Saturday, January 13, 2007

The Lugubrious Results of One Detainee's Effort to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

From Memorandum by Legal Advisor to Combatant Status Review Tribunal (December 16, 2004):
d. The detainee requested the production of nine witnesses. These requests are itemized, although somewhat inaccurately, in paragraph 4of enclosure (1) to the Tribunal Decision Report. Each witness is described below.

1. Shahid Abassi -The detainee proffered that this witness would testify that the detainee was fleeing the war in Afghanistan and was not armed. The detainee could not provide locating information for this witness other than to state that the "Rashid Trust charity organization" might know his whereabouts. The Tribunal President determined that the wimess was not reasonably available due to the limited locating information supplied by the detainee. In my opinion, this decision was not an abuse of discretion given the paucity of irfformation provided by the detainee.

2. Tahir Ashraf- The detainee proffered that this witness would testify that the detainee spent the preponderance of his time in Afghanistan building a school and teaching at another school. The detainee stated that the witness lived in the United Kingdom and could be located through the detainee’s father. The Tribunal President determined that the winess was relevant and requested the U.S. State Department to initiate contact with the witness. Contact was established but the wimess did not reply to inquiries regarding whether they were willing to testify at the tribunal. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal President determined that the wimess was not reasonably available. In my opinion, this decision was not an abuse of discretion by the President.

3. [name deleted]-The witness was the detainee’s wife. The detainee proffered that this witness would testify that the detainee did not support terrorist organizations or military activities. The detainee stated that the witness lived in the United Kingdom and could be located tttrough the detainee’s father. The Tribunal President determined that the witness was relevant and requested the U.S. State Department to initiate contact with the witness. Contact was established but the witness did not reply to inquiries regarding whether she was willing to testify .... Under the circumstances, the Tribunal President determined that the witness was not reasonably available. In my opinion, this decision was not an abuse of discretion by the President.

4. Abdul Walid- The detainee proffered that this witness would testify that the detainee did not support terrorist organizations or military activities. The detainee stated that the witness lived in the United Kingdom and could be located through the detainee’s father. The Tribunal President determined that the witness was relevant and requested the U.S. State Department to initiate contact with the witness. Contact was established but the witness did not reply to inquiries regarding whether he was willing to testify at the tribunal. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal President determined that the witness was not reasonably available. In my opinion, this decision was not an abuse of discrefian by the President.

5. A Sudanese in charge ofthe [deleted] camp -It appears that the detainee proffered that this witness would testify that the [deleted] camp had no ties to al Qaida or the Taliban and also that the detainee did not attend the camp (in which case the location of the camp seems to be relevant). In any event, the witness was identified by the Tribunal as detainee ISN [deleted]. When approached by the Personal Representative, the witness refused to testify at the tribunal but provided an oral statement that was reduced to writing by atranslator. This statement was included in the evidence as exhibit D-g.I Althungh the Tribunal President did not render a formal decision on the relevance and reasonable availability of this witness, it is apparent that he was neither.

6. Patrick Hamilton- The detainee proffered that this witness was an ICRC employee who would testify that the detainee had previously been issued a POW identity card at a U.S. detention facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Tribunal President initially determined that the witness was relevant, but after consultation with the Assistant Legal Advisor, she changed her determination.~She based her decision on her conclusion that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals do not have the discretion to determine that a detainee should be classified as aprisoner of war -only whether the detainee satisfies the definition of "enemy combatant" as provided in references (a) and (b). In my opinion, this decision was correct it bears noting that in a written statement prepared by the detainee especially for the CSRT, the detainee specifically says that he does not claim POW status (see exhibit D-e).

7. [name deleted]- The detainee stated that this witness was amember of the U.S. armed forces and could testify that the detainee had been classified as aprisoner of war when detained in Kandahar. For the reasons indicated in paragraph l(d)(6) above, witness was deemed not relevant.

8. [name deleted] detainee proffered that the witness accompanied the detainee in Afghanistan and could testify that the Government atlegafions were false. For the reasons discussed in paragraph 3of enclosure (2) of the Tribunal Decision Report the Tribunal President determined that the witness was not reasonably available. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal President had no option other than to hold that the witness was not reasonably available.

9. Abu Ukashah- The detainee proffered that the witness only testify that he was with the detainee in Afghanistan and the Government allegations were false. The detainee stated that the Karkhana police station in Peshawar, Pakistan, would have locating information for this witness. The Tribunal President initially determined that the witness was relevant and reasonably available (see enclosure 5of the Tribunal Decision Report). Paragraph 4 of enclosure (1) of the Tribunal Decision Report, which documents the Tribunal’s ruling on witness requesls, does not mention the request for Abu Ukashah at all. I have confirmed with CSRT personnel in Guuntunamo Bay, however, that Abu Ukashah was included among the names provided to the U.S. State Department with the request for assistance in locating witnesses (see enclosure (2)). State Department was unsuccessfnl in making contact with this witness. Although the Tribunal Decision Report does not address a final decision on this witness, it appears that he was not reasonably available.

5 comments:

Anonymous said...

An article in foreign press (reporting on the article 'New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial' of The Washington Post) uses an image from defencelink.mil

http://www.lenta.ru/news/2007/01/15/tribunal/

- with the tribunal members shown faceless

Anonymous said...

With the knowledge of infamous 'troikas', the special tribunals of the Stalinist regime (operating in 1937 and onward) in mind, I will forever be suspicious of the merits of 'specialized' courts.

Now I just learned that the European Union has established a specialized court (a tribunal) "to adjudicate in disputes between the European Union and its civil service" - the
European Union Civil Service Tribunal.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Civil_Service_Tribunal

While reasons for the existence of juvenile courts appear quite convincing, it is hard to see how grievances of EU employees toward their employer are so specific that need a special tribunal, (controlled by the very same employer?). EU whistleblowers may have hard time.

Cat said...

I was looking up information on Evidence and came across your site and your blog. I am a Legal Studies student at UCF and I am taking Evidence this semester. I figured I'd say 'hello'.

Unknown said...

"UCF" is "University of Central Florida"?

Which text or what materials do you use in your Evidence course?

Unknown said...

pp,

Special-purpose administrative tribunals do not have a happy history in the U.S. But much of that history has been forgotten. Administrative agencies that adjudicated claims frequently became captives of the entities they supposedly regulated. In addition, early promises that administrative adjudiucation would be speedier than trials in ordinary courts were often not fulfilled. For example, in some administrative adjudicative proceedings evidence was usually submitted only in written form. But often administrative hearings conducted exclusively on the basis of paper records became almost interminable. Imagine, for example, using written questions to cross-examine a witness or party, and then seeing the opposing party conduct a redirect examination in the same fashion, with written questions. This sort of procedure was sometimes used in some administrative adjudication.

There is considerable controversy about whether "special courts" within the judicial system -- e.g., courts merchant, or commercial courts, of one kind another -- worked well or did not work well. As with other questions of this sort, the answer one gives depends much depends substantially on the crteria of "success" and "failure" one uses. A prominent U.S. defender of courts merchant, or commercial courts, is Dan Coquillette of Boston College Law School, who is also a practically perpetual "visiting professor" at Harvard Law School. See http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/fac-staff/deans-faculty/coquilletted/

Other people have advocated various kinds of "science courts" that would adjudicate certain kinds of disputes in which scientific evidence often plays a large part. But the attempts to establish science courts generally haven't made much headway. One fear, perhaps well-founded, is that the triers of fact in such science courts would import their mores, their norms, their values, as well as their technical expertise into their adjudicative work. And engineers etc. are not necessarily or even probably good interpreters of public value systems or, alternatively, appropriate lawmakers.

But every solution exacts a price. If highly technical and scientific questions are adjudicated by lay jurors with little or no scientific training, one would expect that such fact finders would make more technical mistakes than would triers of fact who having the relevant scientifi expertise [or than triers of fact having just some familiarity with math and scientific procedure].

Peter T