Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Schedule of Events at Workshop on AI & Evidential Inference, June 10, 2011


One-Day Workshop on AI & Evidential Inference
(in memory of Craig Callen)
in Conjunction with
ICAIL 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 10, 2011


 


Schedule of Workshop Talks & Events, Friday, June 10, 2011

8:50 – 9:00
Giovanni Sartor & Peter Tillers
Welcome, greetings
9:00 – 9:30
James Franklin
How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review
9:30 – 10:00
D. Michael Risinger
Against Symbolization—Some reflections on the limits of formal systems in the description of inferential reasoning and legal argumentation
10:00 – 10:30
Federico Picinali
Structuring inferential reasoning in criminal cases. An analogical approach
10:30 – 11:00
Coffee
Coffee
11:00 – 11:30
Michael Pardo
Relevance, Sufficiency, and Defeasible Inferences: Comments on Modeling Legal Proof
11:30 – 12:00
David Hamer
A probabilistic model of the relationship between the quantity (weight) of evidence, and its strength
12:00 – 12:30
Joseph Laronge
Evaluating Universal Sufficiency of a Single Logical Form for Inference in Court
12:30 – 1:00
Rainhard Bengez
On the Computable Structure of the Logocratic Method and Analyses Specific to Evidence Law
1:00 – 2:00
Lunch
Lunch
2:00 – 2:30
Bruce Hay
Roughly Two Conceptions of the Trial
2:20 – 3:00
Ronald J. Allen
Taming Complexity: Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the Legal System
3:00 – 3:30
Scott Brewer
Representing Legal Arguments: The Centrality of Abduction
3:30 – 4:00
Coffee
Coffee
4:00 – 4:30
Douglas Walton & Floris Bex
Combining Evidential and Legal Reasoning with Burdens and Standards of Proof
4:30 – 5:00
Bart Verheij
Can the argumentative, narrative and statistical perspectives on legal evidence and proof be integrated?
5:00 – 5:30
Henry Prakken
Can non-probabilistic models of legal evidential inference learn from probability theory?
5:30 – 6:00
Giovanni Sartor & Giuseppe Contissa
Evidence arguments in air traffic safety. A model for the law?
6:00 – 6:30
Boaz Sangero
Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for Key Evidence

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