Karl R. Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (Basic Books, 1962)

Henry Prakken, Chris Reed & Douglas Walton, Argumentation Schemes and Generalisation in Reasoning about Evidence" [url needed]

Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE (Wiley, 1995)

Irvin Rock, THE LOGIC OF PERCEPTION (MIT Press, 1983)

David Schum, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST (2 vols., University Press of America, 1987)

David Schum, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (Wylie, 1994)

D. Schum & P. Tillers, Marshalling Evidence in Adversary Litigation, 13 Cardozo Law Review 657 (1991)

Glenn Shafer, THE ART OF CAUSAL CONJECTURE (MIT Press, 1996)

Brian Skyrms, CHOICE & CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC (4th ed., 2000)

Peter Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 Boston University Law Review 883 (1986)

Peter Tillers & Eric Green, eds., PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (1988)

Peter Tillers & David Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial Proof: Beyond Wigmore, 9 Cardozo Law Review 907 (1988)

Peter Tillers & David Schum, A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, 24 University of California at Davis Law Review 931 (1991)

Stephen Toulmin, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958; 1st paperback ed., 1964)

William Twining, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990)

William Twining & Iain Hampsher-Monk, eds., EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE IN HISTORY AND LAW (Northwestern U. Press, 2003)

Douglas N. Walton, LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND EVIDENCE (2002)

David T. Wasserman, The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability, 13 Cardozo Law Review 935 (1991)

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